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November 16, 1977

It is hard to overstate the impact of Bob Yegge on
The University of Denver, The City and County of Denver, and
The State of Colorado.
Bob Yegge has worked long and hard, unselfishly and
unreservedly, to make his community a better - fairer - more
just place. His skills in leadership are superb.
All of Colorado owes him a great debt of gratitude.
Sincerely,

Ric ard D. Lamm

Governor

ROBERT YEGGE-AN UNUSUAL PERSONAGE
I do not propose here to dwell upon all the credits of Bob
Yegge which would appear in a curriculum vitae. The reader will
probably be fully informed on these matters anyway in the other
writings which will appear in these pages.
What has impressed me most about the Dean is the extraordinary rapport he has with the young people who have touched
his life in and out of the university setting. Each time I have been
in places where Bob and his students or other young people are,
I can actually feel the good vibrations that pass between them.
It is inspirational to hear the lively exchanges which are typical
of his sessions with his disciples.
Always predominant in these exchanges is a mutual respect
for each other's ideas and concerns and because of his affinity for
the aspirations, the concerns, and the problems of those who will
shape the future course of this society of ours, he has become a
dynamic protagonist of the programs which will meet the challenges raised by the generation of the leaders to come.
One last thought comes to me. I envy his ability to become
younger, more kinetic, more creative, more vital as he grows
chronologically older. That is a rare quality and I know it will
continue as he now makes his contribution to a better world in a
different setting.
Edward E. Pringle
Chief Justice, Colorado Supreme Court

A

TRIBUTE TO ROBERT YEGGE

Socrates once said, "Let him that would move the world, first
move himself." Robert Yegge is indeed a self-mover and by the
maximum utilization of his energy and talents has indeed contributed to a better world for all of us.
We had our first encounter when I was working my way
through the University of Denver College of Law, in broadcasting,
and Bob was a student leader in high school and producing and
directing a radio program for high school students. His writing
ability, his flair for the dramatic, and his fertile imagination convinced many of us that he had a bright future in the world of
entertainment and the arts. But even then, Bob had his heart in
the field of the law. Son of one of Denver's mostprominent trial
attorneys, Ronald Yegge, Bob displayed a universal interest in
almost all disciplines, but he knew in his heart he could not
escape his involvement with the legal profession.
Having kept in touch with Bob throughout his undergraduate and law school days, it came as no surprise when he joined
the faculty of the University of Denver College of Law as an
Adjunct Professor. Shortly thereafter, the University was faced
with the task of selecting a dean for the Law School. Those of us
who were serving on the selection committee asked the faculty for
recommendations of one of their members to serve as Acting Dean
while the search continued for the permanent occupier of that
position. I was not surprised when recommendations came in
from those whom I considered to be the wisest and most venerable
of the faculty members suggesting Bob Yegge. After a few months
service as interim Dean, several of the faculty contacted me to
suggest that we search no further; that Bob Yegge would be the
perfect person for the permanent position.
After great agonizing and soul searching, Bob agreed to accept the position and his spectacular performance in the twelve
years that he served has been nationally recognized by legal educators and the legal profession.
He has served at a crucial time in the history of legal education. With literally thousands of applicants for relatively few positions in the law schools of our nation, admission to the University
of Denver College of Law has become one of the most prized
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objectives of students throughout the country. Bob Yegge has
developed an outstanding faculty, has created more innovative
programs and clinical training than any other school in the
United States, and has developed a sense of pride in both student
body and alumni unequaled in the long history of the University
of Denver College of Law.
We who have been privileged to observe his stewardship and
have had the opportunity to work with him are grateful beyond
description.
Richard M. Schmidt, Jr.
Partner,Cohn & Marks, Washington, D.C.
Member, Board of Trustees, University of Denver

A TIME TO REMEMBER
YEARS

(1965-1977)

ROBERT B. YEGGE'S

-

12

AT THE UNIVERSITY OF DENVER

COLLEGE OF LAW
In the spring of 1965, a few days after my acceptance of a
teaching position at the University of Denver College of Law, two
of my classmates at Yale Law School left a copy of Dicta on my
desk accompanied by a note which read: "We knew you would
select a school of excellent repute. This is the law journal of your
new school." I browsed through the publication which was a joint
product of the Colorado Bar Association and the College of Law
and was disappointed to find that the students did not even have
their own publication. Distressed over not having made a thorough investigation of the school before accepting the position, I
must admit to having second thoughts about coming to Denver.
However, having already accepted the offer, I decided to join the
faculty, consoling myself and assuring my friends that I did not
have to stay at Denver for more than a year. Now, thirteen years
later, I am still here and have no desire to move. The College of
Law has three first-rate publications, the Denver Law Journal,
the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, and the
TransportationLaw Journal,and has started another-The Clinical Education Perspective (with the AALS). In addition, two
professional journals (AdministrativeLaw Journaland the Law
and Society Review) are now published here. And the person
primarily responsible for this transformation is the one to whom
this issue of the Journal is dedicated-Robert B. Yegge, a distinguished colleague and a close friend who assumed the position of
Dean of the College of Law the year I arrived here.
Bob Yegge assumed the leadership of the College of Law in
turbulent times. It takes little reflection to recall the divisive
pains of a society groping for its identity in the late sixties. These
societal challenges reinforced the new dean's basic thesis about
legal education: lawyers must possess the understanding and the
skills necessary to guide human behavior in an environment
where change is pervasive and to shape a society in which inequities and coercion are minimized and human dignity is ensured.
As dean, Bob Yegge initiated innovative and far-reaching
measures to realize his vision of legal education at the University
171
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of Denver College of Law. As a result the past decade has witnessed both a reevaluation of legal education at the College of
Law and a significant outreach by the College into the court
system, the legislature, and the community. The serious student
of the law is now exposed not only to the rigors of the traditional
legal education-the teaching of doctrines, skills, and policy in
the classroom setting designed to instill lawyerly thinking-but
also to the stark realities of the human condition in the prisons,
hospitals, drug treatment centers, court chambers, and the corridors of the state house. Thus, practical first hand exposure to
contemporary problems of law and legal policy supplements the
classroom and the library. If one were forced to choose one principal legacy of Bob Yegge's helmsmanship, it would necessarily be
the nationally recognized, pacesetting clinical approach to legal
education which has become a unique "Denver Law School approach" during his brief tenure. The students have been and will
continue to be the principal beneficiaries of Dean Yegge's creative
response to complex societal needs.
His student years at Princeton and Denver, further enriched
by private practice, part-time teaching, scholarly writing, and a
close community involvement, had prepared Bob Yegge well for
his role as dean of a college of law in a metropolitan setting. Early
in his deanship in 1966, he made a tripartite commitment to the
faculty of the College of Law-that the College of Law must be a
place for teaching the accumulated traditions of the law and
awakening the imagination of future practitioners to tomorrow's
problems; that the College of Law must be a research center in
the entire spectrum of law and the social sciences to support
research necessary to meet the challenges facing the legal profession in the stormy years ahead; and, that the College of Law must
be an active member of the community, a leader in community
involvement and in community action.
Even a slight acquaintance with the College of Law in 197778 will show Dean Yegge's success in accomplishing these goals.
During the past decade, a remarkable change has occurred in the
teaching environment at the College of Law. The number of law
students has doubled. The College has been a national leader in
promoting equal opportunities for women and minority groups in
entering the bar. The full-time faculty has grown from a meager
eleven to more than thirty. As the statistics have changed, so has
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the curriculum. Expanded opportunities for specialization, clinical education, interdisciplinary joint degrees, and graduate legal
education are now commonly available at the Law Center. Reputable graduate programs provide opportunities for study in Master of Laws in Taxation, Master of Science in Law and Society,
and Master of Science in Judicial Administration. Joint Degree
programs are offered in conjunction with the College of Business,
the Graduate School of International Studies, the Graduate
School of Librarianship, the Graduate School of Social Work, and
many departments in the College of Arts and Sciences as well as
with the Colorado School of Mines. The Natural Resources Program is of the premier class; the Program in Transportation Law
is unique among American law schools and arose as part of a
relationship between Dean Yegge and the Motor Carrier Lawyers
Association. The International Legal Studies Program, actively
supported by the Dean, now offers more than a dozen courses and
seminars and continues to make its impact felt far beyond our
national borders. First established by Dean Yegge, the Administration of Justice Program utilizes interdisciplinary faculty and
research techniques in dealing with the multiple aspects of the
effective delivery of legal services to our young, elderly, poor,
and culturally disadvantaged.
The exceptional amount of independent research and writing
conducted at the Law Center in the last few years has allowed the
faculty and students to make significant contributions to the advancement of twentieth century legal thought. Major studies and
pilot projects have been completed in many fields, including international law, environmental law, commercial law including
corporate law and securities, criminal law and procedure, litigation, administrative and constitutional law, poverty law, family
law, clinical education, counselling and negotiations, intellectual
property law, sports law, legal curriculum, legal profession, and
in the use of paralegal personnel. Clearly, Dean Yegge's commitment to the establishment of quality in institutional research has
been significantly realized.
Bob Yegge's sensitivity to the needs of the community and
the law school's role in meeting those needs has had a dynamic
impact in Colorado, the Rocky Mountain Region, and national
thinking about American legal education. While the Clinical Programs have sharply increased the Law Center's visibility in the
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community, Dean Yegge has also played a pivotal role in assisting
the legal profession to meet the new challenges posed by a technocracy where complacency would surely foreshadow defeat. Thus,
the Program for Advanced Professional Development which he
fashioned and nurtured is one of the most active in the nation and
is built on the assumption that lawyers need to be learners all
their lives if the profession is to adequately meet its societal obligations. The community demands and deserves continuing professional competence, and the College of Law is committed to
assume a role of leadership in providing proper educational opportunities toward this end.
As specialists and experts in different fields of law and social
sciences, members of the faculty have made significant contributions as teachers and scholars. The impact of their written and
spoken words has been felt not only in the State of Colorado and
the United States, but in the international community as well.
The credit for creating first the environment which made it possible to attract these people at the University of Denver and
secondly the intellectual fervor at the College of Law which has
kept them here goes to Bob Yegge.
"Contributing" has always been an adjective of common
usage when describing Bob Yegge. He clearly exemplifies the professional with the keen sense of public responsibility and the
ethical instincts so vital to a profession which has been subjected
to a frontal assault on its integrity in the wake of scandals at the
highest levels of government. His professional activities at the
national, regional, and local levels are too extensive to recount
fully here. Suffice it to say that his counsel and advice have been
sought and freely given to national bar organizations, governmental agencies, the judiciary, professional and research organizations and publications, institutes of higher education, public interest and art and culture forums, foundations, and charitable
organizations. Society, in turn, has bestowed a plethora of honors
and awards upon Dean Yegge for his exemplary contributions in
many diverse areas of civic performance.
His scholarship is on a level equal to that of his civic performance. He has published numerous works in a wide variety of areas
including commercial law, jurisprudence, criminal law and procedure, legal education, the legal profession, legal services, parapro-
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fessionals, torts, civil procedure, civil rights, law and technology,
consumer law, and judicial administration. His numerous books,
monographs, and contributions to professional journals reflect his
broad intellectual capacity.
While one could easily document the significant and extensive impact of Robert Yegge's deanship upon legal education in
Denver and elsewhere, and others will, this personal note needs
to be added, lest we would miss the true value of his presence at
the College of Law.
In an age where responsibility is often lost in bureaucratic
mazes and integrity is compromised by the politics of the moment, Robert Yegge stands out, personifying not only responsibility and integrity, but also courage, creativity, and imagination.
He is leaving the College of Law with the same dynamic energy
with which he arrived. His friends wish him well in his new ventures.
Ved P. Nanda
Professor of Law and Director of
International Legal Studies
Program, University of Denver
College of Law.
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INFORMAL RULEMAKING: IN QUEST OF NUCLEAR

LICENSING REFORM
By

JAMES WILLIAM BAIN*

In recent years, efforts to reform the nuclear licensing process
have generally been unsuccessful. The last significant effort was
made by the Atomic Energy Commission in August of 1972 when
the restructured rules of practice were adopted.' These rules, designed to make licensing more efficient, did not accomplish their
purpose. Delays have continued and have even increased so that
today nuclear power plants have become a less attractive alternative for producing energy-not because of public health and
safety considerations and not because of environmental impacts
but because of the ever-increasing time needed to license and
construct a nuclear plant.' Legislation providing comprehensive,
fundamental reforms in nuclear licensing is desirable; however,
it may not happen soon.' If it does not, what can the industry
* The author is an attorney for the Tennessee Valley Authority Division of Law; J.D.,
1976, University of Florida; B.A., 1972, University of Connecticut; Member, Florida Bar,
American Bar Association. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect those of TVA.
37 Fed. Reg. 15,127 (1972).
2 In the period of 1963 and 1964 when the first large nuclear plants were ordered, the
average time between the filing of a construction permit application and the granting of
the permit was 9 months. In 1970, this application time increased to 20 months and has
since risen to 41 months in 1977 and is continuing to rise. This delay has continued to
increase even though the early plants represented innovative technology, whereas the
technology of the current plants has remained stable for years. This delay is a direct result
of the growing regulatory load. The Atomic Industrial Forum's licensing review group
recently concluded that the current licensing process itself adds fours or five years to the
overall project time. For example, in 1972, nuclear plants were subject to 32 Regulatory
Guides (a report promulgated by the NRC Regulatory Staff which, although not legally
binding as a regulation, outlines acceptable methods for implementing NRC's regulations); this number was doubled in 1973; and the number has continued to increase at an
astounding rate. Presently 250 Regulatory Guides and Branch Technical Positions are
either in existence or under development. As a consequence, the period now required to
construct a large nuclear power plant can extend over 12 years.
' The long-awaited legislative nuclear licensing reform proposal by President Carter,
H.R. 11704 and S. 2775, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), has not yet emerged from either the
House (Science and Technology, Interior and Insular Affairs, and Interstate and Foreign
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itself do to initiate reforms? Industry should consider engaging in
some self-help. Rulemaking, largely neglected as a reform technique, may provide an opportunity for this self-help. In order to
effectively utilize rulemaking, new trends in the law must be
recognized, understood, and applied.
Courts required administrative agencies, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),4 to adopt adjudicatory procedures in informal rulemaking proceedings. The requirements of
due process5 and the applicable provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA)l provided no firm foundation for the impoCommerce) or Senate (Environment and Public Works) Committees which are considering it. Additionally, the House Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment indicated
that it will substantially revise the bill before it is reported to the full committee.
' The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5801 (Supp. V 1975), abolished
the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and divided its duties between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Energy Research and Development Administration
(ERDA). NRC received the licensing and related regulatory functions of the AEC. The
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1970 & Supp. V 1975),
outlines NRC's powers and duties. Hereafter, the AEC and the NRC may be jointly
referred to as the Commission.
See California Citizens Band Ass'n v. United States, 375 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1967);
Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 922, rehearing
denied, 377 U.S. 960 (1964). The Constitution does not mandate an across-the-board right
to oral argument in administrative proceedings. FCC v. WRJ, 337 U.S. 265 (1949). The
Supreme Court has held that the requirement of an opportunity for oral argument varies
from case to case in accordance with differing circumstances, as do other procedural
requirements; in some cases it is essential to due process, Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S.
373 (1908), while in other situations opportunity ;or submitting written comments is
sufficient, Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936). This distinction arises from the
difference between adjudication, in which a small number of persons are "exceptionally
affected, in each case upon individual grounds" and rulemaking in which policy-type rules
generally affecting a large number of persons are promulgated. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v.
State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1915). The Supreme Court recently cited
the Bi-Metallic distinction with approval and reemphasized that the due process clause
recognizes the distinction between "proceedings for the purpose of promulgating policytype rules or standards, on the one hand, and proceedings designed to adjudicate disputed
facts in particular cases on the other." United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S.
224, 244-45 (1973).
When rules of general applicability are involved, Bi-Metallic indicates that the Constitution imposes no procedural constraints upon the agency. Bi-Metallic, supra at 445.
But cf. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 503 (4th Cir. 1973) (where due
process did not require that administrator afford hearings prior to approving state air
quality plan). This conflict is epitomized by the important due process concept that the
practical needs of effective government must be balanced against the need to protect
individuals against unfair official action. See, e.g., Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389
(1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended, Pub. L.
No. 89-544, 80 Stat. 378 (1966) (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
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sition of these procedures, but were used as a judicial springboard
for them. Courts, starting with the express APA requirements and
the requirements of fundamental fairness, engaged in creative
lawmaking by basing their holdings on the necessities of adequate
judicial review. In addition to this putative reason for imposing
such procedures, there were other basic and often unstated reasons: constriction of administrative discretion and the necessity
of making factual determinations in informal rulemaking proceedings. These three factors, acting synergistically, led to an
expansive interpretation of the APA requirements for informal
rulemaking. Although the Supreme Court recently reversed a
decision imposing adjudicatory procedures in an informal rulemaking context,' the Court presented no resolution of the underlying problems which caused the Court to impose the procedures.
These problems must be understood if one is to comprehend
where rulemaking was, where it is, and where it is going.
Reform of the nuclear licensing process through informal
rulemaking provides the impetus for this article. It will outline
the law concerning rulemaking, how it was recently changed, and
the reasons why courts required administrative agencies to adopt
procedures in excess of traditional rulemaking requirements. Finally, the article will demonstrate how the nuclear power industry can utilize rulemaking to accomplish its purpose.
I.

BACKGROUND

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 s grants the NRC the authority to "make, promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of
this [Act]." Rulemaking has been the primary method chosen
by the NRC to interpret its obligations under the Atomic Energy
Act and the National Environmental Policy Act. 0 Once passed,
I Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
No. 76-419 (Sup. Ct. April 3, 1978), rev'g Natural Resources Defense Council v. NRC, 547
F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
Id. at § 2201(p) (1970).
0 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). This act requires all federal agencies
to evaluate environmental impacts by utilizing "a systematic, interdisciplinary approach"
of "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in the
seminal case of Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir.
1971), held that in order for the NRC to comply with NEPA, it must review both radiological environmental issues.
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rules and regulations adopted in informal rulemaking proceedings have the force of law." Both the APA'I and the NRC's regulations' 3 grant "interested persons" the right to petition for the
issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule. The courts of appeals
have exclusive jurisdiction to "enjoin, set aside, suspend (in
whole or in part), or to determine the validity of . . . all final
orders"' 4 "for the issuance or modification of rules and regulations"' 5 of the NRC.
The APA provides the format for administrative lawmaking
by the NRC under the Atomic Energy Act." Two alternative
types of procedures for the promulgation of rules are expressly
7
established by the APA. One, known as "formal" rulemaking,
8 and is only required to be utilized
closely resembles adjudication"
in a limited number of circumstances. 9 Formal rulemaking is
only required where the authorizing legislation requires the rules
See Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306, 309 (1964).
12

5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1976).

13 10 C.F.R. § 2.805(b) (1977).
" 28 U.S.C. § 2342(4) (Supp. V 1975).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2239 (1970). Jurisdiction may be obtained by any party aggrieved by
the order who files a petition in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (1970). Alternatively,
an aggrieved party may obtain jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970), which has
been amended to eliminate the requirement of a specified amount-in-controversy as a
prerequisite to the maintenance of any "action brought against the United States, any
agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity." Pub. L. No.
94-574, § 703, 90 Stat. 2721 (1976). The Supreme Court has interpreted the effect of this
modification as conferring authority on federal courts to review agency action regardless
of whether the APA may itself serve as a jurisdictional predicate. Califano v. Sanders, 430
U.S. 99 (1977).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2331 (1970). This section also authorizes the Commission to promulgate
regulations providing for parallel procedures designed to safeguard and prevent disclosure
of restricted data or defense information.
'7 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (1976) (hereinafter also referred to as "sections 556-557").
The APA requires essentially the same procedures for formal rulemaking as for
adjudication, as in both cases there is a hearing with a right of cross-examination before
an administrative judge. 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (1976). Some differences exist, however, including allowing settlements in adjudications, 5 U.S.C. § 554(c)(1) (1976); allowing all or
part of the evidence to be submitted in written form in rulemaking when a party will not
be prejudiced thereby, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1976); allowing the decision of the hearing
examiner to be omitted because rulemaking is not subject to 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1976); and
not applying the separation of functions requirement of 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1970) to rulemaking.
11 Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of GeneralApplicability: The Need
for ProceduralInnovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 1276, 1278
(1972). See generally Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. Cm.
L. REV. 739 (1976).
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to be made "on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing. "' 2" The second rulemaking provision, "informal" or "notice
and comment" rulemaking,2' requires no formal hearing and is
applicable to the great bulk of rulemaking authority bestowed on
Federal agencies.
Section 553 prescribes three obligations for the rulemaking
agency. First, public notice must be published in the Federal
Register stating the time, place, and nature of the proceedings,
"the legal authority under which the rule is proposed," and
"either the terms of substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved. '22 Second, interested
persons must be granted "an opportunity to participate in the
rulemaking through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation. 2' 3 Finally, the agency must "incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose.""
Because of the relative informality of section 553 procedures
and the extreme costliness in time, staff, and money of sections
The Supreme Court interpreted this hearing requirement in United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973). This case concerned the power of the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) to promulgate incentive per diem rates under the Interstate
Commerce Act,which provides that the rate prescription should be be made only "after
hearing." 49 U.S.C. § 1(14)(a) (1970). The ICC promulgated the rates after publishing a
notice and soliciting comments on proposed rule. The Court held that section 1(14)(a) was
not the equivalent of a requirement that the rule be made "on the record after opportunity
for an agency hearing" as the APA requires to make the hearing requirements of sections
556-557 applicable. Rather, the ICC's rulemaking proceeding was governed by section 553
of the APA, which authorizes an agency to restrict interested parties to the submission of
written evidence and argument without oral presentation and, accordingly, upheld the
ICC's rule. The Court reasoned that, despite the paucity of statutes where the words "on
the record" or their equivalent appear, courts are obligated to adhere to the congressional
language and must find the requisite phrase before directing the application of sections
556-557. The Court in effect rendered the Interstate Commerce Act's express requirement
of a "hearing" nugatory, as section 553 would have required these minimal procedures
even if the act had been silent.
Despite the inapplicability of sections 556-557 in these circumstances, the Court did
not rule out such application in all statutes which do not prescribe in haec verba that the
hearing be "on the record," nor did the Court elevate this phrase to sine qua non status.
410 U.S. at 238. However, after Florida E. Coast Ry. it is unlikely that a court would
require a formal rulemaking proceeding when the statute calls for a "hearing", unless the
statute is unmistakably clear, as by the addition of "on the record," or unless the legislative history clearly provides for such a proceeding.
21 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970) (hereinafter referred to as "section 553").
" 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(I)-(3) (1976).
5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976).
24 Id.
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556-557 procedures, the vast majority of administrative agencies
utilize informal rulemaking. The Supreme Court has demonstrated its reluctance to prescribe formal rulemaking procedures. 25 The ponderousness of formal rulemaking renders innovation difficult, allows exigencies to often go unmet, and fosters
changed conditions prior to the completion of the proceeding.
These factors cause the industries which are subject to adjudicatory regulation to be left in a state of perpetual uncertainty. 6 By
contrast, informal rulemaking combines the advantages of legislative decisionmaking with some of the requirements of an adjudicatory proceeding. The agency is not limited to a decision based
entirely on a carefully delineated record; rules can be promulgated efficiently and expeditiously and a broad base of public
participation is encouraged because participation may be in written or oral form without the necessity of undergoing prolonged
cross-examination. While these formidable advantages are widely
recognized, at some point the wide range of discretion committed
to the administrator gives cause for alarm. Nonagency participants have had the impression that this very flexibility and lack
of adjudicatory safeguards have denied them a "full hearing."
The Atomic Energy Act does not mandate a hearing "on the
record" either on its face or as judicially construed. 2 Accordingly,
the Commission took the position early that formal rulemaking
procedures were not required by the Atomic Energy Act.2 9 Despite
21 Cf. United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973); United States v.
Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972).
" This was the position of the utilities regulated by the Federal Power Commission

(FPC) prior to the Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968), which allowed
more informal rulemaking procedures and allowed the FPC to set rates for an entire area
in one proceeding.
' See, e.g., American Pub. Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 498 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Siegal
v. AEC, 400 F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
14 See Siegal v. AEC, 400 F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1968), wherein the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia upheld the Commission's use of informal rulemaking procedures.
The court explained section 553 as follows:
This language seems to say, and has been read by an authoritative source
as saying, that the formal procedures of Sections 7 and 8 [of the APA|
obtain only where the agency statute, in addition to providing a hearing,
prescribes explicitly that it be "on the record." [Here the court cited page
314 of the Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act
(1947) in a footnote.] There is no such prescription in the Atomic Energy
Act, either in terms or by clear implication ...
Id. at 785.
" See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM, ON ATOMIC ENERGY, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 2
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the absence of a statutory obligation, the Commission has on
occasion granted extensive procedural rights to afford the public
an opportunity for more significant participation.30 Such participation can generate public confidence in rulemaking and can
facilitate the representation of otherwise neglected values.3 ' Judicial recognition of the public's role has fostered the gradual erosion of the restrictive standing doctrine, which had previously
curtailed the public's intervention .32
II.

HYBRID RULEMAKING AND ITS UNDERLYING

courts 33

FACTORS

commentators 34

and
have advocated that the
Both
dichotomy
between
formal
and informal rulemaking
APA's strict
should yield to a more flexible analysis which would be guided by
considerations of due process and public policy and which would
produce ad hoc procedures tailored to fit each rulemaking scenario. The courts are confronted with a dilemma in this area: they
must effectively perform their reviewing role and therefore require explanations and reasons for the agency's actions; 3 but they
must recognize that the rulemaker should not be circumscribed
by onerous, time-comsuming adjudicatory encumbrances 3 and
that the courts should not substitute their decision for the
agency's. 3 7 As a potential solution to this problem, some courts

compelled agencies to afford opponents of a rule substantial proAEC REGULATORY PROCESS 149 (Comm. Print 1961).
-o See Freeman, The AEC's Recent Experiment in "Evidentiary" Rule Making, 28
Bus. LAW. 663 (1973).
Johnston, AEC Rulemaking and Public Participation,62 GEO. L.J. 1737 (1974).
32 See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 153 (1970) (standing to seek judicial review need not flow from any express Congressional grant); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 165 (1970) (a court must determine whether
Congress precluded judicial review); Office of Communication of United Church of Christ
v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1000-01 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (standing does not require the assertion of
an economic interest); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 616
(2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966) (aesthetic or environmental interest is
sufficient to confer standing). But cf. Easton Utils. Comm'n v. AEC, 424 F.2d 847, 85053 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (untimely application to intervene precludes standing).
See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1251-54 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
3, See, e.g., Clagett, Informal Action-Adjudication-Rule Making: Somme Recent
Developments in Federal Administrative Law, 1971 DUKE L.J. 51, 85-88.
See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943).
S See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., No. 76-419 (Sup. Ct. April 3, 1978); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckleshaus, 478
F.2d 615, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
17Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
IMPROVING THE
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cedural protections by mandating adjudicatory procedures despite the absence of an "on the record" hearing requirement."
Several of these cases did not place their brands of rulemaking
anywhere within the APA classification;39 rather, this procedural
imposition was labeled "hybrid rulemaking."'' The Supreme
Court in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc." stayed the judicial hand which
mandated adjudicatory procedures in informal rulemaking contexts. Although courts may no longer impose rigorous procedural
requisites upon the rulemaking process, the factors which
prompted this judicial response still exist and will continue to
influence judicial review of agency actions. To fully understand
this area of the law and to comprehend the significance of the
Supreme Court's recent landmark case, the three primary factors
underlying hybrid rulemaking must be understood. These factors
are outlined in the next three subsections. The fourth subsection
demonstrates how these factors were used to expand the scope of
section 553.
A. Constriction of Administrative Discretion
Agencies, unlike courts, have express authority to make law
prospectively through the exercise of rulemaking power and have
commensurately less need or reason to rely on ad hoc adjudication in formulating new standards. 2 Although all potential problems cannot be handled through rulemaking, agencies should
strive towards filling the interstices in their authorizing statutes
through the promulgation of rules. 3 Rules have the salutary effect
of exposing agency policy to public scrutiny, whereas case-bycase adjudication, with its limited effect and restricted participa3, See text accompanying notes 161-176, infra.

", See Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 487 F.2d 1043, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (declining
to reach classification problem); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 500 (4th
Cir. 1973) (discarding APA classifications for determining the type of hearing required);
Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (basing the impositions of
procedural requirements on considerations of "fairness").
1*See, e.g., Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the Administrative Procedure
Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHi. L. REV. 401 (1975).
'
No. 76-419 (Sup. Ct. April 3, 1978).
,2 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947).
' Id. Commentators have also exhorted agencies to make greater use of rulemaking.
See, e.g., Fuchs, Agency Development of Policy Through Rulemaking, 59 NEV. U.L. REv.
781 (1965); Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of
Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965).
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tion, often does not." Absent promulgation of rules, administrative actions are often chaotic and inequitable because neither the
parties nor the administrators know what standard is to be applied. " In recognition of these factors, agencies which had previously promulgated policy in ad hoc piecemeal fashion through
adjudication are now adopting prospective policy standards,
rules, and regulations, which apply generically to a variety of
parties in eclectic situations. The pattern of promulgating regulations is especially prominent in the agencies entrusted with
environmental and energy problems."
Many statutes, such as the Atomic Energy Act, merely establish a legislative framework within which the administrator
enjoys broad discretion when promulgating rules.4 7 Congress, in
recognizing this fact, evinced serious misgivings about agencies
utilizing minimum notice and comment rulemaking procedures.
During the last decade, many statutes have required procedures
in excess of minimum notice and comment rulemaking procedures. 48 These contrast with most older statutes which do not
impose any procedural requirements for rulemaking. 49
" See Wright, Court of Appeals Review of Federal Regulatory Agency Rulemaking,
26 AD. L. REV. 199, 202 (1974).
See generally Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better
Definition of Standards, 75 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1962).
" That both Congress and the agencies emphasize and favor rulemaking over adjudication as the most efficient and useful means of promulgating administrative policy is
demonstrated by the statutory authority bestowed upon the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). EPA has been specifically authorized to establish, in conjunction with
state governments, comprehensive standards for pollution control by focusing on broad
environmental questions involving different pollutants in diverse industries and areas. See
Federal Water Pollution Control Act amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1567
(1977) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1265 (Supp. V 1975)); Clean Air Act amendments,
Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1976)). Similarly, the NRC has been prolific in the promulgation of rules, regulations, and standards.
See 10 C.F.R. §§ 0-170 (1977).
" The court in Siegal v. AEC, 400 F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1968), stated: "Congress agreed
by enacting a regulatory scheme which is virtually unique in the degree to which broad
responsibility is reposed in the administrative agency, free of close prescription in its
charter as to how it shall proceed in achieving the statutory objectives." Id. at 783. See
also Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Electrical Workers, 367 U.S. 396
(1961).
" Hamilton, Proceduresfor the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The Need
for ProceduralInnovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 1276 (1972).
' Id. at 1278. Of course, the APA's procedures apply to rulemaking under these
statutes.
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Rulemaking protects the rights of individual parties by circumscribing unguided discretionary power to decide individual
cases. 0 Similarly, in some cases, the broad discretion to fashion
generally applicable rules must be subject to some restraint. If
only notice and comment procedures are used, the record is ordinarily so unfocused and ponderous that the administrator could
find support for choosing any of the alternatives offered."
Courts, in refusing to blindly rely upon the unstructured exercise of administrative discretion,52 have required agencies to
clarify decisionmaking standards, to consistently apply these
standards to guide their decisions, and to state findings of fact
and the reasons for decisions. The courts, demonstrating their
uneasiness about the extent of administration discretion, have
felt that justice requires judicial intervention to circumscribe
unnecessary and uncontrolled discretionary power. 3 However, in
any endeavor to circumscribe agency action, the court must fully
allow for the reality that agency matters typically involve some
quantum of expert discretion.54 Expertise may form a legitimate
basis for rules resolving questions of policy, but it cannot justify
procedural inadequacy in factual controversies. Expertise is
strengthened in its proper role when it is denied the opportunity
to "become a monster which rules with no practical limits on its
discretion.""
See Holmes v. New York City Housing Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968); Hornsby
v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
" See City of Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1074 (1972).
52 See Environmental Defense Fund Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, (D.C. Cir.
1971), wherein the court stated that:
Judicial review must operate to ensure that the administrative process itself
will confine and control the exercise of discretion. Courts should require
administrative officers to articulate the standards and principles that govern
their discretionary decisions in as much detail as possible . . . . Discretionary decisions should more often be supported with findings of fact and reasoned opinions.
Id. at 598.
See generally K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE-A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969).
Professor Davis has argued that arbitrary administrative action can be effectively restricted only by requiring agencies to formalize their policies in clear rules of prospective
application.
" See NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 290-92 (1965); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. CAB,
379 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
11Greater Boston Tel. Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (quoting
Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167 (1962)).
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B.

Factual Determinationsin Informal Rulemaking

Three types of questions are raised in rulemaking proceedings: policy questions, factual questions, and interdependent
questions of policy and fact. Although many of the issues presented to the NRC are primarily technical, other issues involve
trade-offs between competing values and judgments of broad social and environmental import. Resolution of such policy questions denigrates the significance of detailed factual investigation
and minimizes the need for the constraints afforded by the procedural protection of an adjudicatory hearing.5" Policy issues disguised as scientific problems should not be consigned to technical
experts nor decided by administrators and reviewing judges, but
should be directly confronted as questions of policy by the elected
representatives of the people. However, in the absence of congressional action, policy issues must be decided in rulemaking proceedings open to broad public scrutiny. This is the type of issue
which pure notice and comment procedures were designed to resolve.
Conversely, adjudicatory procedures work best with narrowly
defined factual issues.57 Informal rulemaking is handicapped in
its fact-resolution endeavors by the absence of a clearly defined
mechanism to sift the many topics addressed in the comments;
such sifting would occur if testimony was shaped by witnesses
subject to cross-examination. Hybrid rulemaking decisions attempted to diminish informal rulemaking's fact-finding inadequacies by mandating the application of the traditional methods
relied on by Anglo-American jurisprudence to ensure accuracy in
adversarial proceedings-adjudicatory procedures,5 including
cross-examination with its unique potential as an "engine of
truth."5 9 Of course, after Vermont Yankee, this is no longer a
U See Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the Administrative Procedure Act: A
Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 401, 408 (1975).
",See Hamilton, note 48 supra, at 1313. Cf. Cramton, A Comment on Trial-Type
Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58 VA. L. REv. 585, 586 (1972).
See Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 739,
743 (1976).
" International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Commentators are divided over cross-examination's utility in resolving factual matters in
administrative proceedings. Compare Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy:
Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform,
118 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 522 (1970) ("cross-examination can serve a more valuable function
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Courts are now limited to examining the factual

in testing forecasts and generalized conclusions underlying future policy planning than in
making findings concerning specific past events"), with Homburger, Functions of Orality
in Australian and American Civil Procedure, 20 BUFFALO L. REv. 9, 36 (1970) ("If crossexamination really is the 'greatest engine ever invented for the discovery of truth,' one
wonders why other legal systems have not imported that fabulous 'engine' ").
" The Court set forth a number of policy reasons for refusing to allow courts to impose
adjudicatory procedures on administrative agencies. In order to evaluate the effect of the
Court's opinion, these reasons must be examined. First, the Court reasoned that if courts
are allowed to review agency proceedings to determine whether the agency employed the
"best" procedures, judicial review would be totally "unpredictable." No. 76-419, slip op.
at 24 (Sup. Ct. April 3, 1978). The reasoning underlying this reason is hard to fathom;
judicial review should be no more "unpredictable" if additional procedures are available
as a remedy. None of the hybrid rulemaking cases mandated a particular procedure-they
required a system of procedures as a means of developing an "adequate record." If an
agency develops a record without utilizing such procedures, it could nevertheless be adequate. Such procedures should be permissible if they are used as a tool to remedy a
perceived inadequacy, but not if they are used to evaluate the agency's proceeding. Judge
Friendly places this debate into perspective:
It is thus not too consequential whether a court invalidates a rule on the
ground that the procedures have not developed substantial evidence to support it or even evidence adequate to rebut a claim that it is arbitrary and
capricious, or, instead, takes the route of prescribing ad hoc procedural requirements in addition to those of section 553. Although the former course
seems more in keeping with the statutory language and less likely to promote
undue judicial activism, the practical result is much the same. Both roads
lead to the conclusion that an administrator engaged in rulemaking governed
by the APA cannot always be sure that rudimentary notice and comment
procedures . . . will always suffice.
Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1314 (1975). The Court also
fears that if agencies are forced to operate under such a "vague injunction," they "would
undoubtedly adopt full adjudicatory procedures in every instance," thus losing all the
inherent advantages of informal rulemaking. No. 76-419, slip op. at 24 (Sup. Ct. April 3,
1978). This concern, although possessing superficial validity is in part untrue and in part
exaggerated. Courts mandating hybrid procedures granted agencies discretion in adopting
procedures so long as "reasoned decisionmaking" was assured. There would be no need
for an agency to adopt full adjudicatory procedures for the limited-effect, noncontroversial
rules that compose the bulk of rulemaking proceedings. The Court recognizes this fact in
its opinion when it states: "Since 1970 [after American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d
624 (en banc), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966), the seminal case in hybrid rulemaking]
the Commission has conducted a large number of rulemaking proceedings, some of which
involved matters of substantial importance, and almost none of which involved crossexamination." No. 76-419, slip op. at 21 n.17 (Sup. Ct. April 3, 1978). Although during
this time period NRC had not been required to adopt such procedures, other agencies had
been so ordered, and it was not unforeseeable that a court would order NRC to use similar
procedure in a future situation.
The Court gives as its third reason the fact that agency procedures cannot be looked
at with hindsight; rather, the procedures must be evaluated on the basis of the information
available when the procedures were formulated. The final reason presented by the Court
is also hard to decipher as it does not fit into any syllogistic pattern. The Court reasoned
that informal rulemaking under section 553 does not require an agency to rely exclusively
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underpinning of a rule without mandating procedures to assist
them in this task; the agency itself must determine what type of
procedures will ensure an adequate record.
The most difficult issues in NRC rulemakings, however, involve questions of policy and interdependent questions of complex technological and environmental fact for which pure informal rulemaking may not be sufficient." However, across-theboard use of formal rulemaking procedures is unpalatable because that would militate against the advantages of informal
rulemaking. Adjudicatory procedures have both advantages and
disadvantages depending on the function they are to achieve.
Superimposing the adjudicatory model on administrative decisionmaking in a complex scientific and technological scenario
exposes the shortcomings of adjudicatory techniques. The NRC
has been entrusted with broad powers and multiple functions and
is not expected to behave as an impartial umpire presiding over
a private dispute.2 NRC proceedings focus on future, not past,
events and their consequences. Most importantly, this type of
issue cannot be couched in a form conducive to a simple answer;
rather, the NRC must balance competing values when consideron the transcript generated at a hearing, or to hold a formal hearing at all. From these
premises the Court concludes that "the adequacy of the record . . . is not correlated
directly to the type of procedural devices employed, but rather turns on whether the
agency [complied with the APA and other relevant statutes]." Id. at 25. The Court could
not have meant that using adjudicatory procedures to gather more evidence and to focus
the information it received would not make the record more "adequate." Although such
procedures may not be necessary to render the record adequate, the "record," regardless
of how it is defined, must be more complete after using such procedures. Considering the
historical context in which this opinion was written, this reason can only be interpreted
as requiring courts to ensure that the agency complied with the statutory minimums
without prescribing hearing procedures to generate on-the-record testimony in support of
the rule generaged. In light of SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943), and its progeny,
the Court could not have meant that the agency is not required to take a "hard look" at
the major questions before it and to support each major portion of its rule with some data
and reasoning. See, e.g., Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
' See Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REv. 185, 193
(1974).
2 In re Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and
2), ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741, 752 (1977); In Re Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units
1 and 2), ALAB-123 6 AEC 331, 335 (1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.; Aeschliman
v. NRC, 547 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev 'd on other grounds sub nom.; Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., No. 76-419 (Sup. Ct.
April 3, 1978). See also Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 620
(2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
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ing the vagaries of an uncertain technology applied in a context
of scientific dispute.
Perhaps the wisest course in resolving this type of issue is
the middle ground in which the agency would use the most efficacious procedure for each type of dispute. No single set of procedures will be appropriate for all NRC rulemakings because of the
diversity of issues and the variety of factual and policy questions
involved. The NRC should discriminatively use hybrid procedures, so that mundane noncontroversial rules could be promulgated with dispatch, but the NRC would have the option of increasing the quantum of information submitted for more significant rules. What is needed is some pattern of procedures to fully
develop the record and to supply the basis of judicial review. 3
This maintains administrative flexibility, but can also be conducive to administrative confusion and delay. 4 As yet, no precise
formula for ascertaining the procedural aspects of such proceedings has emerged.
C.

The Requirements of Judicial Review

The scope of judicial review is outlined in section 10(e) of the
APA,15 which provides that a reviewing court shall set aside
agency action found not to meet six separate standards. The
APA putatively describes two alternate standards of judicial review: (1) "arbitrary and capricious" 7 in informal rulemaking pro" International

Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
",See FitzGerald, Mobil Oil Corp. v. FederalPower Commission and the Flexibility
of the Administrative ProcedureAct, 26 AD. L. REv. 287, 299 (1974).
5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
" The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency
action, findings, and conclusions found to be-(A) arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to
constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (D) without
observance of procedure required by law; (E) unsupported by substantial
evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise
reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or (F)
unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de
novo by the reviewing court.
Id.
,1Although no APA provision states expressly the appropriate standard of review for
informal rulemaking it is widely assumed that 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976), which states:
"The reviewing court shall . . .set aside agency action . . . found to be . . .arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," is applicable
to informal rulemaking. See Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the
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ceedings and (2) "unsupported by substantial evidence" 68 when
either formal rulemaking is involved or the agency's authorizing
legislation requires it. 9 Courts have applied both standards to
70
informal rulemaking
1. The Traditional Tests
The potential differences between these two standards lie in
the review of the agency's factual findings.7 The Supreme Court
has defined the traditional substantial evidence standard as mandating a determination of whether the agency's decision was reasonably supported by the record as a whole. 2 The reviewing court
must ensure that evidence used in making predictions was adequately adduced and rationally applied. Exercising review under
this test, a court cannot disturb the factfinder's resolution of
conflicting evidence merely because it is "clearly erroneous," but
can only upset those determinations which are "patently unreasonable. 7 3 Additionally, courts are less inclined to delve into the
United States, 1 CFR § 305.74-4 (1977); Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd,
407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
0 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976). ("The reviewing court shall . . . set aside agency
action . . . found to be . . . unsupported by substantial evidence." Id.).
" The introductory clause of section 10, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1976), limits the application of section 10(e) by providing that, "This chapter applies ... except to the extent
that . . . agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." This section means
that to some extent agency action may be committed to agency discretion with no judicial
review, but that such delegation need not be an all-or-none proposition. A reviewing court
may not set aside an agency's decision to the extent that discretion is committed to the
agency. This has been held to be a narrow exception and is applicable only in those rare
instances where "statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no
law to apply." Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). See
also Berger, Administrative Arbitrarinessand Judicial Review, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 5883 (1965); Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A FunctionalAnalysis of "Committed to Agency
Discretion," 82 HARv. L. REv. 367 (1968).
"s See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (substantial
evidence test); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(arbitrary and capricious test); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 475 F.2d 842 (10th Cir.
1973) (substantial evidence test).
"' Under both standards the agency's policy choices are reviewed under the arbitrary
and capricious standard which allows a court to defer to agency discretion if the policy
choice is rationally related to the factual findings. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80
(1943). See also Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections on Reversal and Remand of
Administrative Orders, 1969 DUKE L.J. 199. The Supreme Court in Bowman Transp., Inc.
v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 284-45 (1974), approved this unsymmetrical treatment of fact and policy questions.
7 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 490 (1951).
" See 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.02 (1958).
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record when its factual underpinning is not "provable" within the
judiciary's accepted definition of "proof." 74 By contrast, the traditional arbitrary and capricious standard was limited to merely
determining whether the agency possessed sufficient authority to
issue the rule and whether a rational basis for the rule exists, 15
i.e., whether any set of facts could be imagined to support the rule
in question."
2. The Appropriate APA Standard of Review for Informal
Rulemaking
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Automotive
Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd77 held that, unless clearly required by the agency's organic statute, the substantial evidence
test is inapplicable to informal rulemaking.7 8 In this case, manufacturers of automobile accessories challenged a regulation promulgated under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act,79 which required all new cars to be equipped with frontseat
head restraints. 0 The manufacturers argued that the act's requirement that the agency file with the court "the record of the
proceedings on which the Secretary based his order"'" necessitated formal rulemaking. The court rejected this argument and
approved section 553 procedures. 2 The "record" requirement was
met by filing all information the agency had before it when it
made its decision.83 In dicta, the court stated that the substantial
" See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir.
1973), where EPA was attempting to predict future events with no past experience on
which to rely and with sketchy and speculative factual information on the available
emission control technology. Similarly, in Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d
467 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the Department of Labor was attempting to promulgate an exposure
standard based on a problematical prediction of the percentage of asbestos workers who
would develop fatal cancers in two to three decades if subjected to some unknown level of
exposure through a biological mechanism as yet unidentified.
11 See, e.g., United States v. George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371 (1940); Superior Oil
Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 922 (1964). See L. JAFFEE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 564 (1965).
'" Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935).
407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
Id. at 337. Accord, Bunny Bear, Inc. v. Peterson, 473 F.2d 1002 (1st Cir. 1973);
Boating Indus. Ass'n v. Boyd, 409 F.2d 408 (7th Cir. 1969).
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1390 (1976).
"o Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 202, 33 Fed. Reg. 2945 (1968).
A' 15 U.S.C. § 1394(a) (1976).
"2 407 F.2d at 338.
Id. at 337.
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evidence test is applicable only to formal rulemaking and adjudication. The court in describing the appropriate standard of review
under section 706(2)(A) stated: "The paramount objective [of
judicial review] is to see whether the agency, given an essentially
legislative task to perform, has carried it out in a manner calculated to negate the dangers of arbitrariness and irrationality in
the formulation of rules for general application in the future." 4
However, the Sixth Circuit obfuscated this clear analysis by
reaching the opposite conclusion in Chrysler Corp. v. Department
of Transp.15 The court held that the applicable scope of review
under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act is the
substantial evidence test and rejected the test set out in
Automotive Parts as providing "virtually no review at all.""
The court in City of Chicago v. FPC7 described the purpose
of reviewing rulemaking actions as determining whether a reasoned conclusion from the whole record could support the premises upon which the agency decision rests. 8 The substantial evidence test in the court's view is an application of this analysis to
a particular kind of record-one containing specific information
tested by cross-examination.8 9 The court in effect obliterated all
distinctions between judicial review of formal and informal rulemaking except the name. This broad scope of review was based
on an analysis of the nondelegation doctrine. Although rulemaking is a quasi-legislative function, it is not the equivalent of legislative action, and agency findings of fact are not accorded the
same deference as legislative conclusions. If an agency's findings were exempt from judicial review, the law governing delegation would be "little more than formalistic mutterings," as it
would make little sense to require the legislature to articulate
intelligible standards to govern agency action of an authentic inquiry into whether those standards are being complied with vel
non is foreclosed.9 The court concluded that inquiry into the
factual predicate for adopted rules is authorized and that the
m Id.
472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972).
" Id. at 667.
" 458 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
" Id. at 744.
"Id.
" Id. at 742.
"1 Id.
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nature of the inquiry depends on the nature of the record on
review."
These cases demonstrate the lack of consensus as to the appropriate standard of review."3 This disagreement has helped
erode the traditional distinction between the respective standards
of judicial review of rulemaking. 4 The merging of reviewing standards has rendered mechanical labeling of the appropriate reviewing standard a Sisyphean effort, which is often counterproductive because it obscures the mandatory flexibility of judicial review. 5 The label used to identify the type of review is not
as important as the judicial philosophy underlying review.
The increased judicial vigilance" demonstrated in rulemaking actions and the consequent reduction in the deference accorded agency discretion 7 stems from the emergence of broad and
12

Id. at 743.

The Supreme Court has further obfuscated the matter by apparently equating
formal and informal rulemaking and assuming that substantial evidence is the appropriate standard for reviewing informal rulemaking. See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum
Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 753 (1972); United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S.
649, 671-73 (1972); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414-15.(1971).
However, Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973), clarifies the situation by limiting
judicial review of informal rulemaking to the arbitrary and capricious standard of section
706(2)(A). See Note, Judicial Review of the Facts in Informal Rulemaking: A Proposed
Standard, 84 YALE L.J. 1750, 1757 (1975).
U See Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d
342 (2d Cir. 1973) ("[In the review of rules of general applicability made after notice
and comment rulemaking, the two criteria do tend to converge." Id. at 349-50.). National
Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F2d 688 (2d Cir. 1975) (Lumbard, J., concurring) (agency abuses discretion and acts arbitrarily and capriciously if its actions are not
supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 705).
0 See K. DAVIS, ADMINISmTRATIvE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 29.01 (1976) (judges accept
or reject agency rules not by applying a formula of judicial review, but by discerning the
level of care used in the development of the rule); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340
U.S. 474 (1951) (lack of certainty in the standard of judicial review reflects the impossibility of a single formula describing all factors involved in judicial review). Cf. City of
Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
" See L. JAPFEY, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINsTRATIVE ACTION 589 (1965). The new
judicial activism is in marked contrast to the prevalent attitude of earlier days succinctly
epitomized by Chicago B & Q Ry. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585 (1907), wherein the Supreme
Court upheld the "sensible judgments" of a board of tax assessors on the ground that they
"express an intuition of experience which outruns analysis." Id. at 598.
"7 Prior to Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), reviewing courts,
even when utilizing the substantial evidence standard, often felt constrained to uphold
the agency's determination if it was supported by some evidence anywhere in the record
"without reference to how heavily the countervailing evidence may preponderate." Id. at
481. Universal Camera changed this attitude by requiring that the decision be supported
by the record "as a whole."
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sweeping rulemaking authority. Agencies can affect individual
rights and interests throughout society without any type of hearing,"5 and this broad authority evokes an apprehensive judicial
reaction. The broad sweep of the statutes also promotes a heightened belief in the importance of providing participation by interested parties and careful articulation of agency methodologies
and conclusions. Perhaps the emphasis on an increased opportunity for participation in the rulemaking arena is a manifestation
of an analogous phenomenon in other areas. Since Goldberg v.
Kelly,"5 there has been a torrent of due process cases in disparate
areas of governmental activity in which the Supreme Court has
expanded the hearing requirement.'0 0 However, the case which
directly propagated rigorous scrutiny of administrative actions is
the Supreme Court's opinion in Citizens To Preserve Overton
Park v. Volpe.' 0 '
3.

Overton Park's Substantial Inquiry

Although dealing with judicial review of an administrator's
informal decision and not informal rulemaking, the Overton Park
decision has been repeatedly applied to rulemaking proceedings.
This case dealt with the scope of the Secretary of Transportation's authority under the Federal Highway Act, which authorized expenditure of federal funds to construct highways through
public parks only if no "feasible and prudent" alternative exists
and if such program is designed to minimize harm to the park.'0
The Secretary concurred in the judgment of local officials that
the highway should be built through the park, but did not include
a statement of his factual findings in his decision. The district
court and the court of appeals upheld the Secretary's determination, believing that the Secretary had broad discretion and that
reviewing courts had a narrow scope of review.' 3 The Supreme
Court reversed, rejecting these contentions and subjecting the
Secretary's decision to judicial review under the APA.'0 '
See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976).
* 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
"' See, e.g., North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972).
101401 U.S. 402 (1971).
10249 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970).
113 401 U.S. at 409.
I" Petitioners were entitled to judicial review under 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1976), which
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The Supreme Court went on to order the district court to
conduct a plenary review of the Secretary's decision' 5 based on
the full administrative record that was before the Secretary when
he made his decision. If the record does not disclose the determinative factors in the Secretary's construction of the evidence, the
district court was empowered to require additional explanation,
even to the extent of requiring administrative officials to give
testimony explaining their actions. 0
The critical portion of the decision dealt with the standard
of judicial review under APA section 706. The Court held that
despite the inapplicability of the substantial evidence test to the
Secretary's decision, "the generally applicable standards of § 706
require the reviewing court to engage in a substantialinquiry." 0,
After recapitulating the aphorism that the Secretary's action is
entitled to a presumption of regularity, the Court declared that
"that presumption is not enough to shield his action from a thorough, probing, in-depth review."108
Under Overton Park, a court has three functions to fulfill in
reviewing agency action. First, it must delineate the scope of the
agency's authority and discretion and then determine whether
the agency acted within the scope of its authority by scrutinizing
the facts.10 Second, the court must find that the actual choice
provides that the action of "each authority of the Government of the United States" is
subject to judicial review unless there is a statutory prohibition on review or where
"agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." The Court held that there was
"law to apply" and the "committed to agency discretion" exemption of 5 U.S.C. §
701(a)(2) was inapplicable. 401 U.S. at 410.
I0 On remand, the district court conducted a "substantial inquiry" by mandating
diverse procedural safeguards. Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 335 F. Supp.
873 (W.D. Tenn. 1972). The court ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to discovery to
determine whether the record was complete and to explore the mental processes of the
agency personnel. Id. at 877. They were also entitled to adduce expert testimony to show
that feasible and prudent alternative routes existed and to evaluate the Secretary's investigation of such alternative routes. Id. Finally, a plenary hearing was conducted which
consumed 25 trial days and admitted 240 exhibits and 287 pages of posttrial briefs. Id. at
878.
, 401 U.S. at 420. Although such an inquiry into the mental processes of the decisionmakers is usually to be avoided, if there are no contemporaneous formal findings, such
an inquiry may be the only effective method of judicial review. Id. See Nathanson, Probing
the Mind of the Administrator:Hearing Variations& Standardsof JudicialReview Under
the Administrative ProcedureAct & Other Federal Statutes, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 721 (1975).
10,401 U.S. at 415 (emphasis added). Informal rulemaking is reviewed under the same
standard. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
401 U.S. at 415.
' Id. at 415-16.
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made was not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law" in order to uphold the
agency action. To make this finding the court must again scrutinize the facts to determine whether the "decision was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors" and whether there has been
a "clear error of judgment.""' 0 In both cases, the inquiry into the
facts must be "searching and careful.""' Finally, the court must
determine whether the agency followed the necessary procedural requirements."' In essence, this three-part analysis advocates a vigilant approach to agency review in which the court does
not make the ultimate decision, but insists that the agency take
a hard look at all relevant factors.
4. Application of Overton Park to Informal Rulemaking
No firm consensus exists for the method of applying the
Overton Park standard of review to informal rulemaking or for the
proper amount of scrutiny to be used in reviewing the factual
basis of agency action."' The opinions presented in Ethyl Corp.
v. EPA"' demonstrate a continuum of views on this issue by
contrasting the views of the judges of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals." 5 This case involved a petition to review an
EPA order under the Clean Air Act requiring an annual reduction
in the lead content of gasoline."'
Judge Wright, writing for the majority," 7 affirmed the Administrator's decision and rejected petitioner's objection that
three notice and comment periods were procedurally defective." 8
In upholding the administrative action, Judge Wright described
Id. at 416.
11

Id.
Id. at 417.

See generally Note, JudicialReview of the Facts in Informal Rulemaking: A Proposed Standard, 84 YALE L.J. 1750 (1975).
"' 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
IS The opinions of this court have special importance for administrative law because
it is an optional venue under a plethora of regulatory statutes, it has exclusive jurisdiction
over the actions of EPA under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5 (1970 & Supp. V
1975), and it has attracted the largest share of environmental litigation. See Friendly,
Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1310 (1975).
", 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6c(c)(1)(A) (1970).
Judge Wright's majority opinion was joined in by Chief Judge Bazelon and Circuit
Judges McGowan, Leventhal, and Robinson.
"1 541 F.2d at 48.
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the standard of review of informal rulemaking"9 as "a highly
deferential one" which "presumes agency action to be valid," but
which is not merely superfluous or a rubberstamp for the agency
decision.'2 He went on to state that no inconsistency exists between a deferential standard of review and a requirement that the
reviewing court involve itself in even the most complex evidentiary matters; the more technical the case, the more intensive
must be the court's effort to comprehend the evidence. 21 This
immersion in the evidence is designed solely to enable the court
to determine whether the agency decision was rational and based
on consideration of the salient factors. Judge Wright in analyzing
Overton Park concluded that it no more than affirmed the tradi122
tion rational basis test.
[A]fter our careful study of the record, we must take a step back
from the agency decision. We must look at the decision not as the
chemist, biologist or statistician that we are qualified neither by
training nor experience to be, but as a reviewing court exercising our
narrowly defined duty of holding agencies to certain minimal standards of rationality.I"

Judge Leventhal, in his concurrence, interpreted the majority
opinion as advocating no substantive review at all.' 2' He stated
that this type of review does not fulfill the reviewing court's
mandate of ensuring that the agency outlines its objectives in a
rational and nondiscriminatory manner so that its delegated
power is exercised only within its statutory parameters. 25 Judge
Leventhal stated that when an agency is confronted with a factually based challenge, the court must examine the evidence and
findings of fact to ensure that the evidentiary fact findings are
supported by the record and that they provide a rational basis for
inferences of ultimate fact. 2 If the agency's decision is within a
zone of reasonableness, though not the one the court would have
I Judge Wright assumed that informal rulemaking under 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976) is
reviewed under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976), under which agency action is upset if it is
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."
See note 67 supra.
'" 541 F.2d at 34.
I
Id. at 34-35.
"' Id. at 34-35 n.74.
'
Id. at 36 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).
12, Id. at 68 (Leventhal, J., concurring without reservation).
12 Id. at 69.
In

Id.
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chosen, it must be sustained. One of the least intrusive but most
effective methods of review is to have the agency comply with
certain minimal procedural safeguards. These procedures will
vary from problem to problem and must be fitted in an ad hoc
fashion to the issues at hand.'
Judge Wilkey, in his dissenting opinion," 8 applied Overton
Park'ssubstantial inquiry analysis by focusing on the "clear error
of judgment" language, which allows a reviewing court to overturn agency action even if there is evidence in the record supporting the agency decision.' After reviewing the whole record, a
court may conclude that the agency erred in exercising its rulemaking power, because the evidence against the agency's conclusion is overwhelming and persuasive, the agency's approach is
one-sided, the decisionmaking process is flawed, or an essential
point or element is missing in the logical progression towards the
agency's conclusion.'30 The court's task on review is "to explore
the evidentiary record to determine whether the statements and
conclusions of fact have an adequate basis in the underlying evidence" and to determine whether the agency decision is
"principled and reasonable."'' In applying this standard, the
dissent concluded that the Administrator had made clear errors
in his analytical and evaluative methodology and in his decisionmaking process. Several vital links in EPA's chain of reasoning
were unsupported, its conclusions were thus arbitrary and capricious, and the court's proper action should have been to remand.
Judge Skelly Wright, another judge in this circuit, has stated
that APA section 706 requires substantive review."' The arbitrary
and capricious standard does not apply to the fact-finding, factpredicting, and factual reasoning process which leads an agency
to adopt a rule. A contrary interpretation of this standard would
reduce judicial review to "a relatively futile exercise in formal"' See generally Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the
Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509 (1974).
11 541 F.2d at 70 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). Judge Wilkey was joined in this opinion
by Circuit Judges Tamm and Robb.
I" Id. at 98.
130Id.
"I Id. at 100.
"12 Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of JudicialReview,
59 CORNELL L. REv. 375 (1974).
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ism.' ' 33 However, Judge Wright went on to state that a reviewing
court is not authorized to examine whether the agency's empirical
conclusions have support in substantial evidence and emphasized
3
that a court may not substitute its judgments for the agency's.'
D.

Judicial Expansion of Section 553 Requirements

Courts have begun to explore the full reach of section 553
requirements. An expanded interpretation of this section's requirements has resulted from the confluence of constraining administrative discretion, making factual determinations in informal rulemaking proceedings, and reviewing administrative action. Courts reinterpreted section 553 requirements in order to
effectuate these three principles; indeed, some courts read the
statutory requirements so expansively as to be accused of creating
a new type of rulemaking unconnected with the APA.' 35 The original decisions mandating hybrid rulemaking procedures were
premised on basic considerations of fairness, ,36 because the courts
did not have the crucial element of Overton Park's aggressive
technique of judicial review and were forced to rely upon their
misgivings about the extent of administrative discretion and the
adequacy of notice and comment procedures to answer factual
questions. After Overton Park, the courts gained momentum in
prescribing adjudicatory procedures. This momentum was completely dissipated by the Supreme Court's decision in Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc. ,37 The three following subsections outline the presently
existing requirements of section 553.
' Id. at 390.
,' Id. at 391.
' See FitzGerald, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Commission and the Flexibility
of the Administrative ProcedureAct, 26 AD. L. REv. 287 (1974).
"' Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971); American Airlines,
Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966).
W No. 76-419 (Sup. Ct. April 3, 1,978). Before explaining the present judicial interpretation of section 553, a caveat is necessary. The Supreme Court severely chastised the
Court of Appeals and minced no words in its condemnation of the appellate court's
interpretation of the administrative-judicial relationship. Consequently, other inroads
which courts have made on the administrative process may be in jeopardy and a court
may be acting ultra vires if it imposes any requirement in excess of the bare minimum
requirements of section 553. Courts may hereafter be hesitant to broadly interpret any of
the procedural requirements of section 553, but may focus more closely on the adequacy
of the record. See slip op. at 13-14 n.14, 22.
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1.

Inadequate Notice

Agencies intending to promulgate rules under the auspices of
section 553 must publish a general notice of proposed rulemaking
in the Federal Register. The notice must include inter alia,
"either the terms of substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved."' 3 8 The legislative history
of the APA explains that this requirement was included because
public rulemaking would be of little value either to interested
parties or to the agency unless notice is promulgated in advance
so that interested parties could provide input. 3'
Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC,10 demonstrates how agency action
can be overturned for failing to comply with the notice requirement. In Mobil Oil, the Federal Power Commission published a
notice that it was considering the adoption of a general policy
statement concerning transportation rates for natural gas."' The
notice concerned only the wisdom of establishing such a policy
and comments were limited to that issue. After the agency received comments from concerned groups, meetings were held
with some interested parties. At the conclusion of the meetings,
further conferences were deferred, and shortly thereafter the FPC
issued an order setting generally applicable rates for the transportation of hydrocarbons"2 without benefit of the requisite technical
14 3
and factual data on costs ordinarily required in ratemaking
The court reversed the FPC order and remanded to the Commission for further proceedings because the Commission's notice was
inadequate for a proceeding fixing specific mandatory rates."
"'
'9
140

5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (1976).
S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1946).

483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

Notice of proposed statement of general policy concerning charges for transporting
liquids and liquifiable hydrocarbons. 33 Fed. Reg. 2860 (1968).
",2 Order establishing charges for transporting liquids and liquifiable hydrocarbons.
37 Fed. Reg. 2954 (1972).
"
483 F.2d at 1244-45.
"
d. at 1263. Another panel of the same court in American Pub. Gas Ass'n v. FPC
498 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1974), held that the FPC's use of a rulemaking format that
combined written statements, public hearings to receive oral statements, and written
rebuttal submission was adequate. The Mobil decision was distinguished on the ground
that the notice had been inadequate and the FPC had relied on data obtained by informal
and, to some extent, ex parte procedures. By contrast, the FPC in American Public Gas
had clearly stated the issues and had given the parties an adequate opportunity to participate. Id. at 723.
"'
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Thus, the notice will be scrutinized on review to determine if the
enacted rule is outside the scope of the proposed rulemaking notice, because one of the functions of judicial review is to determine if the agency considered all relevant comments prior to
enactment of the rule.' If potential participants are unaware or
misapprehend the scope of a proceeding, they are unable to submit comments, thus depriving the agency of their input.
The notice of proposed rulemaking must be "sufficiently descriptive of the 'subjects and issues involved' so that interested
parties may offer informed criticism and comments.""' The requirement of giving notice of the "issues involved" could be read
as mandating that agencies disgorge the data and policies underlying the proposed rule." ' Notices should contain the proposed
regulation and a statement of its factual premises and methodology, including its tentative empirical findings and a description
of the critical experiments and methodological techniques.' All
significant information developed during the rulemaking must be
made available to the participants prior to issuance of the final
regulations. If an agency does not fully comply with these directives, its decision can be overturned for failure to observe "a
procedure required by law""' 9 or because objectors are denied an
opportunity to participate (by probing the agency's analysis and
by providing information).
5
The decision in InternationalHarvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus10
emphasized the importance of promulgating a complete notice
which indicates the major issues to be resolved, and how notice
relates to the other requirements of informal rulemaking. In this
case, EPA decided not to defer for one year the effective date of
the Clean Air Act's 1975 automobile emission control standards.
The act provided that engines manufactured in model year 1975
should have a ninety percent reduction in the emission of carbon
See text accompanying notes 212-230 infra.
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (quoting Portland Cement
Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 392-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921
(1974) and Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1251 n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
" See Wright, Court of Appeals Review of Federal Regulatory Agency Rulemaking,
26 AD. L. REv. 999, 204 (1974).
"I International Harvester Co. v. Ruckleshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
14' 5 U.S.C. § 706(D) (1976).
5 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
"
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monoxide and hydrocarbons over 1970 model engines.1 5' A one
year suspension from these standards could be granted by EPA
if it determined after a "public hearing" that the technology to
meet the 1975 standards was not available. 52 As EPA based its
determination on a complex "prediction methodology" never revealed to the automobile companies, the court remanded the case
to EPA for further consideration and imposed upon the agency
the requirement of providing "the parties . . . [an] opportunity
. . . to address themselves to matters not previously put before
them." 53
The remand was premised on the court's perception that the
notice requirement of APA section 553 was not adequately complied with, because the prediction methodology should have been
published prior to EPA's final decision.'" As the automobile industry raised serious questions about EPA's methodology, it
should have been provided with an opportunity to challenge the
critical steps of EPA's reasoning process. The auto companies
had put forth all of their available data, but EPA merely rebutted
it with their prediction methodology without any supporting
data. If this were allowed to be sufficient, the information adduced by the auto companies would be effectively meaningless,
and they would be effectively precluded from challenging EPA's
data.
In Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus,'5 5 EPA's regulations were rejected because the petitioner was unable to obtain
critical information which formed a partial basis for the final
regulations.' 8 The petitioners were, thus, effectively denied an
adequate opportunity to comment on the proposed standards
because of EPA's failure to disclose the detailed findings and
1S,42

U.S.C. § 1857f-l(b)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1975).

42 U.S.C. § 1857f-l(b)(5)(D) (Supp. V 1975).
" 478 F.2d at 649.
254 The necessities of judicial review also provided impetus for the court's expansive
reading of the notice requirement. Neither the majority opinion by Judge Leventhal nor
the concurrence by Chief Judge Bazelon attempted to describe the standard of review in
traditional APA terms, i.e., arbitrary or capricious or substantial evidence. However, both
judges agreed that the function of judicial review is to require reasoned decisionmaking
to assure that the agency procedures provide a structure for agency decisionmaking, and
both evinced a growing dissatisfaction with the traditional rational basis standard. 478
F.2d at 649.
1- 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
1' Id. at 392-93.
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procedures of relevant EPA-sponsored tests. 5 In referring to section 553 requirements the court states, "Obviously a prerequisite
to the ability to make meaningful comment is to know the basis
upon which the rule is proposed."' 5 8 The court stated that information forming the basis of a rule should be disclosed as early as
15
possible, generally at the time of issuance.
2.

Failure to Provide an Opportunity to Participate

Section 553(c) provides that after notice the agency must
give "interested persons an opportunity to participatein the rule
making through submission of written data, views, or arguments
with or without opportunity for oral presentation."' 60 Hybrid rulemaking was partially premised on and can be partially explained
by this statutory requirement.
a. The rationale of hybrid rulemaking
Courts which mandated hybrid procedures refused to apply
the expressio unius est exclusio alterius principle of statutory
construction to section 553(c) procedural safeguards. On the contrary, they attempted to expand this requirement beyond recognition. The adjudicatory procedures imposed by some courts were
designed to facilitate judicial review and to assure meaningful
participation with consequent reasoned decisionmaking and
analysis by the agency.''1
The court in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
NR C112 stated that participation under this section must be
meaningful: "[W]e would expect that [the NRC] will endeavor
to allow meaningful participationby the public interest groups
whose limited resources often relegate them to the role of contest1 Paring the studies and conclusions of industry participants." ' 63
Is at 402.
Id.
Id. at 393 n.67.
's, Id. at 394.
"s

5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976) (emphasis added).
S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1946). Some of the hybrid rulemaking
cases partially relied on the legislative history which explains that because an agency is
not a representative entity, "public participation ... in the rulemaking process is essential to inform [the agency] and to afford safeguards to private interests." Id.
162 539 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded to determine mootness, 434
U.S. 1030 (1978). This decision was vacated as moot in light of NRC's termination of
GESMO (Generic Environmental Statement Mixed Oxide Fuel). 42 Fed. Reg. 65,334
(1977).
1" 539 F.2d at 839 (emphasis added). Accord, Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus,
"
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tially based on such a premise, courts determined what procedures would allow participation to be meaningful and required
the "hybrid modes of procedure most appropriate to the issues
and circumstances."'' 4 Judge Wikley in Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC6 5
reasoned that if a court knows the degree of evidentiary support
required to establish a factual predicate, the court would know
the type of rulemaking procedures which must be designed to
create this support and which would be required to uphold the
agency's decision.' The required procedure is not contingent
upon the classification of the activity, but depends on the importance of the issues before the agency and the kinds of questions
involved.' 67 Complex questions should be "resolved in the crucible
of debate through the clash of informed but opposing scientific
and technological viewpoints."' 68 However, neither a formal hearing nor cross-examination is required if an adequate opportunity
to participate in developing the relevant evidence in an
"adversary setting" exists.' The court in Walter Holm & Co. v.
Hardin,710 stated that an opportunity to present an effective presentation is essential to ensure that the agency will take a hard
look at the problems in light of the written submissions.' Judge
Leventhal, summarizing what adjudicatory procedures are required, stated: "What counts is the reality of an opportunity to
submit an effective presentation,to assure that the Secretary and
his assistant will take a hard look at the problems in light of those
72
submissions."
486 F.2d 375, 393 n.67 (D.C. Cir. 1973); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478
F.2d 615, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
IU Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 500 (4th Cir. 1973).
"' 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
"' Id. at 1257.
67 Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 500-01 (4th Cir. 1973). Cf. Walter
Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971); American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB,
359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966).
" Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
"' American Pub. Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 498 F.2d 718, 722-23 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
.70 449 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
"I Id. at 1016. The court here was also concerned that the Secretary of Agriculture
was abusing his discretion by circumventing the statutorily imposed hearing procedure
under section 8c of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 7 U.S.C. § 608c
(1976). As a means of limiting this discretion, the court of appeals directed the district
court to issue a declaratory judgment that petitioners were entitled to a hearing with a
limited right of cross-examination on "crucial" issues. Id. The court stated that where
petitioners made "a not insubstantial claim that an effective showing requires oral presentation to Department officials . . . this right is available to them." Id.
'" Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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The court in Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC 3 explained its rationale' for imposing hybrid procedures by stating that the APA is
not dichotomized into two mutually exclusive procedures; rather,
it outlines a continuum of available hybrid procedures located
between the minimum and maximum articulated in section 553
and sections 556 and 557, respectively.' Flexibility in fitting
administrative procedures to particular functions was declared to
be the touchstone in evaluating the APA. 17 1 This flexible attitude
towards procedure is designed to assist eclectic agencies in meeting the multifarious situations arising as a result of their diverse
statutory authorization. However, the court failed to recognize an
unwanted ramification of this analysis, viz., administrative agencies would be placed in the quandry of choosing in advance the
appropriate procedure from a limitless variety of permutations
within the APA's boundaries. Once the putative dichotomy under
the APA is abandoned, the type of procedures in a rulemaking
proceeding becomes a litigable issue. The agency could be certain
that it utilized the proper procedural devices only in an ex post
facto fashion after the rendering of an appellate opinion. A similar analysis prompted the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. I" to negate any further judicial imposition of adjudicatory
procedures.
b. Vermont Yankee
The Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation applied for
a license to operate its nuclear plant, and, upon NRDC's objection to the granting of the license, a hearing was held on the
0' 483

F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Another potential rationale was that the section 553(c) requirement of giving interested persons an opportunity to participate "with or without opportunity for oral presentation," grants the agency discretion to decide whether such an opportunity will be granted;
but since a court is authorized to set aside agency action found to be "an abuse of
discretion," denial of such a request can be held to be reversible error. See Chemical
Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States, 368 F. Supp. 925, 946 (D. Del. 1973). Thus,
whenever a rulemaking proceeding involves a contested factual issue which is crucial in
determining the reasonableness of the rule and which is readily susceptible to the taking
of evidence, an agency may abuse its discretion if it fails to conduct an evidentiary
hearing. See Claggett, Informal Action-Adjudication-Rulemaking:Some Recent Developments in Federal Administrative Law, 1971 DUKE L.J. 51, 78, 86.
"7'
483 F.2d at 1251.
114

176

Id.

I" No. 76-419 (Sup. Ct. April 3, 1978).
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application.'78 The licensing board excluded testimony involving
the environmental effects of operations to reprocess and dispose
of nuclear fuel as not required under NEPA and granted the
operating license. Subsequently, a generic rulemaking was initiated by the Commission to specifically deal with the question of
these environmental effects. Although discovery and crossexamination were not allowed, extensive background documents
were publicly available, all participants were granted a reasonable opportunity to present their positions, written and oral statements were received, and all persons giving oral statements were
subject to cross-examination by the hearing board. 7 ' After the
hearing was completed, the Commission approved the rulemaking procedures, adopted a rule based on the data collected, and
declared that, because the environmental effects are
"insignificant," the NEPA benefit-cost analysis would not be affected and the granting of Vermont Yankee's operating license
would not have to be reexamined.1s° The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the portion of the order
which adopted a regulation concerning nuclear waste, held that
these environmental effects had to be analyzed in each licensing
proceeding, and, consequently, reversed the grant of Vermont
Yankee's license. 8'
After reading the lower court as invalidating the regulation
because of the inadequacy of the procedures employed, the Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that in the absence of
constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances, "the administrative agencies 'should be free to fashion their
own rules of procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable
of permitting them to discharge their multitudinous duties.' ""'2
The Court left no doubt but that the agencies, not the courts,
determine what extra procedural devices should be employed. 83
"I Consumers Power Co. v. Aeschliman et al., No. 76-528 (1978) (concerning review
of the Commission's procedures in a formal adjudicatory proceeding).
'J No. 76-419, slip op. at 6-7 (Sup. Ct. April 3, 1978).
" Id. at 8. The Commission also vacated the Appeal Board decision in Vermont
Yankee insofar as it differed from the rule as adopted. The Commission decided to require
licensing boards to consider the environmental effects as they are enumerated in Table
S-3, 10 C.F.R. 51.20(e) (1977).
1 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 547 F.2d at 641, 655.
Id. at 21 (citing FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965), quoting from FCC v.
I'
Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143 (1940)).
I No. 76-419, slip op. at 24 (Sup. Ct. April 3, 1978).
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The Court held that a court cannot review and overturn a rulemaking proceeding on the basis of what procedural devices were
employed, so long as the agency employs at least the APA minimums.' 4 The Court went on to explain that the proper scope of
judicial review of agency action comprehends a determination of
the adequacy of the record.'85 If the record is deemed inadequate,
it will be remanded, and the agency will be allowed to "exercise
its administrative discretion in deciding how, in light of internal
organization considerations, it may best proceed to develop the
I" Id. at 26. In order to evaluate the effect of the Court's opinion, the cases relied on
by it must be analyzed. The Supreme Court was interpreting the requirements of the APA,
but none of the holdings relied on by the Court [for the proposition that the APA does
not authorize courts to prescrive prescribe procedures] are on point. FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp., 423 U.S. 326 (1976), dealt with a court of appeals order which
directed the FPC how to investigate a claim and which deferred its review of the Commission's order pending the investigation. This case was based on an interpretation of section
19(b) of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1970), which stated that the Commission must have the opportunity to review its order based on the evidence it obtained after
remand. The appellate court's method directly contravened the statutory procedure.
Similarly, FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279 (1964), involved an interpretation of section
4(j) of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 154(j) (1958), which expressly grants
the FCC broad discretion in how to conduct its proceedings to grant licenses. In this case,
the appellate court totally usurped the Commission's function in direct contravention of
the act by not only prescribing the procedures to be used, but by also making the initial
decision on the evidence collected after remand. 381 U.S. at 333. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1939), also involved an interpretation of the Communications
Act and the respective roles played by the FCC and the courts under it.
Civil Aeronautics Board v. Herman, 353 U.S. 322 (1956), involved an interpretation
of section 1004(b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 102 1021, as
amended, 49 U.S.C. § 644(b) (1970). The Court in Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling,
327 U.S. 186 (1945) held that section 9 of the Federal Trade Comm'n Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat.
717 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. 99 41-51 (1970)), contained no provision for
judicial review of the applicability of the act to the subject company prior to judicial
enforcement of a subpoena duces tecum. Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944),
involved judicial acceptance of procedures devised by the Labor Board, not the imposition
of procedures by a court. Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943), construed the Walsh-Healy Act, ch. 881, 49 Stat. 2036 (1936) (current version at 41 U.S.C.
99 35-45 (1970)), as precluding district court review of whether the act applies to the
subject company when the agency authorized to administer the act applies for a subpoena
duces tecum. Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Comm'n, 306 U.S. 56 (1939),
involved a construction of section 10(a) of the Bituminous Coal Act, ch. 127, 50 Stat. 72
(1937) (version at 15 U.S.C. § 838 (1937) eliminated), and whether a petition for an
injunction stated a cause of action. Finally, Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States,
288 U.S. 294 (1933), construed section 315 of the Tariff Act, ch. 356, 42 Stat. 941 (1922)
(current version in scattered sections of 19,31,46 U.S.C.), which gave the Tariff Commission board authority "to adopt such reasonable procedures, rules, and regulations as it
may deem necessary." Additionally, almost all of these cases preceded the APA so that
they could in no way be deemed authority for a construction of it.
I" No. 76-419, slip op. at 22 (Sup. Ct. April 3, 1978).
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needed evidence and how its prior decision should be modified in
light of such evidence as develops."1 " Because the Court was not
certain whether the proceedings had provided a sufficient basis
upon which to predicate the rule, the decision was remanded to
the Court of Appeals for further review.
The Court also recognized that in exceptional circumstances,
"when an agency is making a 'quasi-judicial' determination by
which a very small number of persons are exceptionally affected,
in each case upon individual grounds," additional procedures
may be required." 7 However, this is the type of exception which
would be rarely utilized in the nuclear regulatory context, because these proceedings have at least an indirect effect on many
people.
3. Failure to Clarify Basis for Administrative Decision
Section 553(c) directs agencies "[aifter consideration of the
relevant matter presented" to "incorporate in the rules adopted
a concise general statement of their basis and purpose." These
statements must be more than mere boilerplate.'" They should
serve as detailed, substantive support for the rule by outlining
crucial empirical and policy issues, pointing to support in the
record for the agency decision, and responding to all significant
objections to the agency's approach and methodology submitted
by the participants. 8 The agency should explain its actions by
articulating with reasonable clarity its reasons for decision and by
identifying the significance of crucial facts."" If the agency does
not comply with this directive, a court may refuse to approve the
rule as adopted and may remand to the agency to obviate any
frustration of judicial review and to ensure that the agency gave
reasoned considerations to all material facts and issues.", This is
"Id.

Id. at 20. The Court failed to address how a lack of procedures would violate the
APA in this context.
' See Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir.
1968), where the court warned against reading the adjectives "concise" and "general" too
literally.
" See, e.g., Pillai v. CAB, 485 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1973); National Air Carrier Ass'n
v. CAB, 436 F.2d 185, 198-99 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
'go Greater Boston Tel. Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 923 (1971).
"I Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 792 (1968); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
'7
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also necessary to ensure that participants are not deprived of the
means to file an intelligent petition for reconsideration, 2 and
that the agency retains an early opportunity to be appraised of
and to correct any errors it may have committed. 9 '
This requirement codifies a long line of decisions requiring
agencies which issue reviewable orders to sufficiently explain
their actions so that judicial review is feasible. 14 If no such requirement existed, regulations would be affirmed whenever a reviewing court could derive any reasonable rationale for their
adoption." 5 Elucidation of the reasons and policies underlying an
agency decision assists the judiciary in fulfilling its function of
ensuring that agency action is the result of fair and reasoned
decision-making.'
A court is able to determine whether the
agency gave the required consideration only if the agency articulates the basis of its decision and identifies the facts which it
considered significant. "7 This aspect of the supervisory function
requires more active interference with an agency if the court suspects that the agency has not taken a "hard look" at the salient
problems and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decisionmaking.'
In the words of Judge Leventhal this process
"combines judicial supervision with a salutory principle of judicial restraint, an awareness that agencies and courts together
constitute a 'partnership' in furtherance of the public interest,
and are 'collaborative instrumentalities of justice.' "'"
The decision in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Ruckelshaus2rl demonstrates that agency action unaccompanied
"1 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1976) states "Each agency shall give an interested person the
right to petition for the . . .repeal of a rule."
, Tabor v. Joint Bd. for Enrollment of Actuaries, 566 F.2d 705, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943); American Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 179 F.2d 437 Cir. 1949); Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 96 F.2d 554 (D.C. Cir.
1938).
, Tabor v. Joint Bd. for Enrollment of Actuaries, 566 F.2d 705, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
"'
In view of this limited purpose, statements of less than ideal clarity have been held
to be sufficient. See New York Freight Forwarders and Brokers Ass'n v. Federal Maritime
Comm'n, 337 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 190 (1965).
" SEC v. Chenery Corp., 381 U.S. 80 (1943); City of Chicago v. FPC, 385 F.2d 629
(D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 945 (1968).
Pikes Peak Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 422 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 979 (1969); WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
"I Greater Boston Tel. Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 842, 851-52 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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by an adequate explanation is not acceptable. In this case, the
Secretary of Agriculture refused to suspend the federal registration for a pesticide under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act. 201 Although the Secretary recognized a substantial question concerning the safety of DDT, he concluded that a
summary suspension of its registration as interim relief during
the administrative process was not warranted. This conclusion
reflected both a factual determination and the application of a
legal standard. The Secretary was required to first determine
what harm may result and, based on his determination of the
magnitude and probability of the anticipated harm, he must then
decide whether this amounts to an "imminent hazard to the public." 1 The court of appeals remanded because the Secretary had
not given "an adequate explanation for his decision to deny interim relief."' " The Secretary should have determined whether
the available information called for suspension by identifying the
relevant factors and by relating the evidence to those factors in a
2 04
statement of reasons.
The Secretary has an obligation to limit the extent of his
discretion by formulating suspension standards either by promulgating regulations or by articulating his criteria in each individual decision. 201 The reviewing court cannot assume that proper
standards are implicit in every exercise of administrative discretion. 206 Chief Judge Bazelon in this decision made no attempt to
designate the scope of review in traditional APA terms, but focused on the importance of providing a structure for the exercise
of administrative discretion.2 07 If a "framework for principled decisionmaking" is provided, the importance of judicial review will
be diminished by the concomitant enhancement of the administrative process and the improvement in the quality of judicial
review where judicial review is sought.208 Judicial review can correct only the most flagrant abuses so it must operate to ensure
-1 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-135k (1970). The statutory scheme is summarized in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1095 nn.2-4 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
22 7 U.S.C. § 135b(c) (1970).
3 439 F.2d at 596.
2

Id.

205 Id.
2"

Id.
Id. at 597.
Id. at 598.
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that the administrative process itself will confine and control the
exercise of discretion.' 9
2 10
The court in InternationalHarvester Co. v. Ruckleshaus
used a burden of proof analysis to reach a similar conclusion.
After the automobile manufacturers established their argument
for the infeasibility of the emission standards, EPA was required
to sustain the "burden of adducing a reasoned presentation supporting the reliability of methodology. 2 11 The court remanded

the case because the Administrator had failed to make such a
presentation. The court thus used a burden-of-going-forward rationale as a device for controlling the risk of error. Although the
court was hesitant to interfere with EPA's resolution of a scientific issue, it refused to defer blindly to whatever methodology
EPA chose to support its analysis.
In Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA,212 the court determined

that the minimal requirements of section 553 were sufficient for
the promulgation of national secondary ambient air quality standards under the Clean Air Act.213 However, because EPA failed

to disclose the basis of its action, the record was remanded for the
Administrator to supply an implementing statement explaining
his basis for the standard to aid the court's reviewing function.2 1,
Although the minimal requirement of incorporation of a statement of basis and purpose was complied with, the requirements
of judicial review and "fairness" required additional exposition. t 5
The court stated that, inherent in its reviewing responsibility is
a requirement that it be given sufficient indication of the basis
of the administrator's decision to enable it to consider whether
2
the decision embodies an abuse of discretion or an error of law. 1
Although the APA does not expressly require that agencies
respond to the multifarious contentions addressed in the written
comments, the necessity of providing a statement of basis and
purpose has been construed to include the requirement of reId.
/"
210

478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

"I Id. at 643.

462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
U.S.C. §§ 1857c-3, 4 (1970).
211 462 F.2d at 850.
215 Id.
212

2,1 42

"I Id. at 849.
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sponding to significant adverse comments which offer specific
contentions rebutting the factual foundations of the rule. " ' The
21 8
court in Rodway v. United States Department of Agriculture
held that the statement of basis and purpose is designed to require the agency to prepare a reasoned response to the comments
received, to explain how the agency resolved any significant problems raised by the comments, and to show how that resolution
culminated in the ultimate rule adopted.21 1 This statement is
"inextricably intertwined with the receipt of comments. ' 220 If a
party can demonstrate that a rule was promulgated without consideration of the submitted comments, the courts will reverse the
agency's action as arbitrary and capricious. 22 However, the
agency can limit the extent of its response to preserve the effi222
ciency of the rulemaking process.
The proposed rule's opponent's primary method for exposing
weakness or error in the agency's premises and methodology is the
comments he submits. If an agency is permitted to ignore them
or to denigrate their importance by providing a cursory review
and no response, the agency is rendering the opponent's participation meaningless. Agencies must closely evaluate these comments to be able to prepare a response. If no response is forthcoming, the reviewing court cannot determine whether the agency
took the requisite hard look, whether the decision was based on
217 Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973), See Kennecott Copper
Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
- Rodway v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
211Id. at 817; See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir.

1970); cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
n' Rodway v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809, (D.C. Cir. 1975). In
support of this statement the court reasoned:
The APA requires the reviewing court to "review the whole record" in measuring the validity of agency action. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970). The whole record
in an informal rule-making case is comprised of comments received, hearings
held, if any, and the basis and purpose statement. In this case, there is
plainly no whole record to review and the District Court could not perform
its appellate function. (Footnote omitted.)
Id. at 817.
" See Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n,
491 F.2d 810, 812 (2d Cir. 1974).
I See Owensboro On the Air, Inc. v. United States, 262 F.2d 702, 708 (D.C. Cir.
1958), where the court stated "Surely every time the [FCC] decided to take account of
some additional factor it was not required to start the proceedings all over again. If such
were the rule the proceeding might never be terminated." Accord, International Harvester
Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 632 n.51 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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a consideration of the relevant factors, or whether the agency
committed a clear error of judgment.r When an agency decision
is remanded because of failure to respond to significant comments, the remand is in aid of the judicial review function, rather
than a determination that the agency order was invalid because
2 4
of inadequate procedures. 1
Cement manufacturers sought review of EPA's promulgation
of stationary source standards for new or modified Portland cement plants pursuant to the Clean Air Act in Portland Cement
Ass'n v. Ruckleshaus.2 2 The court remanded because EPA failed
to respond to significant adverse comments concerning legitimate
problems with EPA's test methodology. 22 Agencies must demonstrate that they have given serious consideration to the submitted
comments and a reviewing court may demand reasoned explanations for controversial empirical and normative agency determinations. The agency has substantial latitude over the format of
the statement, but it must refer to relevant submissions by participants and should rebut or accept these submissions in an
orderly fashion. The agency's duty to rationalize its decision is
not met by post hoc rationalizations offered for the first time
Cf. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
7 The Supreme Court in Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973) (per curiam), outlined
the proper procedure to be followed when a reviewing court decides that an administrative
agency's stated justification for informal agency adjudication does not provide an adequate basis for judicial review. Although this case dealt with informal adjudication, the
Court did not focus on the rulemaking-adjudication distinction, but rather on the appropriate method for reviewing informal agency action. See Tabor v. Joint Bd. For Enrollment of Actuaries, 566 F.2d 705, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The appropriate standard of review
was whether the Comptroller's decision was the "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law" as specified by APA section 706(2)(A). If
the failure to explain the administrative action frustrates review, the remedy is to remand
to the agency for it to provide "either through affidavits or testimony, such additional
explanation of the reasons for the agency decision as may prove necessary." 411 U.S. at
143.
The court in Tabor v. Joint Bd. for Enrollment of Actuaries, 566 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir.
1977), described the procedure to be utilized when an agency involved in informal rulemaking does not incorporate a statement of basis and purpose in the adopted rules. The
proper method is to vacate the rules and remand to the agency to enable it to adopt
regulations accompanied by a sufficient statement. Id. at 711. Accord, Rodway v. United
States Dep't of Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1975). But cf. National Food Ass'n v.
Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1975) (wherein the court did not vacate the rules and
remand, but allowed the agency to present the necessary statement through affidavits or
testimony before the court. Id. at 701.)
n' 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
22 Id. at 393.
2n
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during judicial review of the agency action.2 Unless an adequate
agency response is prepared, the court cannot determine whether
the agency took the requisite "hard look" at the problem involved.
Although written comments were submitted as required,2
this was not sufficient to develop an adequate record and fulfill
the reviewing court's duty to consider whether "the decision was
based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there
had been a clear error of judgment. '12 If the record contains only
ambiguous and conclusory statements about the basis of the rule,
and if a participant offers precise factual contentions rebutting
the factual foundation of the rule, the rule cannot be judicially
approved until factual clarification is achieved.130 If the record
fosters doubt about a necessary factual predicate of an otherwise
valid rule, the court is unable to affirm the rule.
Although imposing procedural requirements in excess of the
APA's minimums is no longer a viable option for courts to use
when reviewing informal rulemaking, it is clear that courts are no
longer bowing to bland assertions of administrative discretion.
Courts must still review the adequacy of the record, and agencies
must recognize that broadened participation facilitates the development of an adequate record. The holdings of many hybrid rulemaking cases would not be greatly modified if the court was precluded from imposing procedures-the record would continue to
be inadequate. As Judge Friendly pointed out, 31 it is ultimately
of little consequence to the agency if a court invalidates the rule
because the record is inadequate or if the court goes a step further
and imposes ad hoc procedures to generate an adequate record.
In both cases, the rule is invalidated and further procedures are
necessary. Now that the later procedure is unavailable, the
agency must devise procedures designed to rectify the record with
no judicial assistance.
Increased judicial activity has encouraged agencies to modify
their rulemaking procedures and decisionmaking processes, espeBurlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167-69 (1962).
486 F.2d at 393 n.67.

Id. at 403 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416
(1971)).
g' 486 F.2d at 393-94.
'

Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. Rv.1267, 1314 (1975).
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cially for rules which involve highly complex technical or scientific subject matters. Thus, if the nuclear power industry is to use
rulemaking as a reform technique and as a means of self-help, it
must request those procedures which are tailored to the subject
matter of their proposed rule. Pure notice and comment rulemaking for important factual matters in the highly visible environmental arena, curtailed by the hybrid rulemaking cases, may not
be completely revitalized, as Vermont Yankee merely placed the
onus on each agency to determine how to devise procedures which
will generate a proper record.
III. RULEMAKING AS A REFORM TECHNIQUE
In the absence of legislative reform designed to make licensing more efficient, rulemaking presents an opportunity for selfhelp reform. To be effective, the nuclear power industry must be
willing to play the rulemaking game by proposing, rather than
resisting, the appropriate degree of discovery and crossexamination in NRC rulemaking proceedings. Discovery may be
used to significantly delay the proceeding, but it serves the valid
purpose of providing parties with enough information to adequately advocate their interests.2 3 2 Cross-examination contains
the greatest potential for delay and it is also the most difficult
device for the hearing board to control, yet it may be useful for
developing an accurate and comprehensive record when complex
factual issues are involved.
Prior to proposing a rule, industry proponents should select
the most suitable procedural devices by considering the issues
involved and the experience and capacity of the agency. One of
the least intrusive, but most effective devices, is the use of interrogatories among the participants and the agency. This approach
was utilized in both the GESM 0233 and the uranium fuel cycle
rulemakings.1 4 In both of these proceedings, written questions
were more efficacious than oral ones. Unfortunately, reliance on
written interrogatories is timeconsuming, the answers to technical questions are often labored and drafted by nontechnical counsel, and this device ordinarily requires followup questions to be
212

Note, The Use of Generic Rulemaking To Resolve EnvironmentalIssues in Nuclear

Power Plant Licensing, 61 VA. L. REV. 869, 897 (1975).
11 39 Fed. Reg. 43,101 (1974).
2'
Prehearing Conference Order, Docket No. 50-3 (August 12, 1977).
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effective."' If a second round of followup questions is required,
they can be propounded at a legislative-type hearing, as occurred
in the second phase of the uranium fuel cycle proceeding. 3 1 When
there are many participants involved, the most efficient procedure is to have oral questions propounded by the hearing board.
The most intrusive procedural device, cross-examination, is
extremely time consuming and should be infrequently requested.
Commentators have disagreed over the effectiveness of crossexamination to resolve scientific controversies.2 37 Professor Robinson has argued that cross-examination requires "the agency to
explain and articulate the assumptions and the foundations on
which its policies rest,2 3 but he has not demonstrated that less
intrusive methods would not be equally efficacious. Conversely,
other commentators have stated that cross-examination frequently achieves little that could not be obtained by other devices. 238 The utility of cross-examination cannot be generalized
because its utility is situation-specific, i.e., it may be effective in
some situations, but may be time consuming and ineffective in
others.
This device may also give leverage to opponents of a proposed rule. It presents an opportunity for delay; it gives challengers a bargaining tool; and it subtly exerts pressure on the proponent to take a milder stand, so that the heavy investment of
resources involved in supporting the more extreme position in
1 In the long run, reliance on interrogatories is much more efficient than relying on
an oral hearing to obtain the information. Compare In Re Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling, Systems for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Reactors, AEC
Docket RM-50-1 (37 Fed. Reg. 288 (1972) (adjudicatory procedures adopted after initial
notice of proposed rulemaking)), with In Re Environmental Effects of the Uranium Fuel
Cycle, NRC Docket No. 50-3 (37 Fed. Reg. 24, 191 (1972) (notice of proposed rulemaking;
procedures will not include cross-examination or discovery)).
"I Prehearing Conference Order, Docket No. 50-3 (August 12, 1977).
117 Compare Johnston, AEC Rulemaking and Public Participation,
62 GEo. L.J. 1737,
1743 (1974); (cross-examination is effective as it reveals value judgments underlying
"objective" conclusions), with Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearings
for Resolving Complex Scientific, Economic, and Social Issues, 71 MIcH. L. REV. 111, 129
(1972) (cross-examination may hamper rather than advance accurate factual resolution
of complex scientific issues).
" Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and
Adjudication and Administrative ProcedureReform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 522 (1970).
' See, e.g., Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the Administrative Procedure
Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 401, 430-45 (1975).
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cross-examination is not required. 40 However, cross-examination
may also have the beneficial effect of discouraging participation
by persons who oppose a rule on general grounds, but who possess no helpful expertise, because they too will have to invest
substantial resources if they desire to testify in the proceeding.
Cross-examination may also play a crucial role in elucidating
issues in some rulemaking contexts. Additionally, the very existence of a right to cross-examination may inhibit falsehood and
shoddy analysis, or it may lead a witness to bring out information
adverse to his position on direct to prevent its disclosure on crossexamination.
If NRC proposes an unsatisfactory rule, a critic of the rule
may request that the agency furnish a statement of methodology
prior to any final agency action in order to propagate detailed
criticism.141 Such a procedure is exemplified by EPA's process of
promulgating effluent limitation guidelines under the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act.242 This is essentially a two-round
process in which EPA provides interested persons a technical
analysis of the issues prepared by private consultants prior to its
initial notice of rulemaking. After the comments on the drafts are
received, EPA promulgates its proposed rule and its own draft
report attempting to substantiate the proposed rule.2 43 This procedure assures EPA that it will be aware of all the complex scientific, technical, and economic issues.
There are disadvantages in using formal rulemaking to reform the nuclear licensing process, expecially in proceedings
which involve anything more than the minimum requirements of
section 553. Adjudicatory procedures may have the inherent proclivity of encouraging a multiplicity of litigation and propagating
ponderous records which tend to frustrate organization. The rule
may not be adopted at all, or it may not be adopted as proposed.
Additionally, rulemaking proceedings can be very expensive and
drawn out, as the ECCS proceeding demonstrated. 4 4 However, if
adversity occurs, industry must have the resolve to finance its
"I Id. at

443.
21' Failure to grant such a request may furnish another basis for appeal. See notes
67-72 supra.
24233 U.S.C. §§ 1257-1265 (Supp. V 1975).
2 38 Fed. Reg. 21,202-06 (1973).
244 See Freeman, The AEC's Recent Experiment in "Evidentiary" Rule Making, 28
Bus. LAw 663, 669-70 (1973).
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commitment and to carry the matter into the courtroom.
There is also a justifiable fear that opponents of nuclear
power would use the same tactics in rulemaking proceedings as
they use in licensing proceedings. Some nuclear opponents have
adopted a "no win" strategy in which the NRC licensing hearings
are not viewed in the traditional terms of winning or losing, but
are used as a means of achieving another objective-the ultimate
demise of nuclear power. 45 The environmentalists may also perceive the hearing as an opportunity to debate the public policy
of using nuclear power. To further this aim, proceedings are
24 6
dramatized to increase media coverage.
Intervenors who oppose the construction of nuclear plants
frequently rest their cases entirely on delaying tactics and jurisprudential gymnastics rather than on any substantive legal or
factual challenge. Rather than contest factors unique to each
plant, such as the adequacy of its radiation safeguards and the
expected local environmental effects, some opponents continue to
raise the same fundamental questions of fact, such as the basic
danger of nuclear power. 4 7 Such contentions are not really factual, but are policy questions which should be resolved by the
NRC in a rulemaking proceeding, not in an individual licensing
proceeding.2 48 Delay and its consequent expense provide a potent
weapon and can be used to force a utility to accept more stringent
safeguards or extra equipment designed to further reduce any
environmental effects of the plant. 24 1 Environmentalists may also
seek judicial review to provide time to obtain an ultimate resolution through the political process and to engender support by
focusing legislative attention on their problems. 250 In this way,
benefits from lengthy administrative hearings are maximized
2 Like, Multi-Media Confrontation-The Environmentalists' Strategy for a "NoWin" Agency Proceeding, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 495 (1971).
24'

Id.

See Murphy, The National EnvironmentalPolicy Act and the Licensing Process:
Environmentalist Magna Carta or Agency Coup de Grace? 72 COLUM. L. REv. 963 (1972).
P' See Note, The Use of Generic Rulemaking To Resolve Environmental Issues in
Nuclear Power Plant Licensing, 61 VA. L. REv. 869 (1975). Indeed, Congress in enacting
the Atomic Energy Act and in funding the NRC each year has determined that nuclear
power is "good" and should be encouraged. Such a basic policy issue cannot ever appropriately be before the NRC.
" Willrich, The Energy-Environment Conflict: Siting Electric Power Facilities, 58
VA. L. REV. 257, 326 (1972).
J. SAx, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 114 (1971).
24
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even when the chances of an administrative victory are nonexistent. The adoption of adjudicatory procedures in rulemaking pro2 51
ceedings may prompt use of the same or similar tactics.
Rulemaking proceedings can benefit the nuclear industry as
well as the opponents. First of all, it is much better to have the
NRC use adjudicatory procedures and to request them when appropriate in petitions for rulemaking, than it is to have the resulting rules overturned on appeal because of an inadequate record.
For example, more preparation and analysis of the backend of the
fuel cycle would have expedited the first uranium fuel cycle rulemaking22 and, consequently, would have prevented the August,
1976, to December, 1976, nuclear licensing moratorium.2 51 The
industry should use their resources and do the studies and experiments required to prove the practicability and usefulness of proposed rules. It is better to invest time and resources in this type
of rulemaking effort than to be constantly confronted with delay
in individual licensing proceedings. If generic rules are adopted,
the effectiveness of nuclear opponent's delaying tactics in individual licensing proceedings will ultimately be diminished.
Rulemaking proceedings can also be beneficial to the public.
"' Critics of nuclear power have substantially affected the nuclear industry. See
Freeman, The AEC's Recent Experiment in "Evidentiary"Rule Making, 28 Bus. LAw 663
(1973). For example, the nuclear opponents used their writings and testimony in licensing
proceedings to urge a reduction in the upper limits of radiological effluents from nuclear
plants during normal operating conditions. In response to these attacks, utilities volunteered to comply with much lower limits. One utility stated that it would be willing to
accept technical specifications limiting its nuclear releases to 1 percent of the existing
regulatory (10 C.F.R. § 20 (1977)) levels. This challenge also focused public attention on
the critics' exaggerated fears and prompted the AEC to promulgate Appendix I to X
C.F.R. § 50, which requires nuclear plants to be constructed and operated so as to hold
radioactive releases "as low as practicable."
" The NRC adopted table S-3 to quantify the environmental effects of the uranium
fuel cycle in the NEPA benefit-cost ratio in individual nuclear power plant licensing
proceedings. The portion of this table dealing with disposal of the radioactive wastes was
struck down by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d
633 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National
Defense Council, Inc., No. 76-419 (Sup. Ct. Apr. 3, 1978) because of inadequate development of the administrative record. Even the Supreme Court's reversal of this case did not
end the matter, because the Court remanded to determine the adequacy of the record.
233 Immediately after the decision, the NRC placed a moratorium on licensing
of all current nuclear plant applications pending completion of a new rulemaking. 41
Fed. Reg. 34,707 & 34,408 (1976). Shortly after promulgating an interim rule, 41 Fed. Reg.
45,849 (1976), the NRC revoked the moratorium on pending applications, using the interim rule to determine the environmental impact of new plants on the uranium fuel cycle.
41 Fed. Reg. 49,898 (1976).
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Broad participation by industry and public interest groups in an
adversary-type setting with the consequent airing of a wide range
of opinions and factual statements could minimize the possibility
of inaccurate determinations in the rulemaking.254 Such participation would test the premises upon which the proposed rule is
based and would increase the chances that the NRC would be
apprised of all the relevant facts.255 This would foster the legitimate aims of the public interest groups, since they could focus
their merger resources in one proceeding without resorting to
using a "no win" strategy of delay in individual licensing proceedings. From industry's standpoint the more an opponent's resources are beneficially utilized in rulemaking efforts, the less
these resources can be used to delay individual proceedings. 56
Additionally, if opponents perceive a fair chance of influencing
NRC action, they may make less use of disruptive delaying tactics in subsequent licensing proceedings. 57
Industry could petition for a number of rules which would
make future licensing proceedings more efficient and effective.
One obvious example is eliminating the necessity of considering
the need for power and alternative methods of generating power
at the operating license stage. 58 These matters are fully considered at the construction permit stage and it seems ludicrous to
require reconsideration after construction of the plant is completed and it is ready to operate. Another example is elimination
of the formal adjudicatory proceedings utilized for the issuance
of construction permits and operating licenses. The Atomic Energy Act does not require adjudication;2 1 this is only required by
NRC regulations.2 e° While legislative proposals have been intro2" See Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Participationin the
Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525, 529-30 (1972).
" See Note, The Use of Generic Rulemaking To Resolve Environmental Issues in
Nuclear Power Plant Licensing, 61 VA. L. REv. 869, 882 (1975).
Id.
I'
'7 See Coggins, The Environmentalist's View of AEC's "Judicial Function, " 15
ATOM. EN. L.J. (1973).
" Such a proposal is contained in the President's nuclear licensing reform proposal.
See note 3, supra.
2'9 Bauser, The Development of Rulemaking Within the Atomic Energy Commission:
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Valuable Legacy, 27 AD. L. REv. 165, 169 n.32
(1975). Cf. United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973); United States v.
Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 407 U.S. 908 (1972).
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duced to alter this situation, 6 ' no legal barrier prevents the NRC
from changing the structure of its hearings and not requiring
formal adjudicatory hearings in the absence of disputed facts or
issues. These are but two suggestions, but many more can be
devised. The industry should seriously consider utilizing rulemaking as an effective reform technique.
" 10 C.F.R. § 2.761a (1977).
See, e.g., Regulatory Procedures Reform Act, S. 2490, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978)
(introduced Feb. 6, 1978, and not yet acted on).
''
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INTRODUCTION

Transfers of technical information, in particular, know-how,
by a domestic parent corporation to a controlled foreign subsidiary pose difficult tax problems for the domestic parent. Section
351(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that:
[Nbo gain or loss shall be recognized if property is transfered to a
corporation by one or more persons solely in exchange for stock or
securities' in such corporation and immediately after the exchange
such . .. persons are in control 2 .

.

.of the corporation. For pur-
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I If the taxpayer fails to receive stock or securities in exchange for the transfer of
property, the transaction will likely be treated as an ordinary sale or exchange. Any gain
in excess of the adjusted cost of the property transferred will be fully taxable. If, however,
the property qualifies as a capital asset under section 1221, and if the requirements of
section 1231 or section 1235 are met, a transfer of technology may qualify for special
capital gains treatment. See text accompanying notes 54-104 infra which discusses this
issue with respect to transfers of know-how in conjunction with transfers of patents, secret
formulas, and secret processes.
However, in certain circumstances even capital gains treatment will be denied transfers of technology, even though the transaction would otherwise qualify for capital gains
treatment. Where the property exchanged is "a patent, an invention, model, or design
(whether or not patented), a copyright, a secret formula or process, or any other similar
property right," and the transfer is to a foreign corporation "controlled" by the transferor,
any gain will be taxed at ordinary rates. Control is defined as "more than 50 percent of
the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote." I.R.C. § 1249.
Thus if a transfer should fail because stock or securities in the transferee was not received
in exchange, or because the transferor did not have 80% control of the corporation after
completion of the transfer (see note 2 infra and accompanying text) but had the requisite
50% control, there will be no special capital gains rate applicable to the transfer.
Section 1249 would presumably come into play also when the taxpayer met the
requirements of section 351, but failed to comply with the requirements established under
section 367 with respect to tax-free transfers of property to foreign corporations. Otherwise, if the transfer qualifies under section 351, there will be no taxable event, and the
transaction will not be subject to tax under section 1249. S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 C.B., at 1013. See J. BiscHL, TAXATION OF PATENTS,
TRADam1uKs, COPYIuGHrS, AND KNOW-How 6 (1974, Supp. 1976).
Control for the purposes of section 351 is defined in section 368(c) as "the ownership
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services shall not be considered as prop-

Although in foreign transfers the transferor must also satisfy the
reporting requirements under section 367, 3 it is the ambiguous
of stock possessing at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of
stock entitled to vote and at least 80 percent of the total number of shares of all other
classes of stock of the corporation."
Note that, under the new rules for section 1491 imposed by the Tax Reform Act of
1976, a transfer which fails to qualify under section 351 may be subject to a 35% excise
tax. Section 1491 imposes an excise tax of 35% "on the transfer of property by a citizen
or resident of the United States, or by a domestic corporation or partnership, or by a trust
which is not a foreign trust, to a foreign corporationas paid-in surplus or as a contribution
to capital, or to a foreign trust, or to a foreign partnership ..
" The tax is imposed on
the difference between the fair market value of the property transferred and the sum of
the taxpayer's adjusted basis in the property and the amount of gain recognized to the
transferor at the time of the transfer.
The excise tax of section 1491 is not imposed on transfers which qualify for consideration under section 367. I.R.C. § 1492(3). However, one should note that the excise tax
applies to transfers of "all types of property." S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 222,
reprinted in 1976-3 (vol. 3) C.B., at 260. Therefore, if one transfers technology to a foreign
corporation, and does not qualify the transfer under section 351 or a related section subject
to 367, and the Service considers that the transfer is paid-in surplus or a contribution to
capital, the rules of section 1491 will be applicable. A taxpayer can avoid section 1491
through such strategies as electing to be taxed on the latent gain in the property transferred under section 1057; or the transferor may seek an advance ruling from the Service
that the transfer is not for tax avoidance purposes. I.R.C. § 1492. See Alpert & Feingold,
Tax Reform Act Toughens Foreign Transfer Provisions of 1491 and Liberalizes 367, 46 J.
TAX. 2 (1977).

Note further that in any transfer subject to either general taxing rules or the specialized provisions of section 1491, the taxpayer cannot avoid tax by selling the technology
for less than fair market value in a transfer, sale, or exchange which is not at arms length.
The allocation rules of section 482 will adjust the transfer so that it will reflect "market
realities."
I Section 367 was created by the Revenue Act of 1932 primarily to foreclose schemes
designed to avoid taxation on the appreciation of capital assets. H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1932); S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 26-27 (1932). Prior to the
Tax Reform Act of 1976, if a taxpayer sought to make a tax-free exchange (under sections
332, 351, 354, 356, or 361) involving a foreign corporation, he would be required, in most
instances, to obtain advance approval from the Service. The taxpayer had the burden of
demonstrating to the Service "that such exchange is not in pursuance of a plan having as
one of its principal purposes the avoidance of Federal income taxes." Int. Rev. Code of
1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 47, as amended by Pub. L. No. 91-681, § 1(a), 84 Stat. 2065
(current version at I.R.C. § 367(a)).
As often happens, the cure can be as distasteful as the disease. The principal problem
arising under the above provisions was the hardship which resulted from forcing the
taxpayer to await the decision of the Service before he could execute his exchange. If the
Service gave an adverse ruling, the taxpayer would have to consider further delaying the
transfer until litigation was completed. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION GENERAL ExPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 258, reprinted in 1976-3
(vol. 2) C.B., at 270 [hereinafter cited as JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT].
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The new rules were thus designed to minimize notice requirements, and where notice
is required to make notice procedures more palatable. The Amendments first draw the
distinction between transfers into and out of the United States. Transfers out of the
United States will still be required to obtain approval of the Service. The taxpayer must
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Service that the "exchange is not in pursuance of a
plan having as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of Federal income taxes."
However, this determination need no longer be made in advance. The taxpayer need only
file a request for a determination not later than the close of the 183rd day after the
beginning of the transfer. I.R.C. § 367(a)(1). The Act also provides that the Secretary may
designate certain out-bound transfers to be exempt from filing requirements, subject to
any toll charges arising under section 367. I.R.C. § 367(a)(2). These exemptions from the
clearance requirement are to be created for "outbound transfers where significant tax
avoidance possibilities do not exist or where the amount of any 367 toll charge can be
ascertained without a ruling request." S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong. 2d Sess., at 265,
reprinted in 1976-3 (Vol. 2) C.B., at 303. A toll charge is in essence an agreement to include
in income certain of the items transferred.
For example, if a section 351 Transfer to a foreign corporation involves only
the transfer of cash and inventory property, the Secretary may by regulations
designate the transaction as one which does not require the filing of a request, although the regulations would require the inventory to be taken into
income.
JOINT COMM. REP. at 261, reprinted in 1976-3 (Vol. 2) C.B., at 273.
With respect to inbound transfers, no filing is required. Instead, these transfers will
be judged according to regulations published by the Service. I.R.C. § 367(b).
To dissuade the Service from using section 367 as a broad sword to deny nonrecognition status to seemingly permissible potential nonrecognition exchanges, Congress expressly mandated judicial review of the Service's actions. Upon challenge, the Tax Court
is to review both the Service's conclusion with respect to tax avoidance in general, as well
as any specific conditions imposed by the Service in particular. JOINT COMM. REP. at 261,
reprinted in 1976-3 (Vol. 2) C.B., at 273.
The Tax Court is to review whether the Secretary's determination as to tax
avoidance is reasonable and whether the conditions imposed in making the
determinations are reasonable conditions in order to prevent the avoidance
of income tax. If the Tax Court finds that the Secretary's terms and conditions are not reasonable, then the Tax Court is to make a declaration as to
the terms and conditions which it finds to be reasonable in order to prevent
the avoidance of income taxes.
JOINT COMM. REP. at 262, reprinted in 1976-3 (Vol. 2) C.B., at 274. With respect to inbound
transfers the Report also states:
These regulations are to be subject to normal court review as to whether the
regulations are necessary or appropriate for the prevention of avoidance of
Federal income taxes. Thus, a taxpayer may challenge a proposed deficiency
with respect to an exchange dealt with in the regulations by arguing in the
courts that the regulations, as applied in the taxpayer's case, are not necessary or appropriate to prevent the avoidance of federal income taxes.
JOINT COMM. REP. at 263-64, reprinted in 1976-3 (Vol. 2) C.B., at 275-76.
The Joint Committee emphasizes that section 367 rules are designated to prevent tax
avoidance only, and should be applied only to the extent necessary to meet this objective.
Although not meant to be exclusive, the committee provided examples of the ills which
section 367 was designated to cure:
Transactions in the first group [outbound transfers generally include those
transactions where the statutory aim is to prevent the removal of appreciated
assets or inventory from U.S. tax jurisdiction prior to their sale, while transactions in the second group [inbound transfers] include those where the
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language of section 351(a), not the added burden of section 367,
which poses the real difficulties for a taxpayer transfering technology to a foreign subsidiary. The current language of section
351(a) generates numerous unanswered questions.4 Specifically,
what forms of technology represent qualifying "property"? What
forms of technology are in essence services and thereby excepted
from the concept of property by the "services" exclusion in the
last sentence of section 351(a)? And finally, what forms of agreements will qualify as actual "transfers" of rights, rather than
mere licensing arrangements? Without answers to these questions, a taxpayer must plan his international operations without
the benefit of foreknowledge of the tax consequences of his decisions.
statutory purpose in most cases is to prepare for taxation the accumulated
profits of controlled foreign corporations.
JOINT COMM. REP. at 260, reprinted in 1976-3 (Vol. 3) C.B., at 272. Presumably, if a
transaction does not fit the mold of the prohibited avoidance schemes noted above, the
Service cannot use section 367 to deny nonrecognition status to the transfer. Examples of
items which the Service will not recognize as tax-free exchanges under section 351 can be
found in Guidelinesregardingcertain transactionsinvolving foreign corporationsrequiring
an advance ruling under section 367 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Rev. Proc. 6823, 1968-1 C.B. 821, 823-25, § 3.02. For a discussion of the proposed regulations under
section 367, see Arthur & Paisley, Section 367: Working With the Temporary Regulations,
4 INT'L TAX J. 859 (1978). For a review of the new rules under section 367 published prior
to the issuance of the Service's proposed regulations on the subject, see Paisley, Section
367-A Look at the Recent Amendments, 4 INT'L TAX J. 692 (1977). Alpert & Feingold,
supra note 2. For an analysis of the Guidelines under section 367, see, e.g., Sitrick, Section
367 and Tax Avoidance: An Analysis of the Section 367 Guidelines, 25 TAX L. Rav. 429
(1970); Special Committee on Section 367 Policies, Tax Section, New York State Bar
Ass'n, Comments on Guidelines for Rulings under Section 367 Concerning Foreign
Corporations,23 TAx LAWYER 151 (1969).
1 See, e.g., Cohen, Long-Awaited Ruling on Transfer of Know-How Sets Guidelines
in Important Areas, 21 J. TAX. 38 (1964); Flyer & Buell, Tax-free Transfers of Computer
Software to Foreign Corps: An Up-to-date Analysis, 41 J. TAx. 26 (1974); Note, Transfers
of Technical Know-How to Controlled Foreign Corporations, 5 VA. J. INT'L L. 81 (1964).
See also Dunn, The Transfer of Know-how to Controlled Corporations, 39 TAXEs 571
(1961), written prior to the issuance of Rev. Rul. 64-56. See generally, Dean, Transfers to
Controlled Corporations:Analyzing The Problem Areas, 41 J. TAx 72 (1974); Goodman,
How to Avoid Tax Problems Under Section 351 When TransferringServices in Exchange
for Stock, 55 TAxEs 112 (1977).
5 Some of the potential penalties of failing to qualify under section 351 are discussed
in note 182 infra. Although perhaps less likely to occur in the context of foreign transactions, in some circumstances the taxpayer will purposely want to avoid the impact of
section 351. See, e.g., Fisher, The Conversion of Ordinary Income to Capital Gain by
Intentionally Avoiding Section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code, 32 Mo. L. REv. 421
(1967); Note, Careful Tax Planning Avoid 351 for Stepped-Up Basis, 27 J. TAX 20-21
(1967).

TRANSFERS OF KNOW-HOW

The taxpayer encounters the greatest difficulties when the
"property" to be transferred consists wholly or predominantly of
technical know-how. Very often, know-how consists of nothing
more than information. It may or may not be secret; it may or
may not be unique, novel, or original.' Very often the information
transferred represents little more than accumulated experience,
efficiencies, or skills that have been developed over time.7 Certainly such information is valuable to both the transferor and the
transferee.' But the test under section 351 is not explicitly one of
"value"; it is one of "property." ' What forms of valuable information can the taxpayer qualify as "property"? Moreover, even
overcoming the property hurdle, what rights may the transferor
retain in the transferred information while still complying with
the transfer requirements under section 351?
This article will examine these questions. In so doing, the
authors will attempt to provide clarity to current taxing rules
which are at best ambiguous and at worst contradictory. The
analysis which follows addresses three major questions: (1) For
the purposes of know-how, how broadly have the words
"property" and "services" been construed in past tax law decisions; (2) given the courts' treatment of these terms and in light
of recent trade secret developments, what specific forms of knowhow should qualify as "property" for the purposes of section 351;
and, (3) assuming that the information qualifies as "property,"
what forms of transactions qualify as "transfers" for the purposes
of section 351? In general the authors will attempt to highlight
those instances where the Internal Revenue Service has misconstrued the letter and the spirit of the words "property,"
"services," and "transfer," the operative language of section 351.
I. "PROPERTY" AND "SERVICES" WITHIN SECTION 351
As the cynical observer might expect, the Internal Revenue
Service has attempted to limit the term "property" to its narrowest construction, while broadening the concept of taxable services
' See text accompanying notes 162-165 infra.
See R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 2.09[3] (1977); Z. CAVITCH, BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS § 232.02[2] (1978); MacDonald, Know-how Licensing and the Antitrust
Laws, 62 MICH. L. REv. 351, 352-55 (1964); text accompanying notes 174-176 infra.
See text accompanying notes 155-171 infra.
' The authors later argue that the concept of value and of property are nearly synonomous. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 180-190 infra.
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to its fullest sweep. The Service's basic approach to the analysis
of know-how within the meaning of section 351 is set out in Revenue Ruling 64-56.10 In this ruling, the Service conceded that items
which constitute property in the hands of the transferor will qualify as "property" within section 351. "Once it is established that
'property' has been transferred, the transfer will be tax-free under
section 351 even though services were used to produce the property."'" This statement of course begs the question of what is and
is not property. The Service also conceded that secret processes
and secret formulas are property for the purposes of section 351.12
However, as discussed below, there has never been a real dispute
as to whether these most protected of trade secrets fall within
section 351.11
Besides the statement that information "in the general nature of a patentable invention" will be property, 4 the Service
provides little definition to the term "property" in the remainder
of its ruling. The Service does note that, at a minimum, information must be secret and must receive "substantial" legal protection in order to qualify as a nonrecognition property transfer: "It
is assumed for the purpose of this Revenue Ruling that the country in which the transferee is to operate affords to the transferor
substantial legal protection against the unauthorized disclosure
and use of the process, formula, or other secret information involved."' 5 Significantly, however, the Service did not state that
the presence in the transferee nation of legal protection is, in
itself, sufficient to make secret information property for purposes
of section 351. Thus, except for secret processes and secret formulas, the Service stands ready to challenge the "property" status
of secret information-even if that knowledge is afforded legal
protection as a valuable right: "Other information which is secret
will be given consideration as 'property' on a case-by-case
basis." 6
Left without any real guidance as to what constitutes prop1964-1 (Part 1) C.B. 133.
Id. at 134.
12

Id.

11See text accompanying notes 44-52 infra,
" 1964-1 (Part 1) C.B. at 134.
is Id.
16Id.
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erty, the taxpayer must cautiously analogize from the Service's
list of forbidden services:
(1) Training of the transferee's employees in various skills;
(2) continued technical assistance after the start-up phase;
(3) nonancillary assistance in the construction or layout of a plant,
machinery, or equipment; and
(4) other services performed for the transferee which are not
merely ancillary or subsidiary to the transfer of property."

This list of recognition transactions indicates that the Service
intends to tax at ordinary income rates any transfer that can be
catalogued as services to the transferee corporation. The only
exception occurs when the services are merely "ancillary and subsidiary" to the transfer of property. 8 Since the term "property"
is left substantially undefined, and since the Service intends to
tax transfers of services, the taxpayer is forced to anticipate,
without guidance, the expansiveness with which the Service intends to apply its definition of services.
Fortunately for the taxpayer, section 351 and the judicial
decisions interpreting the statute demand a different analytical
approach. From the historical analysis which follows, three basic
conclusions emerge: (1) Despite a trend of Service rulings to the
contrary, the term "property" is to be given its broadest definition;" (2) once transferred information is defined as "property,"
nonrecognition status is not lost merely because the transfer may
be construed as providing services;2 and, (3) even if the informa'*
"

Id. at 134-35.
Id. at 134.

" See E.I. DuPont de Nenours & Co. v. United States, 471 F.2d 1211, 1218 (Ct. Cl.
1973). See also J. BlSCHEL, supra note 1, at 6.3; L. EcKSTROM, LIcENsING IN FOREIGN AND
DoMEsTic OPERATIONS ch. 4 (1977); R. MiLGmm, supra note 7, at ch. 1, 2, 6.4. In general,
commentators have argued strenuously for the broadest possible definition of the word

"property". See generally Dunn, supra note 4, at 572-73; Flyer & Buell, supra note 4, at
30; Nash, The Concept of "Property" in Know-how as a Growing Area of Industrial
Property: Its Sale and Licensing, 6 PAT., T.M., & CoPmGTrr J. RESEARCH & EDUC. 289
(1962); O'Connor, Tax Problems on Transfers of Assets to Corporations,52 TAXES 756, 758

(1974). For a detailed discussion of this issue, see notes 25-42 and accompanying text infra.
" See Howard S. Gable, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1427, 1431-33 (1974); Rev. Rul. 56, 64-1
C.B. 133. See also Burke, Section 351: The Beginning of Life in Subchapter C, 24 Sw. L.J.
742, 747-56 (1970); Cohen, supra note 4; Duffy, Doing Business Abroad: Use of American
Know-How, 20 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 1269, 1269-73, 1299-1300 (1962); Dunn, supra note

4, at 572-575 (1961); Riebesehl, Tax Free IncorporationsUnder Section 351, 46 TAXES 360,
361-62 (1968); Weiss, Problems in the Tax-Free Incorporationof a Business, 41 IND. L.J.
666, 668-670 (1966). For a detailed discussion of this services issue, see notes 30-31, 62-63
and 73-103 and accompanying text infra.
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tion is in fact services, and not a transfer of property, there will
be no adverse tax consequences to the transferor as long as the
services are an "incident of" or related to, the transfer of property. 2' In general, the term "services" is to be given its narrowest
22
definition and its most limited impact.
With respect to transfers of know-how, the effect of this conclusion is dramatic. Both the Service and the courts recognize
that know-how can be "property" within section 351. Nevertheless, a transfer of know-how in gross, i.e. unaccompanied by a
transfer of patents, secret processes, or secret formulas, can almost always be construed as little more than the performance of
services.7 Consequently, under the Service's guidelines as formu21 See Howard S. Gable, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1427, 1431-33 (1974); Bell Intercontinental
Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 1004, 1020 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Heil Co., 38 T.C. 989, 1003
(1962). Until recently the commentators have focused almost exclusively on the Service's
"ancillary and subsidiary to" language. See generally Burke, supra note 20, at 747-56;
Campbell, IncreasingProfits From Foreign Know-How Licensing, 45 DEN. L.J. 31, 32-34
(1968); Cohen, supra note 4, at 38-40; Duffy, supra note 20, at 1270-73, 1299-1300; Flyer
and Buell, supra note 4, at 29-30; Ladas, Legal Protectionof Know-How, 7 PAT., T.M., &
CoYmor J. REARica & EDuc. 397, 401 (1963); Riebesehl, supra note 20, at 361-62; Weiss
supra note 20 at 668-69. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see notes 56-59, 67-104 and
accompanying text infra.
" See generally Note, Does IRS "Sale or Exchange" Theory Under 351 in Recent
Ruling Go Too Far?, 31 J. TAx. 53, 54 (1969) (The author .states that section 351 contains
no definition of property. "Services" are excluded under section 351(a) and such a singular
and extraordinary exception denotes the only exception to the term "property" under the
rule of statutory construction-expressio unius est exclusio alterius (expression of one
thing is exclusion of another).) See also Cohen, supra note 4, at 39, where the author notes
that the Service's exclusion from property status of information developed for the transferee under section 351 should be construed narrowly, distinguishing the production of
information specifically for the transferee from those instances where the transferee benefits only indirectly from the transferor's general research. See also notes 67-103 and accompanying text infra.
1 See generally Howard S. Gable, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1427, 1433 (1974) (in the sale of
technical information the buyer is likely to require technical assistance); United States
Mineral Prod. Co., 52 T.C. 177, 199 (1969) (assuming arguendo that technical information
constituted consulting services). See also Cooper, Tax Aspects of CorporateExploitation
of Inventions and Know How, 38 So. CAL. L. REv. 206, 206-07 (1965) (know-how is the
method of achieving a result); Creed and Bangs, Know-How" Licensing and Capital
Gains, 4 PAT., T.M., & COPYMGHT J. RESEARCH & EDUC. 93, 93 (1960) (know-how may
involve accumulated technical experience and skills which can best, or perhaps only, be
communicated through the medium of personal services); Duffy, supra note 20, at 126973, 1299-1300 (know-how is inherently a personal attribute, an idea, or a skill, i.e., training
and experience); Flyer and Buell, supra note 4 (though there are tangible items in trade
secrets, technical knowledge is the primary value); Ladas, supra note 21 (know-how pertains to the method of achieving a result). For a detailed discussion of this issue, see notes
56-59 and 67-104 and accompanying text infra.
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lated in Revenue Ruling 64-56, and under even stricter interpretations which followed, a taxpayer must question if the transfer of
know-how in gross may ever qualify as a transfer of property if
the Service meticulously and mechanically applies its stated
standards.2 4 However, by broadly defining "property" and by
limiting the impact of the services exception, one reaches the
opposite conclusion, that the transfer of know-how in gross will
qualify as a transfer of property, at least to the extent that the
information is generally recognized as a legal protected interest.
A.

The Historically Broad Approach to Section 351

One source of support for a broad interpretation of the term
"property" as used in section 351 may be found in the legislative
history behind section 202(c)(3) of the Revenue Act of 1921, the
predecessor of section 351(a).2 5 In a noteworthy passage from the
Senate Report, the purpose of section 202(c)(3) was succinctly
stated: The statute fashions new rules of nonrecognition "for
those exchanges or 'trades' in which, although a technical 'gain'
may be realized . . . the taxpayer actually realizes no cash
profit. 2 1 Further supporting the Senate Report's interpretation
Rev. Rul. 56, 1964-1 C.B. 133. For subsequent interpretations and applications of
this ruling, see Rev. Proc. 36, 1974-2 C.B. 491 (Rev. Proc. 69-19 is applicable to § 367
rulings on computer software); Rev. Proc. 10, 1973-1 C.B. 760, (general requirements for
a ruling under section 351) supersedingRev. Proc. 17, 1970-2 C.B. 490; Rev. Rul. 564, 19712 C.B. 179 (transfers of trade secrets under section 351 must be exclusive for the entire
period prior to the secret's becoming public knowledge); Rev. Proc. 17, 1970-2 C.B. 490;
Rev. Proc. 19, 1969-2 C.B. 301 (conditions for a § 367 ruling as to transfers of know-how);
Rev. Rul. 156, 1969-1 C.B. 101 (must grant all substantial rights to a sale or exchange of
a patent to qualify under § 351). The Service's position prior to Rev. Rul. 64-56 may be
found in Rev. Rul. 17, 1955-1 C.B. 388 where the Service ruled that payments for knowhow and technical assistance transferred to a foreign corporation constituted royalty income. It is critical to note that the Service specifically found that the services had only
nominal value apart from the license to use the know-how. For a detailed discussion of
these rulings, in particular Rev. Rul. 64-56 and Rev. Proc. 69-19, see notes 60-67, 121-181
and accompanying text infra.
" See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c)(3), 42 Stat. 230 (1921) (current version
at I.R.C. § 351(a)), The statute stated: "For the purposes of this title, on an exchange of
property, real, personal or mixed . . .no gain or loss shall be recognized . . .(3) when
(A) a person transfers any property . . .to a corporation, and immediately after the
transfer is in control of such corporation."
" See S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1921). The language of the Senate
Report has subsequently been cited with approval in E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v.
United States, 471 F.2d 1211, 1215 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Halliburton v. Comm'r, 78 F.2d 265,
269 (9th Cir. 1935); Ralph L. Evans, 8 B.T.A. 543, 546 (1927). See also Comment, Analysis
of Revenue Ruling 75-292, 17 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 599, 611 (1976) (a brief discussion of
Senate Report 275).
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of the new statute, the Hearings before the Senate Finance Committee emphasized that new section 202(c)(3) was aimed at disregarding merely formal dispositions that lacked economic or commercial reality.2 Finally, and perhaps of greatest importance, the
Hearings Explanation on the subsequent amendments to section
202 in the Revenue Act of 1924 emphasized that section 202(c)(3)
transactions involved no substantial change in ownership, and
thus no gain or loss was to be realized until an event equivalent
to a sale or exchange occurred.2 1 In summary, the historical development of section 202(c)(3) and its successors indicates a legislative concern that lest purely formal and internal corporate rearrangements be impeded, a taxpayer should not be forced to recognize gain or loss when in practical effect he is merely transferring
property to himself.
It was not until the passage of the 1954 Internal Revenue
Code that Congress added the final sentence of section 351(a),
precluding the recognition of services as property.2 The accom' See Hearings Explanation of 202(c) Before the Senate Finance Committee, 67th
Cong., 1st Sess. 27, 30 (1921). Language similar to that found in the Hearings has appeared in numerous cases. See, e.g., Helvering v. Cement Investors, Inc., 361 U.S. 527,
533 (1941) (section 202(c)(3) designed to permit readjustments); Six Seam Co. v. United
States, 524 F.2d 347, 355 (6th Cir. 1975) (aimed at technical transfers only-internal
rearrangements); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 471 F.2d 1211, 121315 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (aimed at mere form exchanges); Jordan Marsh Co. v. Comm'r, 269 F.2d
452, 457 (2d Cir. 1959) (citing Portlandand Trenton); Barker v. United States, 200 F.2d
223, 228 (9th Cir. 1953) (citing the language in Portland); Trenton Cotton Oil Co. v.
Comm'r, 147 F.2d 33, 36 (6th Cir. 1945) (citing the Portland "mere change in form"
language); Portland Oil Co. v. Comm'r, 109 F.2d 479, 488 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S.
650 (1940) (where in a popular or economic sense there has been a mere change in the form
of ownership); American Compress & Warehouse Co. v. Bender, 70 F.2d 655, 657 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 607 (1934).
2 See S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong.,
1st Sess. 278 (1924); H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1924). For further discussion of these Reports, see Comment, supra
note 26, at 611. See also Magill, Notes on the Revenue Act of 1924 - Income Tax Provisions,
24 COLUM. L. Rav. 836, 841-44 (1924) for a brief review of the 1924 Act's amendments and
changes.
As noted above in Comment, supra note 26, at 612: "[The] same principle recurs
throughout the congressional hearings, debates, and committee reports pertaining to the
1934 amendments, which hold that purely formal 'paper' transactions . . . result in no
immediate tax consequences." See, e.g., S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. (1934); H.R.
REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934); Hearings on Revenue Revision Before the
House Ways and Means Committee, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 58, 77, 290-91 (1934).
1 I.R.C. § 351(a) provides that: "For purposes of this section, stock or securities
issued for services shall not be considered as issued in return for property." See also Treas.
Reg. § 1.351.1(a)(1)(i) which states that: "[Stock or securities issued for services rendered or to be rendered to or for the benefit of the issuing corporation will not be treated
as having been issued in return for property . ...
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panying House Report indicates that the exclusion of services
from the definition of property was designed to make the receipt
of stock or securities by a transferor who has rendered, or will
render, services to the transferee corporation, a fully taxable
event.3 The Report does contain a caveat, however, which states
that the committee did not intend the last sentence of section
351(a), the services exclusion, to vitiate the remaining portion of
the transaction; 31 bona fide transfers of property were to remain
non-tax recognition events.
In contrast to the legislative history behind many other provisions of the Code, the legislative history behind section 351 has
played an integral role both in the interpretation of the specific
statutory language and the development of a uniformly liberal
response to the general purpose underlying the statute. For example, one court has managed to turn the services exclusion in section 351(a) into a basis of support for recognition of a broad definition of the word "property." In H.B. Zachary Co., the Tax
Court observed that the known inclusions and exclusions under
section 351 (implicitly referring to the services exception)
strongly suggested that property encompasses whatever may be
See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4017, 4254-56.
1' Id. at 4255. The language of House Report 1337 has served as support for numerous
attempts by various authors to limit the scope of the services exception. See, e.g., Burke,
supra note 20, at 750 (distinguishing services to the transferee, services for third parties,
and property created by personal services); Cohen, supra note 4, at 39 (services for the
transferee should be strictly construed); Goodman, supra note 4, at 113. (citing the language of House Report 1337); Riebesehl, supra note 20, at 362; Weiss, supra note 20, at
668-670; Note, Income Tax - Tax Free Transfers to Controlled Corporations,76 W. VA. L.
REV. 401, 404 (1973-74). Numerous judicial decisions have emphasized that "services for
the transferee" are the main thrust of the exclusion under § 351. See, e.g., Howard S.
Gable, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1427, 1433-34 (1974) (distinguished nontaxable related services
from services rendered to the transferee to create or develop an invention); William A.
James, 53 T.C. 63, 67 (1969) (citing House Report 1337); Elihu B. Washburne, 27 T.C.M.
(CCH) 577, 591 (1968) (stock issued for the obtaining of an option was issued for services
rendered the transferee); Arthur C. Ruge, 26 T.C. 138, 142-43 (1956) (citing Kimble Glass,
a transferor's obligation to (1) further develop his invention, (2) disclose future inventions
to the transferee, and (3) keep the transferee informed of developments in the field were
unrelated to the products transferred and therefore were compensable services); Kimble
Glass Co., 9 T.C. 183 (1947) (see analysis in Ruge, 26 T.C. at 142-43). For further discussion of the "services as property" concept, see notes 63-104 and accompanying text infra.
In Rev. Proc. 19, 1969-2 C.B. 301, Rev. Rul. 56, 1964-1 C.B. 133 and Tress. Reg. §
1.351-1(a)(1)(ii) (1954), the Service formally announced its position that services other
than "ancillary and subsidiary to" services rendered to the transferee are not property
within the scope of section 351.
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transferred.32 Based upon this assertion, the court went one step
further and, applying the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio
alteriusto section 351(a), held that the services exception was the
only statutorily supported exclusion to the otherwise broad and
general meaning of the term "property." '
The court's conclusion in H.B. Zachary Co. that "property"
is to be given its broadest definition received recognition and
support in the 1973 Court of Claims decision, E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. v. United States.34 In 1959, the Du Pont Company granted its wholly-owned French subsidiary a royalty-free
nonexclusive license to make, use, and sell a patented herbicide
formula within the geographic bounds of France. Rejecting the
Service's argument which was based upon an unfounded analogy
between the word "transfer" in section 1235 and the phrase
"transfer

. .

. in exchange" found in section 351(a), the Court of

Claims held that: "[Ulnless there is some special reason intrinsic to the particular provision (as there is with respect to the
capital gains provisions) the general word 'property' has a broad
reach in tax law . .

.

.For section 351, .

.

. courts have advo-

cated a generous definition of property. . . . ,,5 In an attempt to
fashion guidelines delimiting the breadth of this seemingly
boundless language, the court emphasized that in this transaction the nonexclusive license itself was commonly thought of in
the commercial world as a "positive business asset.

'3

DuPont's

reference to a "positive business asset" test for property is peculiarly well-suited to the analysis of issues involving the transfer
of nonpatented and nonpatentable technology, rights often de" 49 T.C. 73, 80 n.6 (1967).
3 Id. The expressio unius est exclusio alterius argument has been echoed in Note,
note 22 supra; Note, Carved Out Oil Payment Constitutes Property For Section 351
Purposes, 17 OIL & GAs Q. 69, 73-4 (1968). The Zachary decision is weakened however by
its failure to address the crucial issue; admitting that services are excluded from the
definition of "property," what constitutes services?
471 F.2d 1211 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
Id. at 1218. The Service argued that section 1235 (I.R.C. § 1235) which outlines the
necessary elements for a patent "transfer" to qualify as a capital asset exchange, also
governed the meaning of the words "transfer" and "exchange" under section 351. Id. at
1215-18. After rejecting the Service's argument, the court examined the scope of the word
"property" only for purposes of section 351. Id. at 1218. The DuPont rejection of this
section 351-section 1235 analogy is discussed in detail in notes 223-229 and accompanying text infra.
u Id.

1978

TRANSFERS OF KNOW-HOW

fined in terms of the "competitive advantage" accruing to their
37
possessor.
Comparably broad language with respect to intangible rights
and assets may be found interspersed throughout much of the
applicable case law.3 8 Citing with approval the DuPont decision,
the District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, in Stafford
v. United States,3" held that, with respect to a lease and loan
agreement at interest rates below the market rate, property for
purposes of section 351 included any real, personal, tangible, or
'7 For a discussion of the "competitive advantage" and the "positive business asset"
test in trade secret law, see notes 115-190 and accompanying text infra. Applying the
"positive business asset" test, the DuPont court noted: "DuPont handed over something
of value and received stock in return .... " 471 F.2d at 1219.
"
The breadth of the DuPont property definition is shocking at first glance; nevertheless, DuPont is not an isolated or single instance of such liberality. Numerous decisions
have espoused a similar test. See, e.g., Max A. Burde, 43 T.C. 252, 269 (1964), aff'd, 352
F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 966 (1966) (property right in an invention
comes into existence when it is reduced to actual practice-tested and operated successfully); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904, 911 (Ct. Cl. 1961)
(a trade secret is property because it conveys more than mere information; it confers an
economic advantage); Nelson v. Comm'r, 203 F.2d 1, 6 (6th Cir. 1953) (secret process that
was valuable and reduced to tangible form constituted property); Halliburton v. Comm'r,
78 F.2d 265, 269 (9th Cir. 1935) (the word "property" is used without qualification in
section 202(c)(3)); George S. Mepham, 3 B.T.A. 549, 553 (1926) (a secret process is property where it is secret, valuable, and successful); Chrome Plate, Inc., 40 Am. FED. TAx.
REP. 2d (PH) 77-5316, 6125 (W.D. Tex. 1977) (citing DuPont and Hempt, the court held
that property should be defined as broadly as possible); Hempt Bros., Inc. v. United
States, 354 F. Supp. 1172, 1175 (M.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 490 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974) (property is whatever may be transferred).
See also Duffy, supra note 20, at 1270-71 (citing Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 1 (1947)
for the proposition that property is everything that is the subject of ownership); Dunn,
supra note 4, at 572 (most, if not all, types of know-how constitute property); Ladas, supra
note 21, at 397-409; O'Connor, supra note 19, at 758 (citing the 1973 DuPontdecision, the
author suggests that there is no reason to restrict the definition of property); Riebesehl,
supra note 20, at 361-62 (trade secrets and patents will ordinarily constitute property, but
the secrecy requirement of Rev. Rul. 64-56 is subject to attack); Note, supra note 33, at
54 (citing the language of Zachary that property is anything that may be transferred). All
of the authors have advocated a broad meaning for the word property in an attempt to
bring at least trade secrets, if not all that is encompassed under the rubric of know-how,
within the scope of section 351.
" 435 F. Supp. 1036, 1038 (M.D. Ga. 1977). Interestingly, the Government raised the
argument that the agreement between the parties did not constitute a legally enforceable
contract and therefore could not constitute "property." In perhaps the most sweeping
dicta to date, the court rejected the Government's position stating that the enforceability
of the agreement was irrelevant; the parties, believing they were bound, did in fact perform. Id. at 1038-39. This language extends beyond even the DuPont, 471 F.2d at 121819, and Zachary, 49 T.C. at 79-80, tests that previously applied only to legally enforceable
agreements, i.e., a nonexclusive license of a patent and a royalty agreement, respectively.
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intangible rights which the owner thereof could possess, use, or
dispose of. Definitions of equivalent breadth may also be found
in Commissioner v. Stephens-A damson Manufacturing Co.4 and
H.B. Zachary Co., 1 where the courts held that whatever may be
transferred constitutes property. Hempt Brothers, Inc. v. United
States, a 1974 Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision, has held
similarly that property consists of whatever may be sold or assigned. 2 Notwithstanding such generous language, any attempt
to analyze the scope of the word "property" for purposes of section 351(a) merely by examining the dicta of past decisions will
be misleading. Often, the courts have been more sweeping in their
analyses and conclusions than required by the specific factual
setting before them.
B.

The Development From Secret Formulas to Know-How

Despite the plethora of section 351 property cases before the
courts in the last fifty years, the body of law concerning trade
secrets and know-how under section 351 (in contrast to that concerning patents) has been slow to develop. Both the courts and
the Service have struggled to define these intangible rights, as
well as to outline the proper tax treatment of their transfers.43
- 51 F.2d 681, 683 (7th Cir. 1931) (For purposes of determining the scope of section
202(a) of the Revenue Acts of 1918 and 1921: "We think it a fair definition to say that
what may be sold and assigned is property.")
" 49 T.C. 73, 80 n.6 (1967) ("Section 351 does not contain a definition of the word
'property.' However, the known inclusions and exclusions strongly suggest that the term
encompasses whatever may be transferred.") See also notes 32-33 and accompanying text
supra.
12 354 F. Supp. 1172 (M.D. Pa. 1973), modified, 490 F.2d 1172, 1175 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974). The court specifically stated that for purposes of section 351,
property is whatever may be identified, valued, and transferred. Such language, however,
adds little to the lower court's formulation of the test: "Whatever may be transferred."
354 F. Supp. at 1175. Again, the breadth of the Hempt test is tempered by the very
traditional nature of the property involved, accounts receivables. Compare Chrome Plate,
Inc., 40 AM. FED. TAx REP. 2d (PH) T 77-5316, 6125 (W.D. Tex. 1977) where the court
relied upon Hempt Bros. and DuPont to support the broad assertion that for purposes of
section 351 the courts were unanimous in holding that property should be contrued as
broadly as possible. See also O'Connor, supra, note 19 at 758, where the author argues
that there is a strong statutory basis for the DuPont-Hempt Bros-Chrome Plate line of
developments.
0 See notes 44-104 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of the tax developments in the know-how area. The phrase "know-how" appears to be a phenomenon of the
last twenty years. As demonstrated by notes 44-52 and accompanying text infra, the
decisions prior to Rev. Rul. 56, 1964-1 C.B. 133 focused primarily on secret processes and
formulas, not know-how. There simply is no use of the phrase "know-how" in the tax law
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Focusing more specifically on trade secrets and know-how transfers under section 351(a), the Service and the courts have been
most favorable to the transfer of secret formulas" and secret processes. As early as 1927, relying on the legislative history of secuntil the Service ruled that certain techniques and methods constituted know-how in
1955. See Rev. Rul. 17, 1955-1 C.B. 388. Beginning with Heil Co., 38 T.C. 989 (1962),
"know-how" has become a common phrase in the tax decisions. Unfortunately, "knowhow" has still not been defined with any specificity. It is the premise of this article that
the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 has implicitly been adopted by the Supreme Court as a
definition of the broad term "trade secrets." See the discussion at notes 105-121 and
accompanying text infra. The definition of "trade secret" found in the Restatement appears broad enough to include know-how. Numerous commentators have attempted to
fashion a definition of "know-how." See, e.g., Creed and Bangs, supra note 23, at 93;
Duffy, supra note 20, at 1269-73, 1299-1300; Dunn, supra note 4, at 572; Nash, supra note
19, at 289; Van Notten, Know-How Licensing in the Common Market, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV.
525, 526-27 (1963). See also BISCHEL, supra note 1, at 6-6 to 6-14.
In 1964, nine years after the Service first addressed the issue of know-how in Rev. Rul.
17, 1955-1 C.B. 388, the Service was still uncertain of what know-how meant. See Rev.
Rul. 56, 1964-1 C.B. 133 where the Service ruled that: "Since the term 'know-how' does
not appear in section 351 of the Code, its meaning is immaterial . . . the Service will look
behind the term . . . to determine.. ...
.the terms . . . constitute property ....
In sharp contrast to the Service's inability to define "know-how" in 1964 is Treas. Reg. §
1.482-2(d)(3) where the Service for purposes only of proper allocation of income and
deductions among related taxpayers defined intangible property as "(a) Patents, inventions, formulas, processes, designs, patterns. . . . (e) Methods, programs, systems, procedures, campaigns, surveys, studies, forecasts, estimates, customer lists, technical data,
and other similar items." (Emphasis added.)
" See Edward W. Reid, 50 T.C. 33, 41 (1968) (secret formula constituted property);
Pickren v. United States, 378 F.2d 595, 599-601 (5th Cir. 1967) (secret formulas were
capital assets under § 1235); Commercial Solvents Corp., 42 T.C. 455, 467 (1964) (a secret
process is a capital asset as well as property); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United
States, 288 F.2d 904, 910 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (Government conceded that secret processes
constituted property); Nelson v. Comm'r 203 F.2d 1, 6 (6th Cir. 1953) (secret processes
may constitute property); Ruth Neuberger v. United States, 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9264,
84166 (D. Ore. 1968) (secret formulas are property); Stalker Corp. v. United States, 209
F. Supp. 30, 33-34 (E.D. Mich. 1962) (trade secrets constitute property); Huckins v.
United States, 60-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9394, 76091-92 (S.D. Fla. 1960) (secret process treated
as a capital asset under section 1221).
For further recognition of secret formulas as property, see generally Benjamin, Tax
Aspects of Operating a Possession Corporation in Puerto Rico, 2 INT'L TAx. J. 197, 200-01
(1976); Cohen, supra note 4, at 38; Dunn, supra note 4, at 572 n.2; Hilinski, Is the IRS
Blocking the Tax-Free Transfer of Know-How to Foreign Corporations?, 23 J. TAx. 305,
305-06 (1965); Nash, supra note 19, at 94-99; Riebesehl, supra note 20, at 361-62.
The Service, since 1964, has officially recognized that secret formulas constitute
property for purposes of section 351. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 564, 1971-2 C.B. 179 (trade secret
remains valuable and therefore constitutes property only so long as it remains a secret);
Rev. Proc. 19, 1969-2 C.B. 301, (the Service requires that the taxpayer represent that the
information he seeks to transfer pursuant to sections 351 and 367 is secret, known only by
certain confidential employees, and is adequately safeguarded); Rev. Rul. 56, 1964-1 C.B.
133 (property for purposes of section 351 includes secret processes and formulas).
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tion 202(c)(3), the Board of Tax Appeals, in Ralph L. Evans, held
that a corporate transfer of a secret hair-dye formula constituted
property for purposes of section 202(c)(3).15 One year earlier, in
George S. Mepham, the Board had accorded capital asset status
to (and ultimately capital gains treatment to the sale of) a secret
fume-trapping process.4" Again in 1948, the Tax Court, in Wall
Products, Inc.," advanced the burgeoning analysis one step fur45 8 B.T.A. 543 (1927). The Board succinctly disposed of the issue as to whether or
not the secret formula constituted property by the overly simplistic statement: "It is
admitted that he transferred the secret process to the Delaware corporation." Id. at 547.
See also William A. James, 53 T.C. 63, 68-69 (1969) where, based on Evans, the court
recognized that secret formulas constituted property for purposes of section 351, but held
such analysis inapposite to the transfer of purely services. The Evans decision was subsequently cited by the Service in Rev. Rul. 56, 1964-1 C.B. 133, 134, to support the Service's
acquiescence as to secret processes and formulas. Evans was also subsequently interpreted
more broadly than its language might support when Flyer and Buell noted that both
Evans and Wall Products, Inc., 11 T.C. 51 (1948) are framed in terms of trade secrets
generally being property. Flyer and Buell, supra note 4, at 27 n.14. This analysis may be
questionable in light of the fact that both decisions dealt explicitly with secret formulas
only. See also notes 46 and 47 infra, and note 44 supra.
- 3 B.T.A. 549, 553 (1926). The Board emphasized three factors: The process (1) was
clearly secret, (2) had proven to be successful, and (3) was never patented. Id. Mepham
was subsequently cited as support for the broad statement in United States Mineral Prod.
Co., 52 T.C. 177, 196-97 (1969), that the courts have long recognized industrial knowledge
and secret formulas, reduced to practice, as property. Although Mepham has been cited
in the case law only infrequently, it has received wide recognition in the legal literature.
See, e.g., Cooper, How a CorporationCan Get Capital Gains When Licensing Inventions
and Know-How, 24 J. TAX. 334, 334-35 (1966) (Mepham held a secret manufacturing
process to be intangible property); Duffy, supra note 20, at 1271 n.7; Sugarman,
Incorporating Tax Free - Basic Requirements Under Section 351 of the Internal Revenue
Code, 12 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 183, 186 (1961) (Mepham cited for the broad proposition
that goodwill, know-how, and trade secrets qualify as property under section 351).
, 11 T.C. 51, 57 (1948). The specific product involved was a highly successful
concrete-curing formula. Id. at 52-55. The court observed that without the inventor's
technical skills, manufacture of the product would have been impossible. Id. at 54. Recognizing that a secret formula may constitute property, the court rejected the Service's
argument that application for a patent was a requisite element to a finding of property
status. Id. at 57. Subsequent attempts by the Service to make property status contingent
on the existence of a patent application have also been rebuffed. See, e.g., Max A. Burde,
43 T.C. 252, 269 (1964) aff'd, 352 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 966 (1966);
Franklin S. Speicher, 28 T.C. 938, 944-45 (1957); Samuel E. Diescher, 36 B.T.A. 732, 74344 (1937), aff'd, 110 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940); Comm'r v.
Stephens-Adamson Mfg. Co., 51 F.2d 681, 683 (1931). Similarly to Evans, (see discussion
in note 45 supra) Wall Prod. was cited with approval in Rev. Rul. 56, 1964-1 C.B. 133,
134. It is interesting to note that in United States Mineral Prod. Co., 52 T.C. at 197,
Mepham was distinguished from Wall Prod. on the grounds that the former was an
industrial knowledge case, while the latter was purely a secret formula decision. Compare
also Cooper, supra, note 46, at 335, (Wall Prod. recognized that a secret formula may
constitute property) and Duffy, supra note 20, at 1271 n.7 (Wall Prod. held a secret
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ther, holding that the property right in a patentable, but as yet
unpatented, secret formula was not negatived by a failure to file
a patent application. Finally, in 1961, in E.I. DuPont de Nemours
and Co. v. United States, the Service conceded that the transfer
of a secret process constituted the transfer of property."8
In light of the Government's concession in DuPont, it came
as little surprise in Revenue Ruling 64-56"° that the Service ruled
property to include such items as secret processes, secret formulas, and secret information concerning devices or processes without regard to the existence of a patent or the patentability of
the asset in question.10 Again the Service's concession as to unformula to be property), with Flyer and Buell, supra note 4, at 27 n.14, where the authors
interpreted Wall Prod. as applicable to the broader field of trade secrets as defined by

the

RESTATEMENT OF

ToRs § 757 (1939). Id. at 28-29.

" 288 F.2d 904, 910 (Ct. Cl. 1961). Despite the Service's recognition that secret
formulas constituted property, the taxpayer failed to meet the "sale or exchange" requirement of sections 117, 1221, and 1231. Id. at 906-909. For further discussion of what constitutes a "transfer" under section 351, see notes 197-241 and accompanying text infra. The
decision in the 1961 DuPont case has subsequently served as the foundation for any
extension of the property concept to include know-how and trade secrets related to transferred patents. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 471 F.2d 1211,
1215-20 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Francis H. Shepard, 57 T.C. 600, 611-18 (1972), rev'd, 481 F.2d
1399 (3d Cir. 1973) (unpublished opinion), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 911 (1974); TaylorWinfield Corp., 57 T.C. 205, 214 (1971); PPG Indus., Inc., 55 T.C. 928 (1970); United
States Mineral Prod. Co. 52 T.C. 177, 199 (1969); Commercial Solvents Corp. 42 T.C. 455
468 (1964); Pickren v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 560, 561 (M.D. Fla. 1965), aff'd, 378
F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1967); Stalker Corp. v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 30, 33 (E.D. Mich.
1962); Rev. Rul. 564, 1971-2 C.B. 179, all know-how decisions citing the 1961 DuPont
decision.
" Rev. Rul. 56, 1964-1 C.B. 133.
Id. at 134-35. In summary the Service ruled that "The term 'property' for purposes
of section 351 of the Code will be held to include anything qualifying as 'secret processes
and formulas' . . . and any other secret information as to a device, process, etc., in the
general nature of a patentable invention without regard to whether a patent has been
applied for . . .and without regard to whether it is patentable in the patent law sense
.
..
The Service, in Rev. Proc. 19, 1969-2 C.B. 301, 302, subsequently defined secret
information as that information "known only by the owner and those confidential employees who require the 'information'. . . and adequate safeguards have been taken to guard
• . . against unauthorized disclosure, and (b) . . .the 'information is original, unique,
and novel." To date, only Howard S. Gable, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1427, 1433 n.3 (1974);
William A. James, 53 T.C. 63, 68 (1969); and Bell Intercontinental Corp. v. United States,
381 F.2d 1004, 1020 (Ct. Cl. 1967) have even mentioned Rev. Rul. 64-56 expressly; to date
no court has cited Rev. Proc. 69-19. For further discussion of the "absolute secrecy" versus
the "relative secrecy" doctrines, see notes 122-154 and accompanying text infra.
Numerous tax commentators have also questioned the need for an "absolute secrecy"
doctrine. See, e.g., Benjamin, supra note 44, at 201 (contrasting Rev. Proc. 69-19, with
the language of DuPont, 471 F.2d at 1218); Cohen, supra note 4, at 38 (secrecy is questionable in light of the 1961 DuPont decision, 288 F.2d at 910-12); Duffy, supra note 19, at
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patented secret devices or processes, in addition to secret formulas, was merely the formal recognition of an already clear line
of judicial developments. Therefore, the Service's seemingly
broad concession on the patentability issue was less an act of
spontaneous generosity and more an official recognition of a demonstrated judicial receptiveness toward transfers of such items.
For example, in 1940, in Samuel E. Diescher, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals held that an inventor's property right in his
invention was not dependent upon his obtaining a patent, but
rather existed as a result of his reduction of the invention to
practice. 51 Seventeen years later in F.S. Speicher, the Tax Court
stated that the unpatented inventions in question constituted
property, for the transferor had a completed conception of his
invention and had previously expressed it in the form of drawings
and a physical machine. 2 In retrospect, there has been little if
any resistance to the recognition of unpatented secret formulas
and secret devices as property for purposes of section 351(a).
The courts, however, have yet to address the issue of what
1271-72 (secrecy alone should not be the test for whether an asset constitutes property);
Riebesehl, supra note 20, at 362 (whether secrecy should be an element at all); Weiss,
supra note 20, at 669 (citing Duffy, supra note 19, the author questions the need for a
secrecy element).
For a detailed discussion of the "unique, novel and original" test, see notes 155-171
and accompanying text infra.
" 39 T.B.A. 732, 743-44 (1937), aff'd, 10 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650
(1940). There is interesting language in Diescher to the effect that the inventor's rights in
his invention were common law rights. Id. at 743. The court cited with approval Six Wheel
Corp. v. Sterling Motor Truck Co., 50 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1931), where the Ninth Circuit
stated: "From the foregoing, it will be seen that the irreducible quantum of the inventor's
right in the res, even under the common law, is that of making, using and vending ....
The statutes (referring to the patent laws) certainly do not curtail the natural right; they
enlarge it." Id. at 571. From the specific facts before the court, i.e., transfer of an unpatented but nevertheless patentable invention, Diescher has come to be interpreted so
broadly as to support the proposition that industrial knowledge and secret formulas reduced to practice constitute property. See United States Mineral Prod. Co., 52 T.C. 177,
196 (1969). One author has cited Diescher for the proposition that the products of a man's
mind are property whether they are tangible or intangible. See Duffy, supra note 19, at
1271. See also note 47 supra for further discussion of the concept of unpatented inventions
as property,
- 28 T.C. 938 (1957). The court rested its analysis on Edward C. Myers, 6 T.C. 258,
265-66 (1946), an earlier decision where the Tax Court held that an invention becomes a
property right when it reaches the "completed conception stage." 28 T.C. at 945. The
Diescher-Speichertest has also been used in Max A. Burde, 43 T.C. 252, 269 (1964), aff'd,
352 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 966 (1966); Nelson v. Comm'r, 203 F.2d
1, 6 (6th Cir. 1953); Comm'r v. Stephens-Adamson Mfg. Co., 51 F.2d 681, 682-83 (7th Cir.
1931).
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forms of know-how or compilations of information, in and of
themselves, will qualify as property under section 351(a). To
date, the success of taxpayer-transferor attempts at transfering
technical information or know-how has hinged solely upon the
relationship between these rights and the other recognized forms
of property transferred .3 Except for a few early cases, the majority of decisions addressing specifically the know-how issue have
been post-Revenue Ruling 64-56 decisions. One of the earliest
decisions to address the issue of whether know-how constituted a
capital asset was the 1947 Tax Court decision Kimble Glass Co."
In Kimble the transferor conveyed the rights to manufacture and
sell specific items under a German patent in conjunction with the
transferor's agreement to diligently develop his invention, to keep
the transferee informed of developments by others in the field,
and to submit to the transferee any offers or proposals he might
obtain for subsequent licensing of these rights. As might be expected, the court found all of these latter rights to constitute
services rather than property.5 5 Nine years later the Tax Court,
in Arthur C. Ruge, cited Kimble Glass Co. for the proposition
that requiring an inventor to (1) further develop his inventions,
(2) transfer future improvements to the transferee, and (3) use his
best efforts to promote and develop the particular business involved constituted the performance of services resulting in ordinary income to the transferor 0 More importantly however, the
court found that an agreement to provide a specific number of
man days of consulting service per year was "ancillary and subsidiary to" the assignments of the inventions and was "of the type
11One reason the courts have examined these assets from the perspective of their
interrelationship generally with patents is because the courts have not yet been faced with
the issue of transfers of know-how in gross. In fact, to date the courts have continued to
struggle with fleshing out the precise meaning of the phrase "know-how." See note 43
supra. For a detailed discussion of the requisite degree of interrelationship, see notes 56104 and accompanying text infra.
9 T.C. 183 (1947).
Id. at 186. However, petitioner entered into two agreements with a German business. The first agreement provided for the sale of certain patented articles, certain machines for the manufacture of these articles, the furnishing of manufacturing and improvement information, and the training and supplying of a mechanic. Id. at 185. In contrast
to the items in the second agreement, the court found none of these items in the first
agreement to constitute the performance of services. Id. at 191.
" 26 T.C. 138, 143 (1956). The court noted: "In the instant case, we are of the opinion
that the services called for by paragraph 6 . . .are similar to those held to be personal
services in Kimble Glass Co . .and . . . therefore constitute(s) ordinary income."
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and kind usually called for to implement the sale of highly technical and intricate inventions," and consequently afforded the
"services" property status. 57
Ruge, therefore, represents the initial formulation of a blackletter-rule for determining when certain assets, expressly recognized as the performance of services, are sufficiently related to
other traditionally recognized forms of property transferred to be
accorded property status under section 351(a). The greatest contribution of the Ruge decision was not its formulation of the
"ancillary and subsidiary to" test, but rather its generous and
liberal interpretation of the general "property" requirement
under section 351. The court in Ruge went so far as to grant
property status to assets that were inherently nothing more than
the performance of services, i.e. consulting assistance. A close
examination of the Ruge test, therefore, reveals that the court was
less concerned with formulating a definition of what constitutes
property and more concerned with formulating guidelines identifying the requisite relationship or nexus between property and
services so as to qualify the entire package for section 351 treatment. 58 Thus, the "ancillary and subsidiary to" test offers little
in the way of guidance to the taxpayer seeking to catalogue his
assets as qualifying property or nonqualifying services. The true
value of the test rests in its offer of property status, regardless of
the nature of the assets or services, if the requisite relationship
between those services and the recognized forms of property
59
transferred exists.
Taken at face value, the early rulings of the Service con" The specific purpose of the consulting services was to assist in the establishment
of subsequent control over the manufacturing operations of the actual inventions transferred. Id. at 139. Compare these services with those items found not to constitute services
in Kimble Glass Co. See note 55 supra. It is interesting to note that assets clearly classed
as services within the agreements themselves were treated as property. See note 58 infra.
" In both Ruge and Kimble Glass Co., the dichotomy between "ancillary and subsidiary to," and unrelated, services was quite clear. In both cases, information and even
services directly related to the implementation of other recognized forms of property
transferred were given property status. See notes 55 and 57 supra. See also text accompanying note 57 supra. In contrast, in these early decisions, services or information only
indirectly linked to the tangible property transferred, such as general future improvements, other developments in the field, and future licensing offers, were denied property
status. 26 T.C. at 142-43.
" The decade following Rev. Rul. 64-56 has witnessed a continuing struggle to identify this requisite relationship. See notes 67-72, 101 and accompanying text infra.
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formed with the initial approach taken by the court in Ruge. In
Revenue Ruling 64-56, the Service attempted to formulate guidelines as to when know-how constitutes property for purposes of
section 351(a).10 The Service rejected the contention that the
mere reduction of know-how to documentary form automatically
accorded the information property status.6 ' In an attempt to be
more specific, the Service noted further that once an item was
found to be property, the fact that services were involved in the
production of that item did not constitute grounds for denying
property status to the entire transfer unless the items transferred
had been specifically developed for the transferee.12 However, recognizing that know-how may inherently consist of both property
and services, the Service adopted language identical to the Ruge
test, ruling that only those services that were "ancillary and subsidiary to" the property transferred would be treated as
"property." 3
The Service soon retreated from its stance taken in Revenue
Ruling 64-56. Over the flexible and very liberal language of the
former ruling, the Service, in Revenue Procedure 69-19, grafted
more onerous requirements for determining whether the transfer
"

Rev. Rul. 56, 1964-1 C.B. 133. See note 10 supra.
IId. at 134. To support its position, the Service cited Harold L. Regenstein, 35 T.C.

183 (1960), where the Tax Court found that the information and transfer of a group life
insurance concept constituted only the rendering of services, not property. The Service's
reliance on this case is questionable, however, for as the Regenstein court stated, all that
was involved was a release by the transferor of any claim he might have had for compensation for his services in developing the plan. 35 T.C. at 191. It is doubtful that the case
may be read as broadly as the Service urged.
11 Rev. Rul. 56, 1964-1 C.B. at 134. It is interesting that the Service again opted to
rest its position upon Regenstein, 35 T.C. 183 (1960) rather than H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra
note 30, at 4254-56. See also notes 11 and 12 and accompanying text supra. One explanation for such analysis may be found in the breadth of the Regenstein holding in contrast
to the language found in House Report 1337. In fact, the court in Regenstein never addressed the issue of whether the plan or idea could be treated as property because in the
court's opinion the petitioners actions constituted only services. 35 T.C. at 190-91.
" Rev. Rul. 56, 1964-1 C.B. at 134-35. The Service gave the following examples of
what constituted "ancillary and subsidiary to" services: (1) promoting the transaction by
demonstrating and explaining the use of the property; (2) assisting in the effective
starting-up of the property; (3) performing under a start-up guarantee; or (4) further
educating the transferee's employees already possessing a modicum of basic skills. In
contrast the Service ruled that the following information failed the "ancillary and subsidiary" test: "(1) training transferee's employees in new skills; (2) continuing technical
assistance; and (3) assistance in the construction of plants, machinery housing, or plant
layouts." See note 17 and accompanying text supra. For a more detailed discussion of the
ruling, see Cohen, supra note 20. See also notes 122-179 and accompanying text infra.
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or know-how would qualify as a section 351(a) property transfer
under the prior approval requirements of section 367.4 First, the
Service ruled that transferable information must be secret,
unique, novel, and original. 5 In addition, the Service hinted at
the severity with which it intended to apply these new rules by
declaring that mere knowledge or efficiency gained from experience or skill was not to be considered property, while reiterating
its position that the mere reduction of know-how to documentary
form was not sufficient to afford such material property status."6
Thus, by giving qualifying know-how its narrowest construction,
the Service necessarily broadened its concept of services and limited the impact of its "ancillary and subsidiary to" exception.
In contrast to the Service's position, the courts' reactions to
know-how transfers have generally reflected a desire to broaden
the scope of those "services" which will qualify as property at
least when the transfer is in some way connected to the transfer
of related patents, secret formulas, or secret processes. 7 From
Ruge through Howard S. Gable," a span of almost twenty years,
the courts have gone through four subtle, and oftentimes indistinguishable phases. From Ruge, in 1956, through Revenue Ruling
64-56, the case law and revenue rulings are analyzed solely in
, Rev. Proc. 19, 1969-2 C.B. 301. On its face Rev. Rul. 64-56 appears to be quite
liberal. There is little in the ruling foreshadowing a restrictive prospective application. See
notes 60-63 and accompanying text supra.
0 Id. at 302. See also notes 14-16, and accompanying text supra and notes 155-171
and accompanying text infra.
11 Id. In addition, the Service restated all of the exclusions formulated in Rev. Rul.
64-56, note 63 supra. Finally, the Service's two new exclusions in subsections .03(b) and
(g) of the Procedure: (1) "The 'information' does not represent mere knowledge, or efficiency resulting from experience, or mere skill in manipulation or total accumulated
experience and skill of the transferor . . . and (2) "Technical information of a related or
similar nature such as new developments in the field will not be furnished on a continuing
" could be interpreted as inconsistent with
basis without adequate compensation ....
Rev. Rul. 64-56. For a critical analysis of the Service's retreat in Rev. Proc. 69-19, see 7020 TAX MANAGEMENT MEMORANDUM (BNA), 8-11 (Oct. 5, 1970). See also notes 172-179 and
accompanying text infra.
1 For a general discussion of the court's approaches, see J. BISCHELL, supra note 1,
at 6.3a-c; B. BrrrKER AND J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS, 3-13 (3d ed. 1971); Burke, supra note 20, at 747-56 (little doubt that
intangibles constitute property); Cohen, supra note 20, at 38-40 (reference to information
developed for the transferee should be construed strictly); O'Connor, supranote 19, at 75758 (cases support a broad definition of property). See notes 68-104 and accompanying text
infra and notes 56-67 supra.
U 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1427 (1974).

TRANSFERS OF KNOW-HOW

terms of the "ancillary and subsidary to" test." From 1962
through approximately 1970, in the face of the Service's contraction of the "ancillary and subsidiary to" test, a noticeable judicial
shift occurred, not in the flexibility and liberality of the courts'
approach to section 351 know-how transfers, but rather in the
specific language used by the courts to attain that result. Suddenly an "incident to" test was espoused to enforce the liberal
standard inaugurated in Ruge, but subsequently misinterpreted
by the Service. 0 From 1970 through 1974, the courts experienced
a transition period, struggling with the apparent deficiencies of
both the "ancillary and subsidiary to" test and the "incident to"
test, when confronted with the issue of transfers of know-how only
indirectly related to recognized forms of property transferred
under section 351.11 Finally, in 1974, the Gable decision marked
the rudimentary beginnings of a final phase. Still reflecting the
judicial liberality with which know-how transfers had been analyzed since Ruge, Gable formulated a new variation on the
"ancillary and subsidiary to" test: the "related to" test. 2 The
following section of this article will attempt to clarify these nebulous and often overlapping phases by a brief review of the major
cases representing each mode of analysis.
Heil Co., a 1962 Tax Court decision was one of the first
attempts to determine if a transfer of patents and accompanying
know-how could qualify for capital gains treatment. 3 Although
decided prior to the release of Revenue Ruling 64-56, Heil Co. was
decided after the Service announced it was currently reviewing
" Ruge represents the initial formulation of the "ancillary and subsidiary to" test.
There appear to have been no decisions discussing this test until Heil Co., 38 T.C. 989
(1962). By this time, however, the Service had announced it was reviewing the entire area.
Prior to the release of Rev. Rul. 64-56 there was nothing to foreshadow an interpretation
of the "ancillary and subsidiary to" test by the Service other than that endorsed in Ruge.
,0Beginning with Heil Co., notes 73-78 and accompanying text infra, a clear inconsistency arose between the liberal language of Rev. Rul. 64-56 and the Service's actual
position. Despite the flexibility hinted at in the ruling, the Service in Heil Co., notes 7378 infra, Bell IntercontinentalCorp., notes 78-79, infra, United States Mineral Products
Co., notes 81-86 infra, and PPG Industries,Inc., notes 89-91 infra, took highly mechanical
and conservative anti-know-how positions. The Service's ruling in Rev. Proc. 19, 1969-1
C.B. 301 epitomized this dramatic contrast.
" By the 1971 decisions, Taylor- Winfield Corp., and Francis H. Shepard, notes 9294 infra, there is little if any mention in the opinions of any requisite degree of relationship
between the know-how transferred and the other forms of property transferred.
" 33 T.C.M. at 1433. See notes 93-99 and accompanying text infra.
" 38 T.C. 989 (1962).
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the know-how transfer guidelines.74 The specific technical information transferred in Heil Co. consisted of assembly drawings,
customer lists, notes on manufacturing operations, expert assistance, future developments, and research.75 Holding that none of
this information constituted the performance of services, the Tax
Court opined that because the know-how in question was pertinent to the successful use of the patents transferred, it took on
the nature of, and was an "incident to", those patents, and therefore was entitled to capital gains treatment.76 Despite the difference in language, the Heil Co. "incident to" test differs little in
result or method of analysis from the Ruge "ancillary and subsidiary to" test." In fact, the two tests as used in Heil Co. seem to
be synonomous. The major advantage of the "incident to" test
however is its expansion of the Ruge test to include past, present,
and even future services.7"
Heil Co. was followed in 1967 by Bell Intercontinental Corp.
v. United States.7 9 Again, as in Heil Co., the issue was not a
section 351 transfer, but rather whether know-how in conjunction
with certain patents qualified as a capital asset under the general
" See T.I.R. 308, 1961 IRB 13, 21.
" 38 T.C. at 993. In addition, Heil Co. was willing to make its engineers and experts
available for consultation with the transferees employees. Id. at 993-94. All of this information related to the development of certain heavy construction machinery.
" Id. at 1003. The court noted that, after reviewing the contract, it was unable to
discover any provisions which provided for the rendering of services by petitioner to the
transferee. Id. at 1002. With respect to future information, the court simply refused to
interfere with the parties' own evaluation of the nature and worth of the rights transferred.
Id. at 1003.
" Compare text accompanyng note 57 with note 75 and accompanying text supra.
" The past services consisted of Heil's own efforts to develop the information; the
present services consisted of consultation with Heil's engineers and experts; and finally,
the future services consisted of any future developments or improvements. Id. at 993-998.
Heil Co. has served as the cornerstone in the development of the concept of knowhow transfers and the issue of whether they constitute property. The Service has issued
guidelines as to what will not be considered "ancillary and subsidiary to" services. See
notes 60-63 and accompanying text supra. In effect Heil foreshadowed a recognition as
property of many of the forms of information subsequently denied property status under
the Service's rulings and procedures. Using the phrase "incident to" rather than "ancillary
and subsidiary to," the court found that engineering and manufacturing assistance, design
improvements, notes on manufacturing operations, and commercial and manufacturing
data were capital assets regardless of their temporal relation, past, present or future, to
the actual transfer. Therefore, the greatest benefit of the "incident to" test was its broadening of the temporal relationship between the actual transfer and earlier or subsequent
service-oriented developments. For further analysis of the "incident to" test, see notes 7991 and accompanying text infra.
1' 381 F.2d 1004 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
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capital gains sections 1221 and 1222. As in Heil Co., the information involved consisted of manufacturing and engineering data,
and the Court of Claims, finding such know-how to constitute a
capital asset, again relied upon the "incident to" test rather than
the "ancillary and subsidiary to" test of Revenue Ruling 64-56.10
Bell, like Heil Co., represents a sharply different attitude toward
the scope of section 351 from that urged by the Service.
In 1969, in United States Mineral Products Co., the Tax
Court reviewed the applicability of the capital gains provisions,
specifically section 1221, to the transfer of manuals, reports, quality control procedures, tests, data, and other documents to a
wholly-owned Canadian subsidiary." Attempting to reconcile the
widening gap emerging between the interpretation by the Heil
Co. and Bell decisions of the "incident to" test and the Service's
dogged adherence to a very restrictive view of the "ancillary and
subsidiary to" test, the Tax Court noted that because the knowhow in question was unique to and necessary for effective utilization of the patents transferred, it was an "incident of" the patents.8 1 Continuing, the court stated: "Assuming arguendo that
this information was equivalent to consulting services . . . we
find that it was of the type usually called for to implement the
sale of highly technical inventions and, thus, was ancillary and
subsidiary to the assignments of the formulas." 3 It is interesting
to note that the court's use of the "ancillary and subsidiary to"
" Bell executed agreements with Agusta concerning the transfer of certain patents
and production know-how including manufacturing and engineering data for production
of a helicopter. Curiously, in light of the court's reliance upon the "incident to" test, the
court found that the know-how transferred was not dependent upon the patent drawings.
Id. 1019-20. Unfortunately, the court did not identify the specific items constituting the
know-how. Additionally, it is important to note that the court relied exclusively on the
Heil Co. "incident to" test with only an oblique reference to Rev. Rul. 64-56. Id. at 1020.
Clearly, the "incident to" test was seen as a more flexible alternative to the restrictive
interpretation by the Service of Rev. Rul. 64-56's guidelines.
1 52 T.C. 177 (1969). Specifically, petitioner transferred formulas, processes, patents,
manuals containing technical information, consultation with the transferee's employees
as to the use of all information transferred, disclosure of all future inventions and improvements during the term of the agreement, and an agreement to conduct, publish, and
publicize future test results on the products. Id. at 179-80.
" "Without these products a proper application of the ... products would have been
difficult or impossible. This information was an incident of the patents and assumed their
nature as capital assets." Id. at 199. Again as in Bell, note 80 supra, the court refused to
apply the Service's version of the "ancillary and subsidiary to" test.

A

Id.
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test was more conclusory than analytical. Only after analyzing
the know-how in terms of the "incident to" test did the court feel
any obligation to express its result in language acceptable to the
Service."' Nevertheless, this broadening of the "ancillary and subsidiary to" test by reliance upon the "incident" test was clearly
contrary to the position urged by the Service. 5 Also noteworthy
was the fact that the court cited Ruge and Revenue Ruling 5517, rather than Revenue Ruling 64-56, in support of its broad
interpretation of the "ancillary and subsidiary to" test.8"
Subsequent to the decision in Mineral Products Co., the
Service released Revenue Procedure 69-19.11 Although the Procedure made no mention of Mineral Products or its predecessors, it
did break new ground for section 351 transfers of know-how by
providing that: (1) The information must be secret in the strictest
sense of the word; (2) it must represent a discovery that is origi52 T.C. at 199.
0 See notes 80 and 82 supra. The information transferred probably ran afoul of Rev.
Rul. 56, 1964-1 C.B. 133, because not all of it was secret, it constituted technical assistance
after the start-up phase, and was merely educational in nature. See the discussion of Rev.
Rul. 64-56 and Rev. Proc. 69-19 in notes 60-63 and 64-66 supra, and notes 122-179 and
accompanying text infra.
0 Interestingly, the cited support for the "ancillary and subsidiary to" test was Arthur C. Ruge, 26 T.C. 138 (1956) and Rev. Rul. 17, 1955-1 C.B. 388, not Rev. Rul. 56, 19641 C.B. 133. Without any reference to "ancillary and subsidiary to" services, Rev. Rul. 5517 simply ruled:
The right to use such 'know-how' is not materially different from the right
to use . . . secret processes and formulae, and, if the right thereto is granted
as part of a licensing agreement, it becomes, in effect, an integral part of the
bundle of rights acquired ....
The payments made . . . are applicable both to . . . the 'know-how',
and to services performed . . . in instructing and training the employees
...
. Since the personal services have only nominal value apart from the
license to use such 'know-how,' all but a nominal sum should be allocated
to the license.
Id. at 389.
Ruge is more directly on point and its initial interpretation and formulation of the
"ancillary and subsidiary to" test is more nearly approximated by the "incident of" test
of Heil Co. and Mineral Products. The Ruge court stated: "The consulting services...
were ancillary and subsidiary . . . to the inventions . . . and are of the type and kind
usually called for to implement the sale of highly technical and intricate inventions." 26
T.C. at 143. One may speculate that the Mineral Products court's reliance on the
"incident to" language represented an attempt to maintain the breadth of the "ancillary
and subsidiary to" test as originally formulated in Ruge but subsequently erroneously
reinterpreted by the Service in Rev. Rul. 64-56. Comparetext accompanying note 83 supra
with Ruge, 26 T.C. at 143.
11 Rev. Proc. 19, 1969-2 C.B. 301.
'A
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nal, unique, and novel; and (3) following from the two requirements above, the information may not represent mere knowledge
or efficiency gained from experience or skill."8 Immediately following the release of Revenue Procedure 69-19 the Tax Court
was again faced with the issue of the proper treatment of the
transfer of patents and accompanying know-how, in PPG Industries, Inc. 9 Referring both to the Service's "ancillary and subsidiary to" test and the "incident to" test, the court recognized
that even after-acquired information may come within the Heil
and Mineral Products Co. "incident to" test for property0 under
section 1211 of the Code. As in Heil Co., the court's use of the
"ancillary and subsidiary to" test in conjunction with the "incident to" test reflected both an implicit rejection of the Service's
highly mechanical and restrictive interpretation of the Ruge test,
in Revenue Ruling 64-56, and a continued adherence to the more
liberal approach developed in prior decisions."
A major step forward came in the 1971 decision TaylorWinfield Corp. where, without citation of any past case law, the
court simply asserted that it was "settled" that the transfer of
unpatented technology, such as know-how, could be the subject
of a sale, and that technical data should be treated, for section
I Id. at 302. See the brief discussion of the Procedure in note 66 supra. For a detailed discussion of Rev. Proc. 69-19 see generally Burke, supra note 20, at 755; Flyer and
Buell, supra note 4, at 27-28; TAX MANAGEMENT MEMORANDUM, supra note 66. Though the
Procedure does not expressly so state, many of its new prohibitions strike directly at the
developments in Heil Co., Bell Intercontinental Corp., and Mineral Products. See notes
73-85 and accompanying text supra. See also notes 122-179 and accompanying text infra.
9 55 T.C. 928 (1970). The assets transferred to the corporation consisted of patents,
trade secrets, research and development data, technical information and know-how, including engineering, scientific and practical information and formulae, manufacturing
data and procedures, machinery, plant and equipment designs, information or materials
and commercial sources thereof, technical information in reports and drawings, blueprints, and specifications, along with all such future information coming into the possession of the transferor during the term of the agreement. Id. at 975, 977, 979-80, 983.
" The court cited with approval the applicability of the Heil Co. "incident to" test
even for information conveyed after the date of the agreement. Id. at 1015-16. Referring
to Heil Co. and Mineral Products, the court referred to the "ancillary and subsidiary to"
test but clearly applied something more akin to the earlier discussed "incident to" test.
Interestingly, the court found that the materials in question implemented the patented
and unpatented information transferred, and made possible the effective utilization of
such technology. The court reasoned therefore that the materials were "ancillary and
subsidiary." Id. at 1018. In PPG, the court used the more liberal test to find that certain
know-how constituted property but relied upon the more restrictive test to phrase its
conclusions.
9" See notes 73-78 and 80 and accompanying text supra.
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1235 capital gains purposes, in a manner similar to patents.2
Again, the nature of the know-how transferred was similar to that
transferred in the earlier discussed decisions and probably came
within the prohibitions of Revenue Procedure 69-19. 13 Interestingly, no mention was made of the procedure. Tempering the
broad language employed by the court, however, was the fact that
in conjunction with the transfer of know-how, Taylor-Winfield
did transfer certain patents and processes. Addressing the
"transfer" issue, the court emphasized that the value of these
patents was not insignificant. 4
The most recent Tax Court examination of the know-how
issue occurred in 1974, in Howard S. Gable. Citing all of the
earlier discussed opinions, the court, in an ambiguously worded
opinion, advanced a new "related to" test and interpreted it very
liberally." Addressing an issue often avoided in the past, the
court noted that underlying any patent transfer is a transfer of
knowledge, knowledge a transferee is likely to require to imple-2 57 T.C. 205, 213 (1971). The specific information transferred consisted of engineering data, designs, research, developments, drawings, layouts, reports and any future developments and patents. Id. at 207.
It is interesting to note that by disregarding the patents transferred, and looking at
the know-how in isolation, Taylor-Winfield recognized that technical data is to be treated
similarly to patents. Id. Conspicuously missing in the opinion is any reference to a requisite relationship between patented and unpatented materials transferred. Id. at 217.
'1 Compare notes 57, 75, 80, 81 and 89 and accompanying text with notes 63-66 and
accompanying text supra.
"1 57 T.C. at 217.
Taylor-Winfield was followed by Francis H. Shepard, 57 T.C. 600 (1972), rev'd 481
F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1973) (Unpublished Opinion), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 911 (1974). In
Shepard the lower court examined the transfer in question and found that the payments
made were only in consideration for certain technical information including drawings,
designs, and blueprints. The lower court accorded this technical information capital asset
treatment. Id. at 609-615. It is difficut to ascertain whether the decision was reversed on
this ground. In contrast to all the cases prior to Shepard, including Taylor-Winfield,
Shepard was the first to favorably address technical information in gross, although the
court was careful to note that all of the information transferred related to a patented
invention covered in the original agreement but never actually transferred to the transferee. Id. at 612-615. The precedential value of Shepard however is highly questionable in
light of its unexplained reversal.
- 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1427 (1974).
" Id. at 1433. The court formulated a test even more flexible and liberal than the
"incident to" test. The court held: "The rule is to be applied to exempt from treatment
as services not only the communication of existing know-how, but the development of
further information as long as it relates to the property transferred and constitutes assistance rendered in connection with the transfer." (Emphasis added.) Id.

1978

TRANSFERS OF KNOW-HOW

ment and develop the property transferred. 7 Recognizing the necessity of this know-how to the value of the property transferred,
and distinguishing services specifically related to an invention
from services meant only to advance the transferee's business in
a general sense, the court afforded property status to that information "related to" the property transferred. 8 In summary,
Gable must be viewed with caution because of the extremely
imprecise language employed by the court. Nevertheless, the
"related to" test perhaps marks the beginning of a broader approach to know-how transfers that may be sufficiently flexible to
encompass even transfers of know-how in gross.9
In retrospect, the post-1964 know-how decisions reveal a judicial willingness to stretch the language of Revenue Ruling 6456 to its broadest and most liberal limits, and to ignore the more
conservative gloss put on the ruling by the Service in Revenue
Procedure 69-19.100 The decisions have evidenced an increasing
liberality toward section 351 transfers of know-how. From Heil
Co., in which the touchstone test focused on the degree of dependence of the know-how transferred upon the other property in the
transaction, the Tax Court has progressed and broadened its
analysis by means of the "related to" test. In effect, Gable may
foreshadow an analytical framework focusing not predominantly
on the property aspects of the transferred patents alone, but
rather on the independent property status of each of the rights
transferred, both patents and know-how.''
'7

Id.

a The specific information transferred by Gable consisted of inventions, compounds,
processes, improvements thereon, technical information, patents, and an agreement to
continue further work, development, and experiments. Id. at 1429. The court termed the
"essence of the transaction" the sale of a patent, and the performance of any services only
a step in developing the property transferred. Id. at 1432.
N See note 101 and accompanying text infra.
15 To date, the courts have simply ignored Rev. Proc. 19, 1969-2 C.B. 301.
'' In Heil, discussion in notes 73-78 and accompanying text supra, the very nature
of the "incident to" test required a two-step analysis. First the court examined the transaction to determine if property has been transferred. Only after answering the first question in the affirmative did the court address the second issue, that is, whether any nonproperty assets (i.e., know-how) in and of themselves, are incidental to the successful
utilization of the property transferred. This pattern repeats itself in Bell, Mineral
Products, and PPG Industries, discussed at notes 78-79, 81-86 and 89-91 and accompanying text supra.
A subtle shift in language and focus occurred in Taylor- Winfield, 57 T.C. 205 (1971)
and the lower court decision in Francis H. Shepard, 57 T.C. 600 (1972) rev'd, 481 F.2d
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Certainly this method of analysis is at odds with the restrictive reformation of the Service's position found in the most
recent revenue rulings and procedures. 0 2 Perhaps the best example of the ever-widening divergence of the Tax Court decisions
and the Service's published position may be seen in the area of
transfers of future services. In Gable, the court noted that earlier
decisions had recognized that the development of further information for the transferee by the transferor, as long as it "related
to" the earlier transferred property, was still exempt from treatment as services under section 351.'"3 Although an accurate statement of prior case law, this statement is totally contrary to the
Service's position as expressed in both Revenue Ruling 64-56 and
Revenue Procedure 69-19: Technical information of a related or
similar nature such as new developments in the field may not be
furnished on a continuing basis to the transferee without adequate compensation (in other words, ordinary income treatment). 104 Admitting this is only one of many examples of the
conflict between the Service's guidelines and the case law devel1399 (3d Cir. 1973) (Unpublished Opinion), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 911 (1974) (stating that
unpatented technology by itself could be the subject of a sale and that "technical data"
should be treated for tax purposes similarly to patents.) Interestingly, the information
involved in Taylor-Winfield was not an incident of a patent, but only related to unpatented items. See note 92 supra. In Shepard, a patent, involved in the license agreement,
was never transferred. See note 94 supra.
By 1974, the court had come full circle. In Gable, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1427 (1974), by
recognizing that in any transfer of technical information and know-how, knowledge constitutes a large part of the transfer, the court implicitly shifted its perspective to recognize
that know-how itself is deserving of property status coequal with that of patents. A transfer of technical information is more than simply a separate transfer of patents and dependent know-how in the same agreement; the transfer is one of interrelated and interdependent coequal property components; in effect, the transfer is a package of property assets.
Consequently, the "related to" test removes the stigma of dependence or market inferiority attached to know-how by the "incident to" or "ancillary and subsidiary to" tests, and
in its place recognizes the distinct and separate property aspect of know-how in and of
itself. To support this analysis, see Flyer and Buell, supra note 19, at 26, 29.
1' See notes 24, 60-66 supra.
'1 33 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1433. In Heil Co., 38 T.C. at 993-94, the Tax Court included
as property the furnishing of future consultation services relating to the inventions transferred. See notes 75-78 supra. Similar treatment was given an agreement for future consultation, and future developments and improvements in Mineral Products, 52 T.C. at
199. See notes 81-86 supra. See also Shepard,57 T.C. at 605, rev'd, 481 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir.
1973) (Unpublished Opinion), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 911 (1974) (future inventions and
improvements); Taylor-Winfield, 57 T.C. at 209 (future developments and improvements); PPG, Inc., 55 T.C. at 1015 (future services and the Heil Co. decision).
'" Rev. Proc. 19, 1969-2 C.B. 301. See also notes 64-66 and accompanying text supra,
and notes 172-179 and accompanying text infra.
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opments, it is perhaps the most dramatic example of the near
total rejection by the courts of the Service's unfounded and arbitrary distinction between services and property for purposes of
section 351.
II.

KNOW-HOW

IN GROSS: PROPERTY AS DEFINED BY FEDERAL LAW

The tax decisions discussed in the preceding section indicate
that anything which by law constitutes property, should also represent property for purposes of section 351. In E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. v. United States, the Court of Claims defined
property as "that commonly thought of in the business world as
a positive business asset."° 5 DuPont was followed four years later
by Stafford v. United States in which the Middle District Court
of Georgia broadened the DuPont property definition to include
any real or personal, tangible or intangible property, or any asset
which the owner has a right to possess, own or dispose of. 0 Admittedly, property may not, and probably should not, be defined
so broadly as to include anything which may represent a benefit
to the parties, a definition foreshadowed by the broad dicta in
Stafford.°7 However, at a minimum, property for purposes of section 351 should encompass everything which is generally recognized as a legally protected interest; the specific holdings in
DuPont and Stafford mandate no less.
The "legally protected interest" construction of the term
"property" provides the taxpayer with an arsenal of weapons with
which to attack the only restrictive pronouncements of the Service. The vast majority of states define legally protected information in terms of the Restatement of Torts, section 757, defining
"trade secret": A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's
business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. ' As will be
noted below, recent nontax federal cases have also endorsed this
definition of legally protected information. Since the broad concepts of "property" expressed in DuPont and Stafford must at
' 471 F.2d at 1218. See the discussion in notes 34-37 and accompanying text supra.

435 F. Supp. at 1038. See the discussion in note 39 and accompanying text supra.
,0 435 F. Supp. at 1038-39.
"" RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 757, comment b (1939) See generally Klein, The Technical Trade Secret Quadrangle:A Survey 55 Nw. UL. Rv. 437 (1960).
'
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least encompass legally protected interests and since federal
courts define legally protected information in terms of the widely
employed Restatement of Torts definition of "trade secret,"
must not this definition also be binding on the Service for the
purpose of determining qualifying know-how transfers under
section 351? In this fashion, the Restatement can be employed
to provide clear guidelines to the taxpayer as to what forms of
know-how will and should be granted property status. The analysis which follows attempts to outline the specific instances
where, contrary to the Service's pronouncements, know-how
transfers should qualify as property for the purpose of section
351.
At one time serious questions existed as to whether any nonpatented intellectual property could be protected by the states.
Arguments were made that Lear, Inc. v. Adkins'"' stood as a
precedent for the rule that federal patent law preempted state
trade secret law."10 This controversy was put to rest by the Supreme Court in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp."'
10,Lear,

Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).

"I In Lear the Court expressly refused to rule on the issue of whether royalties legally
could be collected for the license of a trade secret. The Court, however, intimated that its
ruling with respect to licensee estoppel might cast a broader shadow on trade secret law:
"Our decision today will, of course, require the state courts to reconsider the theoretical
basis of their decisions enforcing the contractual rights of inventors and it is impossible
to predict the extent to which this re-evaluation may revolutionize the law of any particular State in this regard." Id. at 675.
Viewed in terms of such earlier decisions as Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376
U.S. 225 (1964) and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964), many
commentators expressed doubt as to whether state protection of trade secrets could survive a challenge based upon preemption by the federal patent laws. Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 478 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Painton & Co. v.
Bourns, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd, 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971); Adelman & Jaress, Inventions and the Law of Trade Secrets After Lear v. Adkins, 16 WAYNE
L. REv. 77 (1969); Arnold and Goldstein, Life Under Lear, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 1235 (1970);
Milgrim, Sears to Lear to Painton: of Whales and Other Matters, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 17
(1971); Note, Federal Preemption of State Trade Secret Law: Existing Theories and a
Proposed Solution, 24 CAsE W. REs. L. Rv. 799 (1973); Note, The Viability of Trade
Secret ProtectionAfter Lear v. Adkins, 16 V1L.. L. REv. 551 (1971). Doerfer, The Limits
on Trade Secret Law Imposed by Federal Patent and Antitrust Supremacy, 80 HARV. L.
REv. 1432 (1967). See Hawkland, Some Recent American Developments in the Protection
of Know-How, 20 BuFF. L. REV. 119 (1970). See also Doerfer, The Limits on Trade Secret
Law Imposed by Federal Patent and Antitrust Supremacy, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1432 (1967);
Note, The Scott Amendment to the Patent Revision Act: Should Trade Secrets Receive
Federal Protection, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 900.
" 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
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The Kewanee Court made two important determinations: (1)
that states had the power to protect intellectual property," 2 and
(2) that specific state protections, at least when in conformity
with the Restatement of Torts definition of trade secret, did not
conflict with the federal patent laws." 3 The Court reasoned that
federal patent protection and the Restatement's protection of
trade secrets were complementary, serving the same purpose of
promoting business invention and efficiency."' As a result, state
protection of trade secrets, as enunciated by the Restatement, is
not only permissible but desirable." 5 In other words, compilations
of information meeting the standards of the Restatement can and
should represent a legally protected interest. Viewed in terms of
the Hempt Bros. and Stafford cases, which state that any rights
"1416 U.S. at 478-79. See Sears v. Gottschalk, 502 F.2d 122, 132 (4th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1056 (1975); Richter v. Westab, Inc., 529 F.2d 896, 901 (6th Cir. 1976);
Analogic Corp. v. Data Translation, Inc., 358 N.E.2d 804 (Mass. 1976).
" 416 U.S. at 491. See Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971).
See the following commentaries for discussions of the Kewanee holdings: Stern, A
Reexamination of Preemption of State Trade Secret Law after Kewanee, 42 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 927 (1974); Note, Survival of State Protectionfor Trade Secrets, 28 ARK. L. REV.
491 (1975); Note, Trade Secrets: Federal Patent Law Does Not Preempt State Laws
Protecting Trade Secrets Which, Although Appropriate Subjects for Patent Protection,
Are Ineligible for PatentProtectionBecause They Have Been in Public Use for More Than
One Year, 41 BROOK. L. REv. 682 (1975); Note, State Trade Secret Protection is not
Preempted by Operationof United States Patent Law, 12 Hous. L. REV. 191 (1974); Note,
ConstitutionalLaw-Patentsand Trade Secrets-FederalPatent Law Does Not Preempt
State Trade Secret Law, 51 N.D. L. REy. 212 (1974); Note, Trade Secrets - Federal Patent
Code Does Not Preempt State Trade Secret Statutes, 28 RuT. L. REV. 191 (1974); Note,
Constitutional Law -Patent Clause - Status May Afford Trade Secret ProtectionWithout
Infringing Upon FederalPatentPower, 20 VtLL. L. REv.225 (1974); Note, Accommodation
of Federal Patent and the State Interest in Trade Secrets, 16 WM. & MARY L. REv. 171
(1974); Note, Patent Law - No Federal Preemptionof State Trade Secret Law, 1974 Wis.
L. REv. 1195.
"I "Trade secret law will encourage invention in areas where patent law does not
reach, and will prompt the independent inventor to proceed with the discovery and exploitation of his invention. Competition is fostered and the public is not deprived of the use
of valuable, if not quite patentable, inventions." 416 U.S. at 485
"' The Court discusses the need for state trade secret protection as follows:
Trade secret law encourages the development and exploitation of those items
of lesser or different invention than might be accorded protection under the
patent laws, but which items still have an important part to play in the
technological and scientific advancement of the Nation. Trade secret law
promotes the sharing of knowledge, and the efficient operation of industry
... .Congress, by its silence over these many years, has seen the wisdom
of allowing the States to enforce trade secret protection.
416 U.S. at 493.
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which can be possessed, used, or transferred represent property,
Kewanee's endorsement of trade secret protection in general, and
the Restatement in particular, should serve to establish minimum guidelines with respect to what forms of secret information
transfers will be granted nonrecognition status under section
351(a).
Indeed, subsequent decisions have cited Kewanee for the rule
that the Restatement represents the federal definition of a protected trade secret. Faced with the task of construing "trade
secret" for the purpose of the Freedom of Information Act, the
Ninth Circuit relied on Kewanee's reference to the Restatement:
"The Supreme Court has defined 'trade secret' as it applies to
the patent laws as a 'compilation of information' which is used
in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain
an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.""' In
another case addressing the scope of the Freedom of Information
Act, the District Court for the District of Columbia, quoting from
Kewanee, stated that the court "must make a threshold determination whether such materials fall within the 'widely relied-upon
definition of trade secret found at 4 Restatement of Torts § 757,
comment b (1939).' ""7 Similarly, in those instances where the
court has not specifically addressed local law," '8 or where local law
is in doubt,"9 the Restatement inevitably emerges as the standard
the court applies in defining what constitutes a protected trade
secret. These post-Kewanee decisions, by specifically adopting
the Restatement's definition of protected information for the pur"' Union Oil Co. of Calif. v. FPC, 542 F.2d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 1976). See Rel-Reeves,
Inc. v. United States, 534 F.2d 274, 297 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (citing both the Restatement of
Torts and Kewanee for what is protectable as a trade secret property right under an armed
service procurement regulation defining "proprietary data"); Truck Equipment Service
Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1215 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, (In a case involving unfair competition under the Lanham Act, the court cited Kewanee for the proposition
that those who invest time and money in the development of goodwill should reap the
benefits of their energy); Pharmaceutical Man. Ass'n v. Weinburger, 411 F. Supp. 576,
580 (D.D.C. 1976) (assessing the propriety of a FDA regulation by comparing it to the
Restatement of Torts definition of trade secret).
'" Ashland Oil Inc. v. FTC, 409 F. Supp. 297, 303 (D.D.C.), aff'd 548 F.2d 977 (D.C.
Cir. 1976).
" Timely Prods. Corp. v. Arron, 523 F.2d 288, 303 (2d Cir. 1975); Telex Corp. v.
I.B.M. Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed,423 U.S. 802 (1975); Kodeky Elecs.,
Inc. v. Mechanex Corp., 486 F. 2d 449 (10th Cir. 1973).
"I Tri-Tron Int'l v. Velto, 525 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1975); Keystone Plastics, Inc.
v. C&P Plastics, Inc., 506 F.2d 960, 964 (5th Cir. 1975); K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., Inc.,
506 F.2d 471, 473 (9th Cir. 1974).
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poses of federal law, reinforce the conclusion that Kewanee requires that the Service recognize the Restatement standards of
what information represents property. Kewanee's endorsement of
the Restatement, when construed together with the broad definition of property in DuPont and Stafford must therefore bind the
Service to the Restatement's definition of protected information
for purposes of section 351. As demonstrated in Part II, there has
been little controversy over whether secret formulas or secret patterns and devices (i.e. secret processes) are recognized as property. Similarly, cases interpreting section 351 seem to hold that
virtually any valuable compilation of information will also qualify as property when the information transfer is an "incident of"
the transfer of patents, secret formulas, or secret processes. The
unanswered question is what forms of know-how, independent of
any patents or trade secrets, will qualify as property. By applying
the Restatement to section 351 this question is answered as well.
To illustrate the impact of the Restatement, the analysis
which follows highlights those specific positions taken by the
Service which cannot withstand judicial attack when judged
against the Restatement. Specifically, the authors will address
two fundamental tests which the Service apparently requires that
the taxpayer meet before a know-how transfer will be granted
nonrecognition status under sections 351 and 367: (1) The information must be absolutely secret, that is, known only to the
owner and employees who use it; and (2) in addition to being a
discovery, the information must be original, unique and novel.
Admittedly these tests apply only to the limited issue of whether
a transfer will be granted prior approval under the now obsolete
advance notice rules of section 367.10 In light of the Tax Reform
Act's recent adoption of a post-transfer review procedure, the
standards expressed in Revenue Procedure 69-19 may no longer
necessarily reflect the Service's position with respect to what
forms of know-how will qualify under section 351. However, since
the requirements articulated in the Revenue Procedure appear to
be designed to supplement the ambiguous rules expressed in Revenue Ruling 64-56, the Revenue Procedure must substantially
reflect the Service's position with respect to section 351 as well.
"2 See note 3 supra for the changes in section 367 implemented by the Tax Reform
Act of 1976.
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Indeed a careful reading of the Procedure commands this conclusion.'2 '
The authors will demonstrate how neither the "absolute secret" nor the "unique and novel" tests can stand as appropriate
guidelines for what should constitute property under section
351(a) when compared against the Restatement. Having reached
this conclusion, the authors will further highlight how other more
specific positions taken by the Service with respect to know-how
also must give way in the face of contrary legal authority.
A. Must the Information Be Absolutely Secret?
Although Revenue Ruling 64-56 requires information to be
secret before it will be granted property status,'2 it was not until
Revenue Procedure 69-19 was issued that the Service stated what
it meant by "secret." First, "adequate safeguards" must have
been taken "to guard the secret against unauthorized disclosure."' 23 This demand for adequate safeguards presumably does
not differ materially from the common law requirement that the
owner take "reasonable" precautions under the circumstances to
protect his secret.'2 However, the Service's second requirement
"I The Revenue Procedure demands that the taxpayer represent that the information
is property under section 351 as defined by Revenue Ruling 64-56, and that the information is protected under U. S. law, the law of the transferor. The Procedure then states:
"In making such representations the taxpayer should ... state" that the information is
absolutely secret and that it is original, unique, and novel. 1969-2 C.B. at 302. Since "such
representations" must refer to the property and protection requirements, one must necessarily assume that the dual tests which follow represent the Service's interpretation of
governing U.S. law.
I" In Revenue Ruling 64-56 the Service stated that property consists of secret processes, secret formulas, and secret information "in the general nature of a patentable
invention .

. .

. Other information which is secret will be given consideration as 'property'

on a case-by-case basis." 1964-1 (Part 1) C.B. at 134.
'2 1969-2 C.B. at 302.
,2 R. Mn.zm, supra note 7, § 2.04 at 2-26 to 2-27 (1977); See, e.g., K-2 Ski Co. v.
Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471. 474 (9th Cir. 1974); Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v.
Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102, 1110 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Allen
Mfg. Co. v. Loika, 145 Conn. 509, 144 A.2d 306, 310 (1958); Space Aero Prods. Co., Inc.,
v. R. E. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d 74, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965); Sun Dial
Corp. v. Rideout, 16 N.J. 252, 108 A.2d 442 (1954); General Analine & Film Corp. v.
Frantz, 50 Misc.2d 994, 272 N.Y.S.2d 600, 606, judgment modified, 52 Misc.2d 197, 274
N.Y.S.2d 634 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
The Restatement of Torts mentions "the extent of measures taken by him to guard
the secrecy of the information" and "the extent to which it is known by employees and
others involved in his business" as two of the six factors to consider in evaluating whether
a trade secret exists. RESTATEMENT op TORTS § 757 at 6. Significantly the Supreme Court
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that the information be "known only by the owner and those
confidential employees who require the 'information' for use in
the conduct of the activities to which it is related ... " deviates substantially from the standards expressed in the Restatement. This "absolute" view 2" of secrecy can derive only from the
Service's fundamental misinterpretation of the proprietary interests embodied in a trade secret, in general, and know-how, in
particular.
The Service has attempted to impose upon trade secrets and
know-how tests appropriate only for patents." 7 Patent rights and
trade secret rights are fundamentally different concepts requiring
fundamentally different rules of analysis. A patent is a grant of
an absolute monopoly. The invention is a secret until a patent
application is approved, whereupon the invention is publicly disclosed. In exchange for disclosure, the Government grants the
inventor a monopoly in the invention, limited to a seventeen-year
term. 28 The patentee's monopoly includes the right to prevent
independent creation and use of the invention. 9
A trade secret is information of sufficient competitive value
so that one who does not know the information cannot appropriate the information to himself or another in breach of a confidence. It involves an obligation of fair dealing, implied from the
very value of the information itself or created by express contract.' 31 Unlike a patent, the owner has no right to prevent one
who independently discovers such information from using it; the
in Kewanee stated that one of the disadvantages that would result from denying trade
secret protection would be excessive security measures. 416 U.S. at 486.
12 1969-2 C.B. at 302.
' Those few authorities stating the "absolute" view that a secret can be known only
by the owner and employees with a need to know generally do so gratuitously. In other
words, it is rare, if ever, that a court will employ the absolute secrecy doctrine as a rule
of decision in a case. See R. MiLGRM § 2.07[2] at 2-75 to 2-76 & n. 11.
"' See also the discussion of the Service's novelty requirement at text accompanying
notes 155-159 infra.
'1 416 U.S. at 481. Contrast rights in a trade secret which survive as long as the
information remains secret. American Dirigold Corp. v. Dirigold Metals Corp., 125 F.2d
446 (6th Cir. 1942).
'
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. 416 U.S. 470, 478 (1974).
'° In essence a trade secret action is one for "inequitable competition arising from a
breach of trust." Vulcan Detinning Co. v. American Can Co., 72 N.J. Eq. 387, 67 A. 339,
343 (1907) (granting trade secret protection despite the fact that the secret had been stolen
before). See also Nash, The Concept of 'Property' in Know-how as a Growing Area of
Industrial Property: Its Sale and Licensing, 6 PAT. T.M. & COPYRIGr J. OF REsEARCH &
EnUC. 289 (1962).
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owner's rights therefore are not exclusive.' The owner does, however, have the right to prevent another from appropriating information discovered and developed by the owner's efforts. Having
expended time and money to make a discovery, the owner has the
right to force competitors to make the same investment of their
own time and money. 132 The owner retains his right until that
point in time when the information becomes generally known.'
Since a trade secret action is essentially an action for misappropriation, a requirement of absolute secrecy is irrelevant in
defining the trade secret right. The protective rights derive from
the competitive value of the information. It does not matter if
only the owner and a minimum number of employees know the
secret. Rather what matters is whether knowledge of the secret is
sufficiently limited so that one who does not know the information cannot equitably appropriate it from one who does know it.'
"I "A trade secret law, however, does not offer protection against discovery by free
and honest means, such as by independent invention, accidential disclosure, or by socalled reverse engineering ..
" Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476
(1974). Rather the holder of a trade secret is protected against someone acquiring the
knowledge by "improper" means. Id. Thus the proprietary right under a trade secret is
not an exclusive property right in the information, but rather the right to protect one's
information from improper appropriation. RESTATEMENT OF ToRs § 757 at 4. Droeger v.
Welsh Sporting Goods Corp., 541 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir. 1976); Frances H. Shepard, Jr.,
57 T.C. 600, 614 (1972), rev'd 481 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 417 U.S. 911 (1974);
Junker v. Plummer, 320 Mass. 101, 67 N.E.2d 667, 670 (1946).
"S'The Kewanee Court quoted language from the leading case of A.O. Smith Corp.
v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 1934), modified 74 F.2d 934 (1935)
which noted the function of trade secret law to protect one who makes a discovery, even
if nonpatentable, from the competitive injury resulting from a "competitor who by unfair
means, or as the beneficiary of a broken faith, obtains the desired knowledge without
himself paying the price in labor, money, or mechanics expended by the discoverer." 416
U.S. at 482. This statement repeats a view expressed by the Supreme Court some seventy
years before: "The plaintiff has the right to keep the work which it has done, or paid for
doing, to itself. The fact that others might do similar work, if they might, does not
authorize them to steal the plaintiff's." Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock
Co., 198 U.S. 236, 250 (1905).
" As long as information is substantially secret it will support an action for misappropriation, See text accompanying note 139 infra. However, once information becomes
a matter of general or public knowledge it cannot be a trade secret and any rights to
protection are lost.

RESTATEMENT OF

TorS § 757, at 5-6. 416 U.S. at 475.

I' Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474 (1974). Servo Corp. of Am. v.
General Elec. Co., 393 F.2d 551, 555 (4th Cir. 1968). "It is the employment of improper
means to procure the trade secret, rather than the mere copying or use, which is the basis
of the liability under the rule stated in this section." RESTATEMENT OF ToRrs § 757 at 3-4.
See E.I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917); E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904,910 (Ct. Cl. 1961); International
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Consequently the Restatement expresses the broader majority rule of relative secrecy:'3 5
It is not requisite that only the proprietor of the business know it.
He may, without losing his protection, communicate it to employees
involved in its use. He may likewise communicate it to others
pledged to secrecy. Others may also know of it independently, as,
for example when they have discovered the process and formula by
independent invention and are keeping it secret.'"

In other words, contrary to the Service's stance in Revenue Procedure 69-19, the mere fact that an owner has licensed his secret to
others,"7 or that others have independently discovered the secret, 3 8 does not destroy the owner's proprietary interest in preventing unauthorized disclosure or use of his secret. All that is
required is that "a substantial element of secrecy . . .exist, so
that, except by the use of improper means, there would be difficulty in acquiring the information."' 3 9
Admittedly, certain disclosures will destroy the element of
Indus., Inc. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 99 F. Supp. 907, 913 (D. Del. 1951) aff'd 248 F.2d
696 (3d Cir 1957), appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 943 (1958); Allen Mfg. Co. v. Loika, 145
Conn. 509, 144 A.2d 306, 309 (1958).
I"See, e.g., Tri-Tron Int'l v. Velto, 525 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1975); K-2 Ski Co. v.
Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471, 473-74 (9th Cir. 1974); A.H. Emery Co. v. Marcan Products
Co., 389 F.2d 11, 16 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 835 (1968); Republic Sys. & Programming, Inc. v. Computer Assistance, Inc., 322 F.Supp. 619 (D. Conn. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d
996 (2d Cir. 1971); Cudahy Co. v. American Labs. Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1339, 1343-44 (D.
Neb. 1970); Plastic & Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. Roy, 163 Conn. 257, 303 A.2d 725 (1972);
Town & Country House & Home Serv. Inc. v. Evans, 150 Conn. 314, 317-18, 189 A.2d 390,
393 (1963); Henkle & Joyce Hardware Co. v. Maco, Inc., 195 Neb. 565, 571, 239 N.W.2d
772, 776 (1976); R. Mn~iuM, supra note 7, § 2.07[2].
"' RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, at 6.
"' Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974); Chicago Bd. of Trade
v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 250-51 (1904).
"' The mere fact that others have obtained the information does not defeat its status
as a trade secret. Thus one early opinion states:
A "secret" is nothing more than a private matter; something known only to
one or a few and kept from others. It may be acquired by lawful means, ...
without tracing title to the originator, and when so acquired it does not
necessarily cease to be a secret which may be protected from unlawful competition. Secrecy may be absolute or relative.
Kaumagraph Co. v. Stampagraph Co., 235 N.Y. 1, 138 N.E. 485,487 (1923). See McKinzie
v. Cline, 197 Or. 184, 252 P.2d 564, 567-68 (1953).
I" K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., 506 F.2d 471, 473-74 (9th Cir. 1974); A.H. Emery
Co. v. Marcan Prods. Co., 389 F.2d 11, 16 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 835 (1968); Basic
Chems. Inc. v. Benson, 251 N.W.2d 220, 229 (Ia. 1977); Space Aero Prods. Co. v. R.E.
Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 109-10, 208 A.2d 74, 82, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965); Sun
Dial Corp. v. Rideout, 16 N.J. 252, 257, 108 A.2d 442, 445 (1954).
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substantial secrecy required by the Restatement. In some instances, the public distribution and sale of a product will eliminate
any trade secret claimed in its design.' The publication of a
patent will also destroy the required element of secrecy."' Similarly, publication in trade magazines or the general availability
2
of the information may destroy the secret."
However, disclosure in and of itself will not preclude protection of a trade secret unless that disclosure renders "meaningless"
the duty to maintain such information in confidence."' At bottom, the issue is whether the information remains secret to the
"4 Koehring Co. v. E.D. Etnyre & Co., 254 F. Supp. 334, 361 (N.D. Ill. 1966); Houser
v. Snap-On Tools Corp. 202 F. Supp. 181, 187 (D. Md. 1962); Speciner v. Reynolds Metal
Co., 177 F. Supp. 291, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 279 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1960); Bimbo Mfg.
Co. v. Starz Cylinder Co., 119 Ill. App. 2d 251, 256 N.E.2d 357, 364 (1969). See Skoog v.
McCray Refrigerator Co., 211 F.2d 254, 257 (7th Cir. 1954) (public display of innovation).
But this result follows only when the claimed secret can be easily discovered from inspection of the product. Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 374 (7th Cir. 1953). Thus, Dravo
in finding a trade secret commented: "Here was no simple device, widely circulated, the
construction of which was ascertainable at a glance." Id. at 375. See Kubik Inc. v. Hull,
56 Mich. App. 335, 224 N.W.2d 80, 93 (1974); K & G Tool & Service Co. v. G & G Fishing
Magnets, Inc., 58 Tex. 594, 314 S.W.2d 782, 787, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 898 (1958).
141 Once a patent is granted, all the details of the invention are published and secrecy
is lost. Thus a trade secret action cannot be maintained for appropriations after that date.
Scharmer v. Carrollton Mfg. Co., 525 F.2d 95, 99 (6th Cir. 1975). However, if the secret is
appropriated before the patent is published, even though the patent is later published,
most courts will nonetheless continue to recognize the trade secret action. See, e.g., Engelhard Indus., Inc. v. Research Instrumental Corp., 324 F.2d 347, 352 (9th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 923 (1964); Shellmar Prods. Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co., 87 F.2d 104 (7th
Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 695 (1937); Julius Hyman & Co. v. Velsicol Corp., 123
Colo. 563, 233 P.2d 977 (1951); Adolph Gottscho, Inc. v. American Marking Corp., 18 N.J.
467, 114 A.2d 438 (1955); Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 314 S.W.2d 763, cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 898 (1958).
" Pressure Science Inc. v. Kramer, 413 F. Supp. 618, 626 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd, 537
F.2d 301 (1977), affd 551 F.2d 301; Ferranti Electric "Inc. v. Harwood, 43 Misc. 2d 533,
251 N.Y.S.2d 612 (1964). But the disclosure must destroy the value of the secret. Pressed
Steel Car Co. v. Standard Steel Car Co., 210 Pa. 464, 60 A. 4, 9 (1904); A.H. Emery Co.
v. Marcan Prods. Co., 388 F.2d 11, 16 (2d Cir. 1968). "Absolute secrecy is not essential
and the plaintiff does not abandon his secret by delivering it or a copy to another for a
restrictive purpose, nor by a limited publication." Plastic & Metal Fabricators, Inc. v.
Roy, 163 Conn. 257, 303 A.2d 725, 731 (1972).
"4' Servo Corp. of America v. General Electric Corp., 393 F.2d 551, 555 (4th Cir. 1968);
Wilkes v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 383 F. Supp. 1135, 1140 (D.S.C. 1974).
The fact that one secret can be discovered more easily than another does
not affect the principle. Even if resort to the patterns of the plaintiff was
more of a convenience than a necessity, still, if there was a secret, it belonged
to him, and the defendant had no right to obtain it by unfair means, or to
use it after it was thus obtained.
Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 30, 23 N.E. 12, 13 (1889).
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extent that it retains a competitive value. Information may have
been discovered by others, or disclosed to others; yet despite this
"publication" the information may continue to provide the
"possessor a commercial advantage over his competitors. This
advantage constitutes value, and the disclosure of the information which creates the advantage may be sufficient to raise the
implied agreement not to appropriate it."'"
The possessor's competitive advantage derives principally
from the effort that a competitor would have to expend in order
to obtain the same knowledge.'" Thus, in assessing the impact of
disclosure on the viability of a secret, the proper question is not
whether the disclosure makes the secret discoverable, but rather,
whether an effort is still required in order to discover the secret.
As a result, in evaluating a trade secret it is not determinative
that one could develop or deduce the secret by examining published materials'" or through one's own experimentation." 7 Nei' Kamin v. Kuhnau, 233 Or. 139, 374 P.2d 912, 917 (1962).
,, "[Tlhe mere fact that [a means of]lawful acquisition is available does not mean
that he may, through a breach of confidence, gain the information in usable form and
escape the efforts of inspection and analysis." Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 375
(7th Cir. 1953). Similarly, in holding that know-how reduced to blueprints constituted a
trade secret, one court states: "To be secret means that a blueprint, for example, is not
in the public domain through divulgence and that it is not too easily discoverable; that
is, apparent to all without too much hard work." Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 50 Ill.
App. 2d 402, 200 N.E.2d 615, 618 (1964). See Telex Corp. v. I.B.M. Corp., 367 F. Supp.
258 (N.Dj. Okla. 1973), modified, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 802
(1975); see also Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 342
F.2d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 1965).
"I "It matters not that defendants could have gained their knowledge from a study
of the expired patent and plaintiffs' publicly marketed product. The fact is that they did
not. Instead they gained it from plaintiffs via their confidential relationship and in so
doing incurred a duty not to use it to plaintiffs' detriment." Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d
493, 495 (2d Cir. 1953).
In Ellicott Mach. Corp. v. Wiley Mfg. Corp., 297 F. Supp. 1044 (D. Md. 1969) the
court found that a trade secret existed despite the fact that one could have discovered the
secret "by expending a considerable amount of time in the inspection of Ellicott dredges
and by searching catalogues and brochures issued over a period of years by various suppliers." Where a combination of information is not itself a matter of public knowledge,
the fact that one can piece together the knowledge through the disclosed pieces does not
destroy the trade secret. Id. at 1052-53. See note 145 supra and accompanying text; Franke
v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493, 495 (2d Cir. 1953).
"I International Indus. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 99 F. Supp. 907, 913 (D. Del.
1951), aff'd, 248 F.2d 696 (3d Cir. 1957), appealdismissed, 355 U.S. 943 (1958); Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Technical Tape Corp., 23 Misc. 2d 671, 192 N.Y.S.2d 102, 119
(1959); Schavior v. American Rebonded Leather Co., 104 Conn. 472, 133 A. 582, 583
(1926).
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ther will the mere marketing of a product destroy the underlying
trade secret if one must "reverse engineer" in order to discover
that product. 4 ' Similarly, it is no defense in a misappropriation
action to assert that "the information embraced in each secret
could have been discovered by diligent research or could have
been ascertained by restoring to sources which the defendant
never explored, such as testimony in prior litigation or the examination of expired patents, or by resorting to an article in a trade
magazine. .... ,,9 In other words, by affording protection to all
information which provides a competitive advantage, the Restatement ignores the issue of who knows or could know the information. Rather, the crucial issue becomes who does not know the
"secret." If enough people remain in ignorance so that the information retains competitive value the information will be protected, and therefore should represent property for taxing purposes. 150
Even disregarding the impact of the Restatement, the 1961
Court of Claims decision, E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v.
United States,,5, should bind the Service to the relative secrecy
doctrine. DuPont defined trade secret to include "any information not generally known in the trade . . . . The information is
frequently in the public domain . . . . A plurality of individual
discoverers may have protectible, wholly separate rights in the
same trade secret."152 Having so established the breadth of the
By measuring the component parts, they say, blueprints could have
been prepared and the most efficient productive method deduced. The fact
remains, however, that the defendants took unwarranted advantage of the
confidence which the Schreyers reposed in them and obtained the desired
knowledge without the expenditure of money, effort and ingenuity which the
experimental analysis of the model on the market would have required. Such
an advantage obtained through breach of confidence is morally reprehensible
and a proper subject for legal redress.
Schreyer v. Casco Prods. Corp., 97 F. Supp. 159, 168 (D. Conn.), modified, 190 F.2d 921
(2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 913 (1962).
"I See note 140 supra; R. MnzRIM, supra note 7, § 2.05[3]; Cavitch, supra note 7, §
232.01[5].
"I Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Technical Tape Corp., 23 Misc.2d 671, 192
N.Y.S.2d 102, 116 (1959).
"' See the discussion of Kewanee at text accompanying notes 111-119 supra, and the
discussion of relative secrecy at text accompanying notes 134-139 supra.
"I E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
,12Id. at 911. In a similar case involving capital gains treatment of trade secrets,
Francis H. Shepard, 57 T.C. 600, 617-18 (1972), rev'd without opinion, 481 F.2d 1399 (3d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 911 (1974), the court quoted extensively from Tabor v.
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trade secret concept, DuPont concluded that trade secrets become property for purposes of the capital gains sections of the
Code because, like patents, a trade secret affords its owner a
"means to competitive advantage."' 53 The court further noted,
however, that with trade secrets, unlike patents, one's competitive advantage derives not from absolute rights but from one's
right to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the secret;' thus, if
the information is sufficiently secret to support a claim of misappropriation it will be property for the purposes of the Internal
Revenue Code. This conclusion is in marked contrast to the Service's position that the secret can only be known by the employer
and those employees with a need to know.
B. Must the Information Be Unique, Novel and Original?
The Service's requirement that the information be in the
nature of an "invention" cannot withstand attack once the
preeminence of the concept of competitive advantage is established. Again the Service fails to draw the distinction between the
absolute rights of patents and the relative rights of trade secrets.
Since a patent grants the owner an absolute monopoly and precludes ownership rights in others who may independently discover the invention, the invention must in fact be a clear advance
in technology in order to warrant such an exclusive property interest.3 5 Specifically, the invention must be original, unique, and
novel. ' 56 However, since a trade secret constitutes something of
value sufficient to support a claim of breach of confidence, inventiveness becomes a meaningless standard of assessment. 5 '
Rather, the correct approach is to determine if the information
is an "advance" in technology sufficient to provide its owner with
a competitive advantage.158 If the discovery has such a competi-

Hoffman, supra note 143, to support the conclusion that the disclosure must place the
information in the public domain before one's secret (i.e. property) is destroyed.
113Id.; Stalker Corp. v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 30, 33 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
" 288 F.2d at 911-12; Stalker Corp. v. United States, 209 F. Supp. at 34. See Francis
H. Shepard, Jr., 57 T.C. 600, 616-18 (1972), rev'd without opinion 481 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 911 (1974).
"' The requirements of novelty and invention "are essential to patentability because
a patent protects against unlicensed use of the patented device or process even by one who
discovers it properly through independent research." RESTATEMENT OF ToRTS § 757 at 6-7.
1 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1970).
"5 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 at 7.
' See text at note 119 supra.
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tive value, then it must be a trade secret, and therefore should
be property for purposes of section 3 5 1 .111

The Service's test of invention, however, merely gives lipservice to this concept of trade secret. In Revenue Ruling 64-56
the Service states that the information need not be patentable.""0
In Revenue Procedure 69-19 the Service repeats this statement
but nevertheless imposes a test of invention equivalent to that
required for a patent: "[T]he 'information' [must] represent a
discovery and, while not necessarily patentable, the 'information'
[must be] original, unique, and novel."''
The additional requirement that the information be
"original, unique, and novel" is totally contrary to the view espoused in the Restatement. The Restatement specifically states
that the test of competitive advantage does not demand high
standards of creativity. A trade secret need not be patentable;'
novelty and invention are not required.6 3 The information may
be nothing more than something which is clearly anticipated in
the prior art 6 4 or "[information]which is merely a mechanical
improvement that a good mechanic can make. "115 Certainly,
159As has been argued above, anything qualifying as a trade secret under the Restatement's definition must represent property, as required by DuPont and Kewanee. See text
accompanying notes 111-119 supra. This conclusion is further reinforced by the earlier
1961 DuPont decision which broadly defines what may constitute a trade secret. See text
accompanying notes 151-154 supra.
I" Information need not be "patentable in the patent law sense." 1964-1 (Part 1) C.B.
at 134.
"1 1969-2 C.B. at 302.
12 RE TATEMENT OF Torrs § 757, Comment b at 6.
"3 Id. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974); University
Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 535 n.25 (5th Cir. 1974); Kodekey Elec., Inc. v. Mechanex Corp., 486 F.2d 449, 455 (10th Cir. 1973); Clark v. Bunker,
453 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1972); Water Serv., Inc. v. Tesco Chem. Inc., 410 F.2d 163,
172-73 (5th Cir. 1969); Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp.,
267 F. Supp. 726, 731 (S.D. Cal. 1967), modified, 407 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1969); Seismograph Serv. Corp. v. Offshore Raydist, 135 F. Supp. 342, 354 (E.D. La. 1955), modified,
263 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1958); Sun Dial Corp. v. Rideout, 16 N.J. 252, 108 A.2d 442 (1954);
Henkle & Joyce Hardware Co. v. Maco Inc., 195 Neb. 565, 239 N.W.2d 772, 776 (1976);
Extrin Foods v. Leighton, 202 Misc. 592, 115 N.Y.S.2d 429 (1952); R. MILOUM, supranote
7, § 2.08[21 and authorities cited therein at n.9.
I" See, e.g., E.W. Bliss Co. v. Struther-Dunn, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 890 (S.D. Ia. 1968);
Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 241 F. Supp. 549, 560 (D. Conn. 1964) Sinclair v. Aquarius
Elec., Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d 216, 116 Cal. Rptr. 654, 659 (1974); Mann v. Tatge Chem.
Co., 201 Kan. 326, 440 P.2d 640, 647 (1968); Gallowhur Chem. Corp. v. Schwerdle, 37 N.J.
Supr. 385, 117 A.2d 416, 421 (1955); Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp. v. Cox, 50
N.YS.2d 643, 656 (S.Ct. 1944); R. MmGaim, supra note 7, at § 2.08[3].
I" RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 at 7. A.O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works, Co.,
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there must be some element of "discovery" involved so that the
information contains an element of secrecy and thus provides the
owner with a competitive advantage.' But this liberal standard
of discovery is all that is required." 7
Consequently, if the information in fact provides its owner
with a competitive advantage, it does not matter if the
"discovery" may appear to be simple or obvious.'"1
Facts of great value may, like the lost purse upon the highway, lie
long unnoticed upon the public commons. Hundreds pass them by,
till one more observant than the rest makes the discovery. It is idle
73 F.2d 531, 539 (6th Cir.), modified, 74 F.2d 934 (1934); Ranger Steel Prods. Corp. v.
Chodak, 128 N.Y.S.2d 607, 610 (S. Ct. 1953); Kamin v. Kuhnau, 233 Ore. 139, 374 P.2d
912, 917 (1962); R. MILGRIM, supra note 7, § 2.08[3] at 2-94. See Sloan v. Mud Prods.,
114 F. Supp. 916, 924-27 (N.D. Okla. 1953).
I" "[Slome novelty will be required if merely because that which does not possess
novelty is usually known; secrecy, in the context of trade secrets, thus implies at least
minimal novelty." Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974). Hooker
Chem. Corp. v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 235 F. Supp. 412 (W.D. Tenn. 1964); Sarkes
Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250, 265 (S.D. Cal. 1958) aff'd per
curiam, 283 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 869 (1961).
"I "Quite clearly discovery is something less than invention. Invention requires genius, imagination, inspiration, or whatever is the faculty that gives birth to the inventive
concept. Discovery may be the result of industry, application, or be perhaps merely fortuitous. The discoverer, however, is entitled to the same protection as the inventor." A.O.
Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531, 538 (6th Cir.), modified, 74 F.2d
934 (1934).
ISN The mere fact that the means by which a discovery is made are
obvious, that experimentation which leads from known factors to an ascertainable but presently unknown result may be simple, we think cannot destroy the value of the discovery to one who makes it, or advantage the
competitor who by unfair means, or as the beneficiary of a broken faith,
obtains the desired knowledge without himself paying the price in labor,
money, or machines expended by the discoverer.
A.O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531, 538-39 (6th Cir.), modified,
74 F.2d 934 (1934). See Franke v. Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493, 499 (2d Cir. 1953); Forest Labs.,
Inc. v. Formulations, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 202, 208 (E.D. Wis. 1969), modified, 452 F.2d 621
(7th Cir. 1971); Mann v. Tatge Chem. Co., 201 Kan. 326, 440 P.2d 640, 647 (1968);
Cavitch, supra note 7, § 232.01161; see also Cooper, supra note 46, at 335 (1966).
There are other variations to the same broad approach. For example, one court asks
directly whether the discovery is simple and obvious in order to determine if the information provides a competitive advantage. K&G Oil Tool & Serv. Co. v. G&G Fishing Tool
Serv., 158 Tex. 594, 314 S.W.2d 782, 790 (1958) (holding that a magnetic fishing tool
represented a trade secret). California expresses a similarly broad standard: "[it has
been held that a trade secret in the broad sense consists of any unpatented idea which
may be used for industrial and commercial purposes." Sinclair v. Aquarius Elec., Inc., 42
Cal. App.3d 216, 116 Cal. Rptr. 654, 658 (1974) (holding that a portable device which
converted brain waves into an audible signal was a mechanical improvement over existing
stationary equipment and therefore was a trade secret.).
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to say that, in the eyes of the law, interest may not in such case
follow discovery."'

The test of competitive advantage has been sometimes stated as
"that modicum of originality which will separate it from everyday
knowledge."' 10 The broad concept of "modicum of originality"
can hardly be compared with the Service's narrow demand that
the information be original, unique, and novel.''
C. Are Mere Experience and Mere Plant Design Property?
Because the Service's "unique and novel" and "absolute secrecy" requirements fail to address the true property issue, the
competitive value of the information, those factors which the
Service has enumerated as guidelines for resolving these factual
controversies also become meaningless standards. Among those
items most concerning the Service in a section 351 know-how
transfer," 2 the two most striking are mere knowledge or efficiency
resulting from experience and information representing
"assistance in the construction of a plant building. . . or advice
as to the layout of plant machinery and equipment."1 3 The Service will presume that these items constitute services.
Although admirably suited to the Service's design to expand
the "services exclusion" under section 351 to its greatest possible
breadth, these factors bear little relation to the Restatement's
concern for competitive advantage. Certainly "mere" knowledge
119
A.O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 1934),
modified, 74 F.2d 934 (1935).
"T0
Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 444 F.2d 1313, 1315 (5th Cir. 1971), quoted in Forest
Labs., Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 1971). The test may be alternatively stated as that amount of "novelty" and "secrecy" necessary to make the knowledge
commercially valuable. Atlantic Wool Combing Co. v. Norfolk Mills, Inc. 357 F.2d 866,
869 (lst Cir. 1966).
" The requirement "that the know-how 'represents a discovery and, while not necessarily patentable, the information is original, unique and novel,' is a serious deviation
from trade secret law. Such a requirement imposes a standard of discovery which is not
required by the courts, and which is contrary to controlling state common law under which
trade secrets are recognized, as well as state court decisions governing trade secrets. A
more appropriatecriteriafor deciding whether 'property'has been transferredmight be a
determination of whether the conveyance of the know-how also conveys a competitive
advantage on the transferee." J. BiscHiL, supra note 1, 6.3b[3], 6-23-6-24 (emphasis
added). Nearly identical language can be found at R. Mn.GIuM, supra note 7, § 6.04[41
at 6-128.2.
"I'These factors are enumerated in Revenue Procedure 19, 1969-2 C.B. See note 182
infra for a discussion of those items not discussed in the text.
03 Rev. Proc. 19, 1969-2 C.B. 302.
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or efficiency resulting from experience can represent property
within section 351 where that information amounts to a discovery, i.e. commercially valuable experience."' Perhaps the purest
form of "mere experience" is a corporation's customer lists. In
assessing whether such lists are trade secrets (and thus property),
the courts have refused to impose requirements of novelty or absolute secrecy. Rather the courts examine such lists in terms of
six factors set out in the Restatement, factors designed to assess
7 5
whether the information provides a competitive advantage.
Defendants contend that plaintiff's processes, methods and materials
cannot be trade secrets, since they are known to and used by aircraft mechanics and engineers. This overlooks the fact that a knowledge of the particular process, method or material which is most appropriateto achieve the
desired result may itself be a trade secret. So may a knowledge of the best
combination of processes, methods, tools and materials.
Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158 F. Supp. 919, 923 (D. Md. 1958) (emphasis added).
Space Aero Products Co., Inc. v. R.E. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d 74, 80, cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965). Thus, where experience is competitively valuable it will be
given recognition as property: "The long experience of the plaintiffs enabled the defendant
to efficiently equip its plant by the installation and use of several processes and devices,
which although not patentable by the plaintiffs, yet were valuable additions to the equipment being installed." Reynolds Metals Co. v. Skinner, 166 F.2d 66, 75 (6th Cir.) cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 858 (1948). See also B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Oh. App.
493, 192 N.E.2d 99 (1963).
'T The Restatement specifically includes customer lists as potential trade secrets. §
757 at 5. The Restatement then enumerates the following factors to be considered in
reviewing all potential trade secrets:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his business; (2)
the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in his
business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of
the information; (4) the value of the information to him and his competitors;
(5) the amount of effort or money expended by him in developing the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.
RESTATEMENT § 757 at 6. Perhaps indicative of the difficult factual issues presented, the
courts have been particularly willing to apply these factors to specifically consider whether
customer lists will qualify as trade secrets. Republic Sys. & Programming, Inc. v. Computer Assistance, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 619, 628 (D. Conn. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 996 (2d Cir.
1971); Cudahy Co. v. American Laboratories, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1339, 1343 (D. Neb. 1970);
Basic Chem., Inc. v. Benson, 251 N.W.2d 220, 226 (Ia. 1977); Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v.
Crampton, 361 Mass. 835, 282 N.E.2d 921, 925 (1972); Abbott Labs. v. Norse Chem. Corp.,
33 Wisc.2d 445, 147 N.W.2d 529, 538-39 (1967).
It is noteworthy that the Restatement makes no reference to "mere experience";
rather, the factors recited above specifically assess the competitive value of the information. If "mere experience" satisfies the competitive advantage test, it will be protected as
a trade secret. See Ashland Oil, Inc. v. F.T.C., 409 F. Supp. 297, 303 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 548
F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1976), which applied the same six factors of the Restatement to rule
'7,
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Thus, the courts will protect customer lists where substantial
effort by a competitor would be required in order to duplicate the
information.'
In fact, customer lists specifically illustrate the distorted
construction of "property" which the Service advocates for section 351. For purposes of section 1621 the Service readily maintains that customer lists represent "property" which must be
capitalized rather than expensed in the year of purchase. The
courts have unquestionably adopted the view that customer lists
are property; the only issue is whether they are amortizable property under section 167' 77 of the Code.'78 Since customer lists are
"property," and since a customer list can be nothing but someone's accumulated "experience," how can the Service maintain
that Ashland's gas reserves estimates were trade secrets for purposes of the federal Freedom of Information Act; United States v. Frazell, 335 F.2d 487, 490 (5th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 961 (1965), which ruled, without discussion, that oil maps were property
for purposes of section 351.
,'7 See, e.g., Basic Chem., Inc. v. Benson, 251 N.W.2d 220, 229 (Ia. 1977); Heyman
v. A.R. Winarick, Inc., 325 F.2d 584, 590 (2d Cir. 1963). See also the exhaustive discussion
of customer lists in Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 7 (1969).
Section 162(a) provides that "there shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade
or business ....
" Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1 states in part that a business expense deduction
will not be granted to the extent that an item "is used by the taxpayer in computing the
cost of property included in its inventory or used in determining the gain or loss basis of
its plant, equipment, or other property." Where an asset acquired for one's trade or
business has a useful life in excess of one year, it is generally deductible under section
162. See, e.g., Manhattan Co. of Va., 50 T.C. 78, 86 (1968); Richard M. Boe, 35 T.C. 720,
725 (1961), aff'd, 307 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1962).
'" Section 167 states the rules concerning the depreciation deduction allowable for
property used in a trade or business, or property held for the production of income. Treas.
Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 provides that an intangible asset can be depreciated where it has a
limited useful life "which can be estimated with reasonable accuracy." Notably, the most
"intangible" of assets, goodwill, although not depreciable due to its indefinite life, is
nonetheless considered "property" within the meaning of section 167. Treas. Reg.
1.167(a)-3; see, e.g., Comm'r v. Killian, 314 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1963); Robert B. Tomlinson,
58 T.C. 570 (1972);Edward A. Kenney, 37 T.C. 1161 (1962).
"' The following commercial lists were granted property status for the purpose of
section 167: a list of fuel oil customers, Sunset Fuel Co. v. United States, 519 F.2d 781
(9th Cir. 1975) and Holden Fuel Oil Co., 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 184 (1972); newspaper subscription lists, Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir.
1973); cable television customer lists, General Tele., Inc. v. United States, 77-2 U.S.T.C.
(CCH) 9688 (D. Minn. 1977); laundry service customer lists, National Serv. Indus., Inc.
v. United States, 379 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Ga. 1973) and Manhattan Co. of Va., 50 T.C.
78 (1968); credit information files, Computing & Software, Inc., 64 T.C. 223 (1975); and
a pharmacy prescription file, Grant T. Rudie, Jr., 49 T.C. 131 (1967).

1978
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that something which is "mere experience" is presumptively not
property?
In the same fashion, advice as to plant construction or the
lay out of machinery may also represent property where such
advice concerns knowledge not in the public domain, knowledge
that will afford the transferee an advantage over competitors who
lack the benefit of such advice. Certainly the design of a manufacturing process, in some instances necessarily including plant
design and the lay-out of machinery, qualifies as a trade secret
where the discovery test is met.' Even the most abstract forms
of production designs, or lay-outs, such as marketing techniques'8 " or computer programs, " ' are granted trade secret protec"I'It is also of no consequence that the elements of the process or design are all of
public knowledge. "[A] trade secret can exist in a combination of characteristics and
components, each of which, by itself, is in the public domain, but the unified process,
design and operation of which, in unique combination, affords a competitive advantage
and is a protectable secret." Imperial Chem, Indus. Ltd. v. National Distillers & Chem.
Corp., 342 F.2d 737, 742 (2d Cir. 1965). In other words, this combination of known processes will be a trade secret "if the combination of the interrelated parts represented a
valuable contribution arising from plaintiff's independent efforts." Ferroline Corp. v.
General Aniline & Film Corp., 207 F.2d 912, 921 (7th Cir. 1953) cert. denied, 347 U.S. 953
(1954). See, e.g., Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158 F. Supp. 919, 923 (D. Md. 1958); Space
Aero Prods. Co., Inc. v. R.E. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d 74, 80 (1965); Cavitch,
supra note 7, § 232.01[3]. See also Eastern Marble Prods. Corp. v. Roman Marble, Inc.
364 N.E.2d 799 (Mass. 1977).
,m For example, in Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1972) plaintiff developed
a marketing scheme for prepaid funeral services plans. Defendant alleged that he could
not have misappropriated the scheme as it was not a trade secret. In the first instance
the scheme was to a great degree based on elements of other marketing programs already
of public knowledge. And secondly, the scheme had been sold to or discussed with a
number of others in the mortuary business and therefore was no longer secret.
The court rejected both arguments. Even though the plan was not unique and novel
the district court had found that the plan afforded plaintiff a marked advantage over
competitors, and was therefore a trade secret. Similarly, the disclosures of the plan did
not defeat its status as a trade secret since "[slubstantial effort would be required to
assemble the detailed elements of the plan from publicly available sources." Id. at 1010.
The court in Wilkes v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 383 F. Supp. 1135 (D.S.C. 1974), granted
similar trade secret protection to a scheme for marketing life insurance. The court commented: "The forms and plans consisted of a combination of many commonly used practices, but were combined in a way that had not been used before, and gave plaintiff a
marked advantage over competitors." Id. at 1139. Thus where a business design provides
a competitive advantage, that design will be a trade secret and thus property for purposes
of section 351.
Equally applicable to "mere efficiencies" and "advice as to plant construction," the
Restatement broadly recognizes any commercial practice as potentially a trade secret.
Thus a trade secret may "relate to the sale of goods or to other operations in the business,
such as a code for determining discounts, rebates or other concessions in a price list or
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tion where substantial effort would be required to duplicate the
information. Since these items receive trade secret protection,
they should also represent property for the purposes of section 351
as well. Once again the key test is not whether the transfer takes
on the appearance of a service, but rather whether the knowledge
transferred supplies the transferee with a competitive advantage
over those who do not possess the knowledge."'2
catalogue, or a list of specialized customers, or a method of bookkeeping or other office
management." § 757(b) at 5.
18,In Rev. Proc. 36, 1974-2 C.B. 491, the Service cast a shadow on computer programs
as property under section 351 when it stated that computer software would be judged as
property according to the onerous conditions enumerated in Revenue Procedure 69-19. See
Flyer & Buell, supra note 4, at 27-29 for an argument that computer software would likely
not qualify as property if the Service applied a narrow definition to Revenue Ruling 6456.
Although there is little direct authority on point, it seems evident that the same test
of competitive advantage will also apply to computer software in determining if an element of "property" exists in the program. See Bender, Trade Secret Protection of
Software, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 909 (1970). In Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v.
Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1975), the court
avoided the specific issue of whether a computer program was a trade secret by finding
that there was no misappropriation in that defendants themselves had developed the
program. The court, nonetheless, held defendants liable for breaching their express contract not to disclose confidential information:
The technical planning and development of NIESA [the program] to its
stage of development in January, 1973, including the selection of elements,
solver routine, organization of sub-routines, coding, and other factors contributing to the efficiency and effectiveness of the program constituted important and confidential information, particularly prior to public release of
the program. The technical accomplishments of Surana and Kothwala reflected in their work on NIESA amounted to a compilation of information
which gave SDRC a competitive advantage. The existence or availability of
abstract technical data does not detract from the confidentiality of the combination of such parts and data into a program of the type under
consideration.
Id. at 1116 (emphasis added).
In University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1974)
the misappropriation involved a retail inventory control system consisting of both computer hardware and software. Unfortunately the court made little effort to distinguish
between the hardware and the software, instead addressing the computer "system." Nonetheless, it appears that the misappropriation at issue was predominantly, if not entirely,
a theft of the software. Id. at 529 & n.6. Relying on the Restatement, the court stated that
novelty was not required. Thus the system was a trade secret since it "had unique capabilities and features which make it a valuable competitive product." Id. at 535.
For an analysis of the reasons for granting patent protection to computer software,
see, e.g., Note, Patentability of Computer Software: The Nonobviousness Issue, 62 IOWA
L. Rav. 615 (1976).
In The Service also presumes that the following will not qualify as section 351 prop-
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D. Is the "Incident to" Test the Restatement in Disguise?
Even the Restatement may define property for section 351
purposes too narrowly. The court in DuPont stated the test as
whether the transfer would confer a benefit, whether the information constitutes a positive business asset; ss Stafford defined prop(1) Training of the transferee's employees which is essentially educational in nature.
Like the Service's distaste for mere knowledge or efficiency resulting from experience, the
proper question is not whether the knowledge resulted from experience or whether the
knowledge is training of employees; rather, the Service must ask if the knowledge provides
the transferee a competitive advantage. If the knowledge is of such value then it must be
property regardless of whether it was conveyed in the form of "training." See text accompanying notes 111-119 supra.
(2) Future transfers of information, such as new developments, and (3) information
developed especially for the transferee. Both of these prohibitions appear to be carryovers
from concepts peculiar to the capital gains sections. To qualify for capital asset status,
the property must be held by the taxpayer for the prescribed period and cannot constitute
property held "primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or
business ......
I.R.C. § 1221. Thus transfers of property to be created, or property
developed for the purpose of sale, would apparently not represent a "capital asset." But
see text accompanying notes 103-104 supra.
Section 351, however, requires only that "property" be transferred; 351 contains no
requirements that property must also qualify as a "capital asset." The DuPont decision
discussed in the text accompanying notes 226-230 infra expressly rejected this analogy
between section 1221 capital asset and section 351 property. Consequently, future transfers of information developed specifically for the transferee must also qualify as property
for section 351, at least where that information meets the Restatement test of competitive
advantage.
(4) Information which is merely "the rights to tangible evidence of information such
as blueprints, drawings or other physical material on which it is recorded." If the Service,
by this statement, is requiring that the transferor convey the knowledge to implement the
plans along with the plans themselves in order for the transfer to qualify as a property
transfer, the Service's position apparently contradicts its statements that mere experience
and mere training cannot constitute property. If the Service is stating that blueprints and
drawings are not property, the Service has adopted a position directly contrary to unquestioned authority indicating that quite often blueprints and drawings are protected trade
secrets. See, e.g., Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1953); Tabor v. Hoffman,
118 N.Y. 30, 23 N.E. 12 (1889); R. MILGRIM, supra note 7, § 2.09[6] and authorities cited
therein.
(5) Finally, the Service presumptively denies property status to information which
is revealed by a patent, is the subject of a patent application, or is disclosed by the product
on which it is used or to which it is related. It is true that there can be no trade secret in
information which is revealed in a patent. However, while the information remains in the
form of a patent application trade secret protection is granted where the competitive
advantage test is met. R. MILGRIM, supra note 7, § 2.06[2], at 2-61 and authorities cited
at n.20; text accompanying notes 1-47 & 51 supra. The Service's statement that the
information cannot be disclosed by the product states the obvious. However, in applying
this rule one must recall that disclosure is judged by the permissive concept of competitive
advantage, not the more stringent requirements of absolute secrecy. See text accompanying note 148 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 34-37 supra.
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erty in terms of what could be possessed, used, or transferred. 8"
In 1955 even the Service apparently adopted this broad view.
After stating that know-how is a right akin to secret processes and
secret formulas, the Service defined know-how as "something
that its possessor can grant to another for consideration."'" Similarly, some courts assess the factual issue of competitive advantage by examining whether the information has value on the open
market, i.e., whether the information is a positive business
asset.1 8 Know-how which represents a "business asset," or knowhow which can be "transferred for consideration" may be but two
different expressions of the same test of competitive advantage.
All that should matter for tax purposes, however, is that the
potentially broader concept of business asset is the standard
applicable in transfers of know-how under section 351.
In practical effect, the "business asset" and "transferred for
consideration" tests have been what the courts have in fact been
using with respect to know-how transfers under section 351.
Rather than expressly adopting these broad definitions of property for know-how purposes, the courts have found it easier to
expand the Service's interpretation of the "ancillary and subsidiary to" exception, applying broader "incident to" language. However, the standard employed for defining "incident to" is the
same business value concept endorsed by DuPont and recognized
by the Restatement.' 7
For example, Mineral Products Co. recognized written instructions concerning the use of formulas, processes, and procedures, consulting services, and future communications as to developments in the field as property under the "incident to" excep"'

See text accompanying note 39 supra.
' Rev. Rul. 17, 1955-1 C.B. 389. This ruling, however, was not issued for the purposes

of defining property for section 351, but rather to make the distinction between property
and services for the purpose of determining royalty income. A similarly broad definition
of intangible property is advocated by the Service in Regulation 1.482-2(d)(3) quoted in
note 43 supra.
I" "The difficulty of securing the necessary details except by unlawful means is
evidenced by the substantial sum ($55,000) paid to appellee for a corporation which
appellee had formed to use the plan ....
" Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006, 1010 (9th
Cir. 1972). See, e.g., Extrin Foods v. Leighton, 202 Misc.2d 592, 115 N.Y.S.2d 429, 435
(1952).
" One author has already noted that use of a broad definition of know-how as property would eliminate the need for the "ancillary and subsidiary" rule. Cooper, supra note
46, at 335.
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tion. Specifications, quality-control procedures, and test data

were necessary for the effective utilization of the transferred formulas, and were, therefore, implicitly business assets. Other information concerning sales, cost estimating, and application
techniques was also designated as property. In language strongly
reminiscent of a court applying the Restatement, the Tax Court
noted: "Even though much of the material was available to competitors, it constituted valuable marketing information, developed through practice, which was oriented toward the particular
properties of the CAFCO
products and which could be obtained
88
from no other source.'1

Additionally, in Bell, production know-how, including engineering and manufacturing data, was granted property status
because they were "incident to" the patents. The court noted,
however, that the know-how conveyed "did not depend upon reference to the patent drawings'89 and was thus somewhat independent of the patents. Apparently, what justified the treatment of
this know-how as property was not so much the integral relationship between the know-how and the patents as it was the unquestioned competitive value of the know-how transferred. 90
Finally, Gable expressly minimizes the distinction between
patents and know-how. The Gable court stated that the "incident
to" exception was but "the recognition that a patent transfer is,
in large part, a transfer of knowledge."'' Know-how that "relates
to" the patents transferred, i.e. know-how that assists the buyer
"in implementing the acquired knowledge and in developing its
full potential," may be just as valuable as the patents themselves.9 " Gable implies that know-how "related to" the transfer
1 52 T.C. at 199. The court also found that the design of a device used to measure
the bulk density of fibers was a capital asset as the evidence indicated "that it was not
known to the trade." The parties to the contract transferring the asset had labelled the
device as know-how. Id. at 198.
,' 381 F.2d at 1020.
, "By virtue of the agreement with Bell, Agusta received the benefit
of the FAA certification and obtained engineering know-how . . . which
enabled it to build a small replica of the Bell Fort Worth plant and to enter
into the helicopter business without the years of research and development
and the expenditure of the millions of dollars which Bell had been required
to spend in order to develop this over-all helicopter know-how."

Id.
"'

33 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1433.

192Id.
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of proprietary information constitutes property, even though it
strongly resembles services. 9 3 Viewed in this fashion, the
"incident to" exception is little more than the business asset test
adapted to the specific context of transfers of packages of technology.
E. Does The Broad Concept of Property Permit the Taxpayer a
Choice of Law?
As noted in the historical analysis of section 351 above, there
has never been any question as to whether know-how will qualify
as property. Rather, the issue left unresolved is what forms of
know-how will qualify as property. In initial attempts to resolve
this issue, the courts and the Service have taken divergent paths.
Opinions analyzing section 351 indicate that the term "property"
is to be given its broadest construction. Similarly, courts discussing know-how as property under sections 1231 and 1235 reveal
that the "services exclusion" is to be applied to know-how sparingly, if at all. The Service, however, persists in expanding the
concept of "services" to its maximum limits, while narrowly defining what forms of know-how qualify as property. Because of the
broad definition given property under the decisions in DuPont
and Stafford, the Service's position must yield to the more lenient
standards of the Restatement, a definition of property endorsed
by the Supreme Court in Kewanee and implicitly recognized by
courts applying the "incident to" exception for services.
However, as also noted above, DuPont and Stafford may
stand for a broader concept of property than that expressed by
the Restatement. This conclusion is of particular importance
with respect to international transfers where the taxpayer faces
the additional issue of whose law of competitive advantage will
determine whether a particular form of know-how will be granted
property status. Revenue Ruling 64-56 states that the information
must be given substantial protection in the country in which the
transferee is to operate.'94 Revenue Procedure 69-19 incorporates
113 Thus the court granted capital asset status to transfers of future know-how as well,
based upon the value of this information in assisting the complete use of the patents
transferred. These future transfers were so related to the underlying patent rights that
even though not yet in existence, they would be granted capital asset status in defiance
of the requisite holding period. Id. at 1433-34. For a similar result, see Heil Co. 38 T.C.
989, 1003 (1962) discussed at text accompanying notes 73-78 supra, and PPG Industries,
55 T.C. 928, 1018 (1970) discussed at text accompanying notes 89-91 supra.
"' Rev. Rul. 56, 1964-1 (Part I) C.B. 133.
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by reference the rules expressed in Revenue Ruling 64-56, and
expressly repeats the requirement that the information be substantially protected in the country in which it is to be used. However, in a somewhat contradictory fashion, the Procedure later
requires that the information be property within the meaning of
Revenue Ruling 64-56 and that it be protected under the laws of
the country from which it is being transferred. 5 ' To comply with
the United States law, the information must meet the absolute
secrecy and "unique and novel" tests already discussed. The Procedure then concludes that if these requirements are met, the
information will be deemed to be protected under the laws of the
transferee country as well, for the purposes of satisfying the advance ruling requirement of section 367. Significantly, the Service
does not state whether this assumption is rebuttable, that is,
whether the Service can later challenge a transfer under section
351 as not being protected under the law of the transferee country, even though the requirements for a pre-transfer 367 ruling
have been met. Although the change under section 367 to posttransfer rather than pre-transfer rulings implemented by the Tax
Reform Act of 1976 may eventually eliminate this ambiguity by
eliminating the need for pre-transfer evaluation, at present the
Service's statements indicate a willingness to evaluate
"property" under the laws of both the transferor and transferee
countries. e11
Such fence-straddling by the Service ignores the courts'
broad definition of property. If any person is to be permitted a
"choice of law," it should be the taxpayer not the Service. The
Service is justified in relying on United States law where the law
of the transferee country is in substantial doubt or has yet to
develop.' 7 Nonetheless, in applying transferor country law the
"'

Rev. Proc. 19, 1969-2 C.B. 302.

'" Rev. Proc. 69-19 concludes by stating that "these procedures have no effect upon

the substantive provisions and requirements of Revenue Ruling 64-56." 1969-2 C.B.at 302.
But see Flyer & Buell, supra note 4, for an argument that satisfying Revenue Procedure
69-19 necessarily satisfies the "protection under the laws of the transferee" requirement
of Revenue Ruling 64-56.
"I Illustrative of the potential uncertainties of foreign law regarding know-how in
even the most highly developed countries see the discussion in A. WisE, TRADE SECRETS
AND KNOw-How THROUGHOUT THE WORLD (1974), Vol. 1, § 1.04[l] (Belgium) (1976); Vol.
3, § 3.06 (France) (1974); Vol. 3, § 4.02[4] (Germany) (1974); Vol. 4, § 5.01[31 (Italy)
(1974).
Because foreign law can create confusion, one might do better to address whether the
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Service should employ the proper interpretation of that law, i.e.
the liberal standards of the Restatement. Know-how which meets
the Restatement's competitive advantage test will be protected
in the United States, at least in Restatement jurisdictions. Therefore that information must represent "property" within the broad
business asset concept expressed in DuPont. Taken one step further, since DuPont defines property only in terms of "positive
business assets," not in terms of "protected business assets,"
once the Restatement has been satisfied, the information need no
longer be judged against the protection rules employed by the
transferee country. A recognized "asset" has been transferred,
even though that asset may not qualify as protected property
under stricter rules of foreign jurisdictions.
Conversely, what if a transferee nation employs broader rules
than those expressed in the Restatement?' 8 Will the taxpayer be
permitted to employ this broader definition of property? If the
transferee can protect his information in his country of business,
it becomes irrelevant under the business asset test whether that
information was also protected in the United States. If the transferee can protect the information, then clearly a valuable asset
was transferred; the transferee has received a right capable of
ownership, use, or disposition and, therefore, has received property under the definition expressed in Stafford. Indeed, if one law
is to govern to the exclusion of the other, logic dictates that the
law of the transferee nation control."' DuPont and Stafford preinformation would be recognized as capable of supporting a contract for royalties, rather
than whether the information is property in and of itself. For example, although in France
the property law of information is in doubt, Wise's summary of one French case addressing
the royalty issue yields the very Restatement definition employed in the United States:
By providing an industrial establishment with processes or techniques unknown to it, and which it could learn only through a considerable outlay of
research and development expenditure and after the lapse of some time and
effort, the licensor has provided the licensee with an appreciable advantage
for which it may exact a royalty. This is so even if the particular process or
technique is not secret.
3 A. WISE, supra, § 3.06[41, at 3-76 to 3-77 (1974).
198As a possible example of a standard broader than the Restatement, see 1 A. Wise,
supra note 197, § 4.02[2] (1976), indicating that certain "technical skill" will receive
property protection in the Republic.
"' Because, in the case of transfer of the right to use a secret formula or
process in a foreign country, the laws of the foreign country are determinative
of the nature of the right being transferred, reference to the laws of the
country of the transferor would seem to be inappropriate.
Flyer & Buell, supra note 4, at 27.
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clude the Service from applying the laws of both the transferee
and transferor nations.
III.

WHAT CONSTITUTES A TRANSFER FOR PURPOSES OF SECTION

351?
As demonstrated above, the broad definitions of property
expressed by the courts in such rulings as DuPont, Stafford, and
Hempt Bros. obligate the Service to apply equally broad standards in analyzing the specific question of what forms of knowhow will qualify as property under section 351. However, to focus
exclusively on the property question is to ignore the equally important issue of what constitutes a qualifying "transfer" under
the statute. 00 "Transfer" poses the question of what rights the
transferor may retain in the property, yet still have the conveyance of the property deemed a transfer within the nonrecognition
rules of section 351. One might expect that the lenient definition
of property, particularly as analyzed in DuPont, would generate
equally permissive standards regarding the kinds of transactions
that will qualify as "transfers." Nonetheless, the Service has
characteristically attempted to limit "transfer" to its strictest,
most limited meaning. Relying almost exclusively on the judicial
developments in the area of patent transfers for purposes of capital gains treatment under sections 1221, 1222, and especially
I" See note 1 and accompanying text supra. Both the words "transfer" and
"exchange" appear in section 351; however, the operative word is "transfer." Discussions
have emphasized that for purposes of section 351 bona ide "sales" do not qualify as
"transfers . . . in exchange". See, e.g., Stanley, Inc. v. Schuster, 295 F. Supp. 812, 815
(S.D. Ohio 1969), aff'd, 421 F.2d 1360 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970). Although the precise scope of the word "transfer" has been repeatedly addressed, many
commentators have simply abided by the Service's restrictive rulings without questioning
their validity. For a general discussion of the word "transfer" for purposes of know-how
transfers under section 351, see BISCHEL, (no definition of what constitutes a transfer of

all substantial rights) supra note 1, at

6.3;

CALIFORNIA COIrrINUING LEGAL EDUCATION,

ArroRNEys GUIDE To TRADE SEcRETs Ch. 6 (Brosnahan ed. 1971) (must transfer at least
the right to prevent unauthorized disclosure); MILGRIM, supranote 7, at § 6.04 (discussion
of the 1971 DuPont holding). See also Benjamin, supra note 44, at 200-01 (transfers of
know-how under section 351 governed by § 1235); Burke, supra note 20, at 756-57 (Rev.
Rul. 69-156 comports with legislative intent); Cohen, supra note 4, at 39-40 (Service's
transfer requirements are highly questionable); Cooper, supra note 46, at 335-38 (discussion of the 1961 DuPont decision); Cooper, supra note 23, at 225-237 (discussion of transfer
concept); Creed & Bangs, supra note 23, at 101-02, (discussion of all substantial rights
test); Dunn, supra note 4, at 573-75 (discussion of the exclusivity element); Flyer & Buell,
supra note 4, at 30 (discussion of the exchange requirement); Pugh, Sales and Exchanges
of Foreign Patents, 20 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX 1305 (1962); Note, supra note 33, at 69
(Service's sale or exchange requirement is not supported by the Code).
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1235, the Service has formulated tough guidelines as to how one
may transfer know-how for purposes of section 351.21 Briefly
stated, only the unqualified transfer in perpetuity of the exclusive
right to make, use, and sell unpatented but secret products
"I I.R.C. § 1235 states: "A transfer (other than by gift, inheritance, or devise . . . of
all substantial rights to a patent . . . shall be considered the sale or exchange of a capital
asset ....
" A strong argument may be made that it is only because of the presence of
the "all substantial rights" language of section 1235 and the characterization of this
provision as one of the capital gains provisions that limitation on the word "transfer"
arises. Section 351 contains neither of these limitations. Nevertheless, the Service has
been extremely successful in arguing that know-how should be treated similarly to the §
1235 treatment of patents. See PPG Indus., Inc., 55 T.C. 928, 1012 (1970); Edward W.
Reid, 50 T.C. 33, 40-41 (1968); Pickren v. United States, 378 F.2d 595, 599 (5th Cir. 1967);
Commercial Solvents Corp., 42 T.C. 455, 467-69 (1964); Kimble Glass Co., 9 T.C. 183, 19091 (1947); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 823, 833-34 (D.
Del. 1969), modified, 432 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1970); Stalker Corp. v. United States, 209 F.
Supp. 30, 33 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
An extensive body of law has developed regarding the elements necessary for a patent
transfer to qualify for capital gains treatment under section 1235. The debate has raged
primarily around the meaning of two phrases, "transfer" and "all substantial rights." For
a discussion of the development that only "sales" and not mere "licenses" are required
to qualify for section 1235 treatment, see Waterman v. MacKenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255-58
(1890) (transfer must amount to an assignment not a mere license); E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. v. United States, 432 F.2d 1052, 1053-57 (3d Cir. 1970) (transfer of
anything less than all substantial rights is a mere license); Redler Conveyor Co. v.
Comm'r, 303 F.2d 567, 568-69 (1st Cir. 1962) (citing the Waterman test); Carroll Pressure
Roller Corp., 28 T.C. 1288 (1957); Halsey W. Taylor, 16 T.C. 376, 381-84 (1951) (transfer
of entire interest constitutes a sale not a mere license); American Chem. Paint Co. v.
Smith, 131 F. Supp. 734, 737-39 (E.D. Pa. 1955) (preservation of substantial limitations
by transferor deemed this is a mere license); Thompson v. Johnson, 50-2 U.S. Tax. Cas.,
9428, 13127-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (citing the Waterman test). For a discussion of the "all
substantial rights" test, see William W. Taylor, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1488, 1492-96 (1970)
(must transfer the exclusive right to manufacture, use and sell); Jacques R. Milberg, 52
T.C. 315, 317-20 (1969) (mere license because transferor retained use after license terminated); Allied Chem. Corp. v. United States, 370 F.2d 697, 699-700 (2d Cir. 1967) (enough
control retained by transferor to preclude transfer from being a sale); Young v. Comm'r,
269 F.2d 89, 91-94 (2d Cir. 1959) (right to terminate at will destroyed by sale treatment);
Buckley v. Frank, 57-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9525, 57055-61 (W.D. Wash. 1957). For a detailed
discussion of the overall developments in the field of section 1235 transfers of patents see
Campbell, supra note 21, at 32-42; Cooper, supra note 46, at 334-38; Cooper, supra note
23, at 213-37; Morreale, Patents, Know-How and Trademarks: A Tax Overview, 29 TAx
LAW. 553 (1976); Pugh, supra note 200; Ramunno, U.S. Tax Aspects of International
Licensing Agreements, 5 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 113 (1975).
The following rights have been held to be substantial: (1) right to terminate (Lynn
Gregg, 18 T.C. 291, 302 (1952), aff'd 203 F.2d 954 (3d Cir. 1953)); (2) geographical limitations (Don Keuneman, 68 T.C. 609 (1977)); (3) terms for years (Treas. Reg. § 1.12352(b)(iii)); (4) field of use restrictions (David R. Blake, 67 T.C. 7, 13-16 (1976)). In contrast,
retention of the following rights has been held to be insubstantial: (1) legal title as security
(Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(2)(i)); (2) provision for forfeiture for nonperformance (Treas.
Reg. § 1.235-2(b)(2)(ii)); (3) oftentimes, the absolute right to prohibit sublicensing (Treas.
Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(3)(i)).
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within all the territory of a country will be treated as the transfer
of all substantial rights in the property in that country. 2 '
The "all substantial rights" requirement carried over from
patent transfer cases under the capital gains provision, section
1235, to know-how transfers under section 351(a) has been fleshed
out by Regulation § 1.1235-2(b) which defines the phrase as not
including a grant of rights (1) which is limited geographically
within the country of issuance; (2) which is limited in duration
by the terms of the agreement to a period less than the remaining
life of the patent; (3) which grants rights to the grantee in fields
of use within trades or industries, which are less than all the
rights covered by the patent, which exist and have value at the
time of the grant; and (4) which grants to the grantee less than
all the claims or inventions covered by the patent which exist and
have value at the time of the grant. 0 3 In recent years, the courts
have upheld the validity of all four of these subsections with
regard to patent transfers pursuant to section 1235.204 In attempts
to implement the statutory scheme of section 1235, as interpreted
in the regulations promulgated thereunder, the courts, in Fawick
212 Rev. Rul. 1956, 64-1 C.B. 133, 135. The Service also stated in the ruling: "The
unqualified transfer in perpetuity of the exclusive right to use a secret process or other
similar secret information qualifying as property within all the territory of a country..."
will be treated as a transfer of all substantial rights." Id. Rev. Rul. 64-56 was amplified
in Rev. Rul. 564, 1971-2 C.B. 179 where the Service ruled that in order for all substantial
rights in a trade secret to be transfered, the transferor must transfer to the transferee the
use of the trade secret for its full life. For a general discussion of the Service's position
see 70-20 TAX MANAGEMENT MEMORANDUM, supra note 66, at 6-15.
20 Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b) (1965). The present section 2(b) of the regulation was
not adopted until 1965, one year after Rev. Rul. 56, 1964-1 C.B. 133. See T.D. 6852, 19652 C.B. 289.
"I See Don Keuneman, 68 T.C. 609 (1977) (the Tax Court reversed its pro-taxpayer
stance in Estate of George T. Klein, 61 T.C. 332 (1973), rev'd, 507 F.2d 617, 621 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975), and Vincent B. Rodgers, 51 T.C. 927 (1969), and
held that pursuant to regulation § 1.1235-2(b), licensing agreements containing geographic limitations were not "sales and exchanges" of all substantial rights in a patent);
David R. Blake, 67 T.C. 7, 13-16 (1976) (the Tax Court reversed its pro-taxpayer stance
taken in Mros. v. Comm'r, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 519 (1971), rev'd, 493 F.2d 813, 816 (9th Cir.
1974), and Fawick v. Comm'r, 52 T.C. 104 (1969), rev'd, 436 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1971) and
held that based on regulation § 1.1235-2(b), licensing agreements containing field of use
restrictions did not constitute "sales or exchanges" of all substantial rights in a patent);
William W. Taylor, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1488, 1493-94 (1970) (transfer is not a sale where
the rights to manufacture, use, and sell were not exclusive); PPG Indus., Inc., 55 T.C.
928, 1014 (1970) (transfers for a fixed term of years did not constitute the "sale or exchange" of all substantial rights in the technology).
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v. Commissioner, a 1971 Sixth Circuit decision, '0 5 and Mros. v.
Commissioner, a 1974 Ninth Circuit decision, 06 formulated a twostep test for section 1235 "transfers": What did the taxpayers
actually give up, and what did the transferor retain? 07 In the
2 8
the two-tier analysis of Fawick
recent decision, Don Keuneman,'
2
°
and Mros 0 was relied upon by the Tax Court in its denial of
capital gains treatment to a licensing agreement containing a
2
geographical limitation provision . 0
The analogy by the Service from the traditional "sale or
exchange" interpretation of the transfer language in section 1235
to the "transfer . . . in exchange" language of section 351(a),
particularly with respect to transfers of secret information and
know-how, has been almost complete. In Revenue Ruling 64-56,
the Service ruled that a transfer will qualify under section 351 if
the transferred rights extend to all of the territory of one or more
countries and consist of all substantial rights therein, the transfer
being clearly limited to such territory, notwithstanding the fact
that rights are retained as to some other country's territory."'
52 T.C. 104 (1969), rev'd, 436 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1971).
30 T.C.M. (CCH) 519 (1971), rev'd, 493 F.2d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1974).
See Mros, 493 F.2d at 816 (two-fold test-(1) what did the taxpayer actually give
up, and (2) what did he retain after the transfer?); Fawick, 436 F.2d at 662 (two-pronged
test-(1) what the holder has left after the transfer, and (2) what he relinquished to the
transferee). Support for this two-pronged test in both cases was premised upon S. REP.
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 439-40, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4785, 5082-83. For a detailed discussion of Mros, Fawick, Klein, Rodgers, Blake, and
Senate Report 1627, see Don Keuneman, 68 T.C. 609 (1977). See also Hagen, Are Capital
Gains Still Available Via PatentFragmentation:A CurrentAnalysis, 43 J. TAX. 78, (1975);
Rodgers, Transfer of Patent Rights, 61 A.B.A.J. 374 (1975).
20 68 T.C. 609 (1977).
2' See note 204 supra.
21068 T.C. at 612-19. The court noted that if a patent could be sliced into smaller
segments, and the "all substantial rights" test satisfied merely by transferring all such
rights with respect to the segment, capital gains treatment would be allowed despite the
retention of valuable rights. Id. at 618. In contrast to Keuneman, in Vincent B. Rodgers,
51 T.C. 927, 930 (1969), the Tax Court limited the "substantial rights" test to merely the
rights to "make, use, and sell" and rejected the Service's interpretation of section 1235 as
found in Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b).
"I Rev. Rul. 56, 1964-1 C.B. 133, 135. See also notes 60-63, and 202 supra. Compare
Cohen, supra note 20, at 40 (the Service's field of use restrictions are highly questionable
in light of past judicial recognition of the validity of such provisions), and Note, supra
note 22, at 54, (the Service's "sale or exchange" test is not supported by section 351 or
the regulations), with Duffy, supra note 20, at 1290-92 (secret industrial know-how is
capable of being sold for capital gains purposes to a purchaser who acquires the exclusive
and perpetual right to use the know-how in a particular country and the right to prevent
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Except for Revenue Ruling 64-56's response to a hypothetical
problem, neither the courts nor the Service have had an opportunity to apply or interpret the ruling's restrictive field-of-use and
geographic limitations to a licensing agreement of know-how in
gross. 212
The Service has also argued for the grafting of two other
limitations upon section 351(a), namely, "exclusivity" and "in
perpetuity. 2 1 Analogizing to its successes under section 1235, the
Service in Revenue Ruling 64-56 emphasized that a transfer of
exclusive rights is one element necessary to the finding that a
transfer qualifies under section 351.214 In the 1967 decision,
United States Mineral Products Co., the Service unsuccessfully
raised the exclusivity issue with regard to the transfer of certain
know-how215 under the capital gains rules. Recognizing the inherent validity of the Service's argument as premised on the regulations under section 1235, the Tax Court examined the "licensing"
agreement involved, and contrary to the Service's urging found
the seller and others from disclosing or using the know-how in that country). The degree
of resemblance between Rev. Rul. 64-56 and the Duffy formulation are uncanny.
"IThe closest a court has come to discussing geographic limitations in a know-how
license may be found in United States Mineral Prods. Co., 52 T.C. 177 (1969) where the
court explicitly held: "By granting to CAFCAN the exclusive right within the territorial
limits of Canada to use and to grant to others the right to use the formulas and the design
a. "sale" occurred. Id. at 198-99. The primary authority cited by the Service to
support its position in Rev. Rul. 64-56 was Lanova Corp., 17 T.C. 1178 (1952). Although
recognizing that the transfer of the exclusive right to use an invention in the United States
and other North and South American countries constituted a tax-free transfer under §
112(b)(5) (the predecessor of section 351; see note 25 and accompanying text supra), the
court's primary focus was on a totally different issue, the basis for such assets. Id. at 1179.
At no point in the opinion did the court ever discuss geographical limitations in licensing
agreements. Totally contrary to the Service's position in 1964, there was every indication
that geographical limitations and field-of-use restrictions were permissible. See, e.g., R.N.
Crank, 135 F. Supp. 242, 253 (W.D. Pa. 1955) (patent rights may be limited geographically
or to a particular industry and still qualify as a sale). Language of similar breadth may
be found in William S. Rouverol, 42 T.C. 186, 192-94 (1964).
2' Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b). See notes 201-203 and accompanying text supra. See
Puschelberg v. United States, 330 F.2d 56, 60 (6th Cir. 1964) (exclusivity is a prerequisite
to capital gains treatment in a patent transfer). See also Young v. Comm'r, 269 F.2d 89,
91-94 (2d Cir. 1959) (right to terminate at will is the retention of a substantial right); Rev.
Rul. 156, 1969-1 C.B. 101 where the Service emphasized the importance of the exclusivity
element in the transfer of a patent under section 351.
See notes 201-203 and 213 and accompanying text supra.
,,552 T.C. at 191. The Service phrased its argument somewhat differently, urging
that the exclusivity issue went to whether or not the formulas even constituted property
under I.R.C. §§ 1221 or 1231.
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that the transferor actually had granted an exclusive right to the
transferee within the territorial limits of Canada to use, and to
grant to others the right to use, the technical information in question. 21 In Taylor-Winfield Corp., the Service again raised the
argument that certain transfers of technology constituted no
more than an exclusive grant of rights for a term of years followed
by a nonexclusive grant of rights thereafter in perpetuity. 2t1 Not
faring as well as the transferor in United States Mineral Products
Co., the taxpayer was unable to convince the Tax Court that
Mineral Products was controlling.2ts Despite the presence of exclusivity language in the license, the Tax Court found that the
retention of a sublicensing veto power by the transferor rendered
the licensing agreement no more than a terminable license of
unpatented technology and therefore was not a sale or exchange
for capital gains purposes. 9
The Service's final and most successful basis for attack upon
transfers of know-how under section 1235 "sales or exchanges"
has been the "in perpetuity" requirement. Attempting to clarify
the meaning of this requirement, in the analogous context of a
section 351 transfer as discussed in Revenue Ruling 64-56, the
Service, in Revenue Ruling 71-564, held that a transfer of knowhow under section 351(a) will constitute a qualified transfer if the
rights are granted for a period lasting at least until the secret
becomes public knowledge and is no longer protectible under the
transferee country's laws. 220 The case law has unanimously sup"'Id. at 177-200. Reviewing the language of the CAFCAN agreement, id. at 188, the
court concluded that an exclusive license had been granted with respect to the know-how.
In contrast, the CAFCUS agreement although granting exclusive rights failed the "in
perpetuity" test. Id. at 195. See notes 220-225 and accompanying text infra.
". 57 T.C. at 213.
The court distinguished Mineral Prods. Co., 52 T.C. 177 (1969) on the grounds that
the rights to sublicense was granted to the transferee in that case. Unlike Mineral Prods.
Co., in Taylor-Winfield Corp., the transferee was precluded from sublicensing without the
transferor's consent. In addition, the transferee was to hold the information in total confidentiality and secrecy. 57 T.C. at 219.
"I Delving beneath the mere form of the agreement, namely an exclusive license in
perpetuity, the court found the transaction to constitute no more than a terminable license
of unpatented technology. Id. For similar treatment of the issue of exclusivity of the right
to prevent unauthorized disclosures by the transferees, see Edward W. Reid, 50 T.C. 33
(1968); Commercial Solvents Corp., 42 T.C. 455, 469 (1964); E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904, 912 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Stalker Corp. v. United States, 209
F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
2' Rev. Rul. 564, 1971-2 C.B. 179. More succinctly stated, the transfer must be for
the life of the secret information.
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ported this position with respect to the capital gains "sale or
exchange" rules. In Bell IntercontinentalCorp. v. United States,
PPG Industries, Inc.,222 and Taylor-Winfield Corp.,'2 3 grants for
terms of years were denied capital asset status for failing the "in
224
perpetuity" test.
Amplifying its position in Revenue Ruling 64-56, the Service
restated its position in another section 351 ruling:
Secret information is sufficiently akin to patents to warrant the
application, by analogy, of some of the principles of law relating to
the transfer of patent rights ....
The grant of patent rights . . .
will constitute a transfer of property within . . . section 351 . . .
only if the grant of these rights . . . would constitute a sale or

exchange of property rather than a license for purposes of determining the character of gain or loss.
In order for a grant of patent rights to constitute a sale or exchange, the grant must consist of all substantial rights to a patent. .

.

. Likewise, in order for all substantial rights in a trade

secret to be transferred, the transferor must transfer to the transferee the use of the trade secret for its full life . . . 5

Unfortunately the Service has totally ignored the policy and statutory construction grounds for distinguishing the meaning of the
word "transfer" in section 1235 from its meaning in section 351,
focusing instead upon the alleged sufficiency of kinship between
secret information and patents. Revenue Ruling 71-564 is an excellent example of the confusion generated in this area by the
Service's failure to distinguish the transfer issue from the property issue.
The major breakthrough for the taxpayer occurred in two
decisions in 1973 and 1974. First, in the 1973 decision E.I. DuPont
de Nemours and Co. v. United States, the Court of Claims was
presented with the issue of whether a nonexclusive license of a
patent constituted a qualifying "transfer" of property under sec-1 381 F.2d 1004, 1020-21, 1022-23 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (the right to terminate without
notice, by either side, at the end of the first ten years of the agreement, constitutes the
retention of a substantial right in the information under sections 1221 and 1222).
?2 55 T.C. 928, 1013-15 (1970) (transfer for a term of years is not the sale of all
substantial rights in the information under section 1221).
- 57 T.C. 205, 214-20 (1971) (the right to terminate at the end often years constitutes
the retention of a substantial right in the information for purposes of section 1235).
"I See also Pickren v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 560 (M.D. Fla. 1965), aff'd, 378
F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1967) (twenty-five year transfer was not a transfer of all substantial
rights in certain formulas).
I Rev. Rul. 564, 1971-2 C.B. 179, 180. See also note 202 supra.
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tion 351.226 Recognizing that the Service's position rested entirely
upon the case law and regulations under section 1235,227 and contrasting totally contradictory purposes expressed in the legislative history of the two statutory provisions,22 1 the Court of Claims
stated: "In other words, the capital gains concept of a 'sale and
exchange' is simply irrelevant to section 351, which has a quite
different purpose and an independent postulate."2 9 The court,
comparing the purposes of the two statutes, observed that the
core of section 351 was continuity of interest and continuity of
control, while to the contrary, section 1235 treatment was triggered only by the complete divestiture of any interest in the patent transferred.2 30 Aptly, the court remarked: "It would be odd to
hold that a transfer had to look most like a complete disposition
in order to avoid being treated for tax purposes as a complete
3
disposition." '
The total underpinnings of the Service's position having been
eroded, the court found it only a small step to include a nonexclusive license of substantial value, commonly thought of in the
commercial world as a positive business asset, within the definition of property for purposes of section 351.232 In effect, therefore,
the court focused primarily on the issue of whether a mutual
exchange of valuable items had occurred.
22'471 F.2d 1211, 1212-13 (Ct. Cl. 1973). For a detailed discussion of the court's
"property" analysis see notes 34-38 and accompanying text supra.
2" Id. at 1213. The Service relied heavily on the fact that original section 351 (§
112(b)(5)) and the capital gains provisions both had their origins in closely related provisions of the Revenue Act of 1921. Id. at 1217. Compare ch. 136, § 202(c)(3), 42 Stat. 230
(1921) (current version at I.R.C. § 351) with ch. 136, § 206, 42 Stat. 232-33 (1921) (current
version at I.R.C. §§ 1201-1254). The court quickly disposed of the Service's argument by
noting that the great variance in purposes between section 351 and the capital gains
provisions greatly outbalanced any elements of cognate origin or statutory juxtaposition.
Id. at 1218.
11 Id. at 1213-16. The court noted that the capital gains provisions use such language
as "capital assets" and "sale/exchange", while section 351 is couched in terms of
'property" and "transferred ... in exchange." Id. at 1214. More importantly,
the capitals gains provisions are concerned with total divestiture while the core of section 351 was
"continuance-of-taxpayer-control." Id. at 1214-15. In effect section 351 was aimed at
deferring tax until a true outside disposition was made. Id. at 1214. For a discussion of
the legislative history behind section 351, see notes 25-31 and accompanying text supra.
To ignore this distinction between section 351 and the capital gains provisions is to
emasculate the 80% control requirement of section 351.
2" Id. at 1217.
11*Id. at 1214-18. See also note 225 supra.
231 Id. at 1217.
'
Id. at 1218. See notes 34-40 and accompanying text supra.
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Barely a year later, in May of 1974, the Supreme Court
sounded the death knell for the Service's section 1235-351 analogy. As discussed in part II of this article, the Supreme Court
implicitly adopted the Restatement of Torts, section 757, definition of trade secret as a federal trade secret standard in Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.2M In effect, the Restatement recognizes
that any secret compilation of information may qualify as a protected interest as long as it gives the possessor of such information
a competitive advantage over those who do not know it or use it. 234
Similar language had already been applied to the transfer of
know-how in 1961, when foreshadowing Kewanee, the Court of
Claims in E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States held:
"In each case [transfers of patents and trade secrets] the transferee . . .gets more than mere information. Of greater importance, he obtains what he believes to be a competitive advantage,
23 5
a means for commercial exploitation and reward.
The importance of the Kewanee decision rests therefore in its
implicit rejection of the two-step Fawick-MrosM test for determining what constitutes a transfer of "all substantial rights." As
properly noted in Kewanee, the perspective from which a trade
secret or know-how transfer must be viewed is from that of the
transferee, not the transferor; 237 what the transferor has retained
- 416 U.S. 470, 474 (1970). For a discussion of the specific impact of Kewanee in
trade secret law, see notes 110-121 and accompanying text supra.
" 416 U.S. at 474. See also notes 110-193 and accompanying text supra,
"
288 F.2d 904, 911 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
See notes 207 and accompanying text supra.
The Restatement definition makes competitive advantage both an indicia of as
well as an element of a trade secret. RESTATEMENT OF ToETs § 757 (1939), as cited in
Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 474-75. In contrast, the value afforded the information received by
the transferee is totally ignored under the Mros-Fawick two-step test. (493 F.2d at 816;
436 F.2d at 662). As noted in DuPont, 471 F.2d at 1215, running throughout all of the
capital gains provisions is a requirement that the transferee fully and completely divest
himself of any interest in the transferred asset. The Code determines that gain or loss is
to be determined at the time of the transfer. Consequently, the only way to determine if
a sale has occurred is to determine if the transferor has retained any interest that would
indicate a transaction falling short of a sale. In contrast, the very purpose of section 351
is to avoid the complete divestiture of ownership of the information by the transferor. 471
F.2d at 1215. See also notes 26-28 and accompanying text supra. See particularly,S. REP.
No. 265, 67th Cong. Ist Sess. 11 (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (part 2) 188. As noted
in the DuPont decision, to give meaning to the control element under section 351, yet insist upon a "sale or exchange" is to bring about "disparate results not rationally connected
to the fundamental principle behind section 351." 471 F.2d at 1217. The nature of the
Kewanee competitive-advantage test is perfectly suited for section 351. Once the
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is irrelevant in a section 351 transfer, if the assets transferred to
the transferee will result in a competitive advantage to him.
Once one shifts to a test of "commercial advantage" to the
transferee, many of the Service's positions regarding qualifying
"transfers" become less defensible. The transfer of a trade secret
or know-how which confers a commercial advantage upon the
transferee-possessor who operates in a particularly limited sphere
of business is no less property or no less a qualified transfer simply because the transferee's business or market extends over a
geographical area encompassing less than the geographic bounds
of the transferee's country.131 Similarly, commercial advantage
transferred to a corporation in one particular field-of-use may be
totally unaffected by the transferor's conveyance or retention of
the right to convey identical rights to a different transferee in a
3
totally distinct field-of-use. 1
"perspective of the transferor" test is abandoned only one participant's vantage point
remains, that of the transferee. This test was implicitly adopted in DuPont, 471 F.2d at
1219. The court noted that DuPont "handed over" something of value, received stock in
exchange, there was no disposition to an outsider, and the transferee remained in control;
in retrospect, the very form of transaction that section 351 was aimed at. Id. at 1219.
Should the Service contend that such a broad approach would open the floodgates for tax
evasion, I.R.C. §§ 482 and 367 remain as powerful protectors of the federal fisc. Id. at 1220.
Clearly the Service, the courts, and the legal commentators have noted that section 1235 excludes licenses containing geographical limitations from the concept of sales
of all substantial rights. See, e.g., Don Kueneman, 68 T.C. 609 (1977); Estate of George
T. Klein, 61 T.C. 332 (1973), rev'd, 507 F.2d 617, 621 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 991 (1975); Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b) (1965); Rev. Rul. 56, 1964-1 C.B. 133; Burke,
supra note 20, at 755-57; Duffy, supra note 20, at 1290-92. However, once the analogy to
section 1235 is removed, the prohibition on geographical limitations seems less supportable. The most that can be said about an agreement containing a geographical limitation
is that it is not a sale. However, to qualify for section 351 treatment this is exactly what
the transferor must argue. The very structure of the language of section 1235 recognizes
that a license containing a geographical limitation is a transfer; the statute reads: "A
transfer . . . of property consisting of all substantial rights . . . shall be considered the
sale or exchange." The Service has never argued that such tainted licenses are not transfers, but merely they are not sales. See the Tax Court decisions in Estate of George T.
Klein, 61 T.C. 332 (1973), rev'd, 507 F.2d 617, 621 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
991 (1975); Vincent B. Rodgers, 51 T.C. 927 (1969). There is no reason to read into the
word "transfer" a requirement that the transfer be inclusive within the entire geographic
bounds of a country.
Recently, field-of-use limitations have also run into stiff opposition. See Blake v.
2
Comm'r, 67 T.C. 7 (1976); Mros v. Comm'r, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 519 (1971), rev'd, 493 F.2d
813 (9th Cir. 1974); Fawick v. Comm'r, 52 T.C. 104 (1969), rev'd, 436 F.2d 655 (6th Cir.
1971). See also the Revenue Ruling and articles discussed in note 200-01 supra. The same
analysis used in note 238 supra is equally applicable, if not more so, to field-of-use restrictions. If a sale is the last form of transaction and the transferor means to effect under
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As for the "exclusivity" and "in perpetuity" requirements
espoused by the Service in the recent revenue rulings,4 0 an analogy to field-of-use and geographic limitations analysis, as discussed above, may open to the taxpayer new avenues of attack
upon the Service's position. By focusing on the broad meaning of
the word "transfer" and by emphasizing the "competitive advantage" test of the Restatement and Kewanee,"4 ' the taxpayer may
successfully argue that grants for less than the life of the trade
secret or know-how, or retention by the transferor of the right to
license others besides the transferee, may not appreciably lessen
the advantage gained by the transferee. As discussed earlier, if
the two-tier "what-has-been-retained" test of Mros and Fawick4 2
is not applicable to a section 351 transfer, the transferor's retention of certain substantial rights should only preclude section 351
treatment if the transferee's right (competitive advantage) is
materially impaired or diminished. Specific factual settings
therefore must be examined to determine what effect such limitations may have upon the transferee. In addition, the Service always has sections 482 and 367 to fall back on in the event of a
taxpayer's attempt to evade taxes through a section 351 transaction .23
In conclusion, the qualified "transfer" requirement of section
351 has often been confused with, or lost in, the maze of cases
concerning the definition of the word "property" for purposes of
section 351. The Service's guidelines for what constitutes a bona
fide section 351 transfer have been even more befuddled as a
result of its misplaced reliance upon an unfounded and insupportable section 1235-351 analogy. In light of the DuPont rejection of the analogy between sections 1235 and 351,44 the taxpayer
has been granted a second opportunity to fashion transfer guidelines more consistent with the purpose and rational underlying
section 351.
section 351, inclusion of a field-of-use restriction is one means recognized by the Service
to avoid such a result. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b) (1965).
"' See the discussion of Rev. Rul. 64-56 and Rev. Rul. 71-564 at notes 202 and
accompanying text supra.
"' See the discussion of the Restatement definition of trade secret, as discussed in
Kewanee at notes 110-193 and accompanying text supra.
"I See notes 207-09 and accompanying text supra.
24
I.R.C. §§ 367, 482. See the discussion in note 237 and accompanying text supra.
"' See notes 226-32 and 237 and accompanying text supra.
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In conclusion, the primary goal of this section has been to
make the reader aware of the numerous weaknesses in the Service's already attenuated line of analyses regarding the word
"transfer." Until the courts are presented with specific factual
settings, it is difficult to speculate as to the potential erosion of
the Service's position in the future.
CONCLUSION

The foregoing analysis has attempted to demonstrate that
the standards adopted by the Service with respect to transfers
of know-how under section 351 are substantially without legal
foundation. The taxpayer seeking tax-free exchange treatment
would be well-advised to structure his agreement so that information transferred is treated by the contracting parties as property. Common sense also demands that the taxpayer label his
information in a manner consistent with the demanding property
rules under Revenue Procedure 69-19, and the equally onerous
"transfer" rules of Revenue Rulings 64-56 and 71-564. However,
the taxpayer must also recognize that the Service's rules are distortions of the law. If the taxpayer is willing to litigate with the
Service, he should attempt to stretch the concepts of property
and transfer to their limits. Once in court, the taxpayer's chances
of success should be far greater than those of the Service.

DAMAGES IN SECTION

1983

ACTION CONTROLLED BY STATE LAW:

Jones v. Hildebrandt,
550 P.2d 339 (Colo. 1976), cert. dismissed, 97 S. Ct. 2283 (1977).
INTRODUCTION

On June 16, 1977, the United States Supreme Court in a per
curiam opinion dismissed a petition for certiorari in the case of
Jones v. Hildebrant.' This opinion cast serious doubts upon the
continuing validity of the Colorado Supreme Court's interpretation of the interplay between actions brought pursuant to 42
U.S.C. section 19832 and the state's wrongful death statute.'
This comment will first examine the Colorado court's rationale in dismissing plaintiff's section 1983 action. Then the questions raised-and as yet left unanswered by the United States
Supreme Court's dismissal-will be discussed with an eye toward
the potential for a separate section 1983 recovery in Colorado
today.
I.

THE WRONG

On the evening of February 5, 1972, Denver police officers
Hildebrant and Moran, responding to a silent alarm, came upon
plaintiffs son, Larry Jones, in an alley next to an abandoned
building. Believing Larry to be a possible burglary suspect, Hildebrant gave chase, and when the suspect would not stop, Officer
Hildebrant drew his weapon, shot, and killed Larry Jones.'
Mrs. Ruby Jones, mother of the deceased, brought an action
on her own behalf against Officer Hildebrant and the City and
County of Denver in the state District Court for the City and
County of Denver. She sought compensatory and punitive damages for the allegedly unlawful killing of her son. As amended, her
complaint stated three claims for relief: (1) for battery under
550 P.2d 339 (Colo. 1976), cert. dismissed, 97 S. Ct. 2283 (1977).
2 Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § I, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)).
COLO. Rav. STAT. § 13-21-202 (1973). Action notwithstandingdeath.

When the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default of
another, and the act, neglect, or default is such as would, if death had not
ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover
damages in respect thereof, then, and in every such case, the person who or
the corporation which would have been liable, if death had not ensued, shall
be liable in an action for damages notwithstanding the death of the party
injured.
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 3, Jones v. Hildebrant, 97 S. Ct. 2283 (1977).
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state law; (2) for negligence under state law; (3) for violation of
federal constitutional rights.5 The state court treated the first two
claims for relief as being authorized by the state wrongful death
statute, and the third was treated as authorized by section 1983.8
The defendants admitted the shooting but asserted that Officer Hildebrant was acting within the scope of his authority as a
Denver law enforcement officer.
The case proceeded to trial on all of plaintiff's claims. At the
close of proof, defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff's federal
claim. The trial judge granted the motion on the ground that the
section 1983 claim was "merged" with the state law claims, and
that no relief different from that recoverable under the statelaw claims was available under section 1983. The case thus went
to the jury on plaintiff's state-law claims only. On the issue of
damages, the jury was instructed that the plaintiff was limited
to recovering the net pecuniary loss she sustained as a result of
her son's death, with a maximum allowable recovery of $45,000;1
future earnings, loss of society, and exemplary damages were
held to be unrecoverable under the state wrongful death statute.,
The jury resolved the issues of liability under state law in favor
of the plaintiff and returned a verdict of $1,500. The trial judge
denied a motion for a new trial.'
550 P.2d at 341.
The complaint as filed was drawn in common law pleading style and made no
specific reference to either the state wrongful death provision or section 1983. However,
all courts in the case have construed claims one and two as being under the wrongful death
statute and claim number three as being authorized by section 1983.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-203 (1973). Limitation on damages.
(1) All damages accruing under section 13-21-201 shall be sued for and
recovered by the same parties and in the same manner as provided in section
13-21-201, and in every such action the jury may give such damages as they
may deem fair and just, with reference to the necessary injury resulting from
such death, to the surviving parties who may be entitled to sue; and also
having regard to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending any
such wrongful act, neglect, or default; except that if the decedent left neither
a widow, widower, nor minor children, nor a dependent father or mother, the
damages recoverable in such action shall not exceed forty-five thousand
dollars. No action shall be brought and no recovery shall be had under both
section 13-21-201 and section 13-21-202 and in all cases the plaintiff is required to elect under which he will proceed.
For a critical discussion of the Colorado pecuniary loss limitation, see, Note, Blind
Imitation of the Past:An Analysis of Pecuniary Damages in Wrongful Death Actions, 49
DEN. L.J. 99 (1972) (authored by David K. Rees, counsel for plaintiff in Jones).
I Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 2, Jones v. Hildebrant, 97 S. Ct. 2283 (1977).
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A.

Appeal

Mrs. Jones then appealed the lower court's verdict on the
issue of damages. Of the three allegations made on appeal, only
one, petitioner's claim that the federal section 1983 cause of action should not have been "merged" with the state wrongful
death action, will be discussed in this comment.' 0
In support of the uniqueness of her federal claim, petitioner
advanced four distinct theories which were recognized and discussed by the Colorado court." The first theory, which was described by Justice Hodges in his majority opinion as being
"confusingly stated," was that petitioner's "civil right to her son's
life," as recognized by the state wrongful death statute, "was
denied her without due process of law through his wrongful killing.' 1 2 The court interpreted this claim as being solely an attempt
to exercise a right to sue for damages. The court then turned to a
discussion of what constitutes a right to "property" or "liberty"
as set forth in the recent United States Supreme Court case, Paul
v. Davis.11
In Davis, a section 1983 action for injuries allegedly inflicted
upon plaintiff's reputation, the Court ruled that the right to sue
for defamation was not a "liberty" or "property" right protected
by the fourteenth amendment.'
On the basis of this decision, the Colorado court reached the
conclusion that
[t]he right to sue becomes a right protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment only when the statutorily guaranteed access to the
courts is denied. Therefore, where, as here, the state allows a plaintiff to bring her suit, she is not deprived of any of her civil rights
without due process of law."
, Mrs. Jones asserted three issues on her appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court: (1)
Her damages under the wrongful death statute were unconstitutionally restricted by the
net pecuniary loss rule; (2) her recovery was inadequate, as a matter of law; and (3)
additional damages should have been permitted under her section 1983 claim because that
cause of action was not limited by the pecuniary loss rule. 550 P.2d at 341.
"Id. at 341-45.
" Justice Hodges wrote the opinion for the majority. Justice Kelly did not participate. Chief Justice Pringle, joined by Justice Groves, dissented, saying, "I respectfully
dissent. I do not believe that Colorado's judicial limitation of net pecuniary loss as a
measure of damages for wrongful death applies to actions founded upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970)." Id. at 346.
"

424 U.S. 693 (1976).

Id. at 712.
550 P.2d at 343.
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The second of plaintiff's arguments was that although section 1983 does not expressly create a wrongful death action for a
violation of civil rights, a different section of the same act, section
1988,11 "authorizes the incorporation into federal law of state
wrongful death remedies to vindicates of civil rights that result
in death."' 7 The court agreed with petitioner's claim on this point
and also agreed that the purpose of the incorporation was to
"effectually implement the policies of the legislation."", However,
the court would not accept the second part of plaintiff s argument
that although section 1988 required incorporation of state law in
certain circumstances it did not require the acceptance of the
state limitations regarding damages. The Colorado Supreme
Court concluded
that Colorado's wrongful death remedy would be engrafted into a
§1983 action if brought in a federal court. However, because the
instant suit was brought in State court and joined with a suit under
the state wrongful death statute, the trial court properly ruled that
the two actions were merged so that the §1983 claim should be
dismissed.
Furthermore, because the allowable damages are such an integral part of the right to bring a wrongful death remedy, we believe
the state's law on damages should also apply."9

'

42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970): Proceedings in vindication of civil rights.

The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district
courts by the provisions of this chapter and Title 18, for the protection of all
persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication,
shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United
States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in
all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the
provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against
the law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and
statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or
criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the
said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal
nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party found guilty.
/d.
I7

The Colorado court as 550 P.2d 339, 343, n.4, set forth the proposition that federal
courts have ruled that section 1988 permits the incorporation of the state's nonabatement
statutes and wrongful death statutes into section 1983 actions in order to effectively
implement the policies of that legislation. In support of this proposition the court referenced the following cases: Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1974); Hall v. Wooten,
506 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1974); Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1961); Javits v.
Stevens, 382 F. Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Troutman v. Johnson City, 392 F. Supp. 556
(E.D. Tenn. 1973).
1 550 P.2d at 344.
"
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The court also rejected petitioner's third theory of recovery,
"that a federal wrongful death remedy impliedly exists in section
1983, independent of the state wrongful death remedies." 20 While
acknowledging that the United States Supreme Court had ruled
that federal wrongful death remedies impliedly exist in some
areas of the law,22 the court decided to base its decision on three
other factors: (1) The court's perception of Congressional intent
not to preempt state remedies in the area of wrongful death, (2)
the adequacy of the state remedy in death cases to vindicate
civil rights violations, and (3) the "overwhelming acceptance of
2' 3
state remedies in the federal courts.
Petitioner's final theory for obtaining a separate recovery
under her section 1983 claim was that she was deprived of her own
constitutional rights. In the words of Justice Hodges, "[S]he
alleges in her complaint that her rights were violated because her
child's right to life, his freedom from physical abuse and intimidation, and his right to equal protection of the laws were violated. 1 4 The court concluded, however, that these deprivations
were really those of the son and that
one may not sue for deprivation of another's rights under § 1983, and
that a cause of action can be maintained only by the "person injured." She therefore cannot sue in her own right for the deprivation
of her son's rights apart from her remedy under the wrongful death
25
cause of action.

Furthermore, the court concluded that the state, by wrongfully killing Mrs. Jones' son, did not directly attempt to restrict
her own personal decisions relating to procreation, contraception,
and child rearing which were involved in cases such as Griswold
v. Connecticut 6 and Meyer v. Nebraska.n The court concluded:
Although the death of a family member represents a loss to her, we
nonetheless, are of the opinion that § 1983 was not designed to
Id. at 344.
The case acknowledged by the court was Morange v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S.
375 (1970), where the United States Supreme Court held that an implied action for
wrongful death based upon the seaworthiness of a vessel was maintainable under federal
maritime law. Id. at 345, n.10.
55 P.2d 339.
Id. at 345.
2,Id. at 345 (emphasis added).
2 Id. at 345 (footnotes omitted).
- 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
- 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
2
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compensate for those collateral losses resulting from injuries to others. Otherwise damages would infinitely extend not only to parents
and children, but to siblings and perhaps even to a "family" of close
friends. The interestsprotected by §1983 are adequately vindicated
when actions are brought by injured parties themselves, or at their
death, by those designated in our wrongful death statute.2"

II.

THE RIGHT

As is so often the case in legislation born out of compromise,
section 1983 is general in its language and utilizes terms not carefully defined. Courts which have sought guidance within the provisions of the statute itself have been frustrated by its lack of
specificity. Others, which have turned to the legislative history of
the act, have found strong advocacy in favor of a multitude of
positions. Thus, lawmakers have found in section 1983 a flexible
legal tool. Passed in the post-Civil War reconstruction period to
provide a remedy for plaintiffs who were not receiving adequate
protection from state laws, it lay dormant for almost half a century. 25

The case in which the statutory skeleton of section 1983 was
first firmly fleshed out by the Court was Monroe v. Pape.30
Monroe involved an illegal search and seizure of a black couple's
home by thirteen Chicago policemen.' In his opinion, Justice
Douglas examined the legislative history of the section and formalized "three main aims" of the act: (1) To "override certain
kinds of state laws"; (2) to "provide a remedy where state law was
inadequate"; and (3) to provide "a federal remedy where the state
remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice.

'3 2

These three goals of section 1983 as formulated by Justice

Douglas are significant in that they have provided the authority
by which subsequent courts have been able to expand the scope
of the section 1983 cause of action.
After Monroe, there was a rapid increase in cases filed under
section 1983. 3 Many offenses which had previously been actiona550 P.2d at 345 (emphasis added).

Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Federal Civil Remedy,
26 IND. L.J. 361, 362 (1951).
365 U.S. 167 (1961).
31 Id. at 174.
2 Id. at 183.

According to one source:
Between the enactment of the statute [§ 1983] in 1871 and 1939, only 19 §
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ble only in state courts under state tort theories became section
1983 violations.
More recently, the Court, in an attempt to stem the "rush
to the federal" courthouse," has begun to give a more restrictive
interpretation to the prerequisites of a section 1983 cause of action."

In Paul v. Davis36 the Court made a direct attack upon the
substantive rights protected under the fourteenth amendment
and thus actionable under section 1983.
In Davis, an individual attempted to secure damages under
section 1983 against police officers for alleged damage to reputation. The plaintiffs picture had been circulated on a flyer identifying "active shoplifters" despite the fact that charges against the
plaintiff for shoplifting had been dropped.
The Court recognized that the police activity would have
been actionable under the law of defamation in the state court,
but ruled that this alone was insufficient to support a section 1983
action even though state officials happened to be the defendants.
This decision relied on the fact that in addition to the "under
color of state law" requirement, section 1983, unlike state tort
actions, required the deprivation of a constitutionally protected
right. Unlike the clearly unconstitutional search and seizure present in Monroe, the plaintiff in Paul v. Davis was unable to point
to any specific constitutional guarantee safeguarding one's reputation from state intervention. Thus he could show no cognizable
liberty deprivation. The Court observed that the due process
clause alone was not in itself a source of protected liberty interests
so as to become an embodiment of general tort law.
1983 cases were reported. In fiscal 1960, the year prior to Monroe, only 280
cases were filed. By 1970, the number had mushroomed to 3,586, and the
upward trend continued in 1971 with a 30 percent increase to 4,609. One
estimate placed the number of actions filed in 1973 at approximately 8,000.
Note, Section 1983 and Federalism: The Burger Court's New Direction, 28 FLA. L. REV.
904, 915 (1976).
1 Aldisert, JudicialExpansion of FederalJurisdiction:A FederalJudge's Thoughts
on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAw & SOCIAL ORDEa 557, 559.
1 For a discussion of the post-Monroe restrictions on the Civil Rights Act, See, Note,
Section 1983 and Federalism: The Burger Court's New Direction, 28 FLA. L. REv. 904
(1976); Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARv.
L. REv. 1486 (1969); Comment, Section 1983 and the New Supreme Court: Cutting the
Civil Rights Act Down to Size, 15 DuQ. L. REv. 49 (1976).
- 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
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Davis was a verbalization of the Court's growing disenchantment with section 1983 as a cure-all statutory remedy. It was also
the case cited by the Colorado court in its rejection of Mrs. Jones'
section 1983 claim. At the time Jones came to trial in Colorado,
it was clear, under Monroe, that civil rights suits could be
brought against state officials alleging specific constitutional
deprivations such as illegal search and seizure. This protection
was specifically provided for by the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments. However under Davis, other interests such as reputation were not actionable under section 1983 due to the Court's
failure to recognize them as being fundamental rights. Other than
these specific cases, lower courts had little upon which to base
decisions in the area. 7 Yet it was clear that fears of a federalization of the state tort system had prompted a new wave of courtimposed limitations on section 1983 actions.
Some issues, such as what rights were protected under section 1983, had been established as clearly federal concerns. For
other issues, such as which statute of limitation to apply, the use
of state law was well settled." Other issues, however, such as the
survivability of actions, defenses available, and measure of damages, were not so easily categorized. For assistance, the courts
looked to a second provision of the Civil Rights Act.
Section 1988 addressed the question of what law should
apply in proceedings taken in vindication of civil rights. The
section provides that federal law shall control where "suitable"
and that state law shall be used to achieve the purposes of the
act or to provide suitable remedies where federal law is deficient. 9
This concept, however, is more simply stated than applied
as is shown in the almost ten years of litigation surrounding the
4"
infamous section 1983 case, Shaw v. Garrison.
I One test proposed by commentators is Judge Friendly's opinion in Johnson v.
Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973), where it was suggested that conduct which "shocked
the conscience," as defined in cases such as Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952),
would allow an action to be brought under section 1983. Comment, Section 1983 and the
New Supreme Court: Cutting the Civil Rights Act Down to Size, 15 DuQ. L. REV. 49 (1976).
" In O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318 (1914), an action arising out of the predecessors
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it was held that there was no federal limitations statute applicable
to a civil damage action under the federal civil rights statutes and that the limitation
statutes of the state in which the cause of action arose controlling.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970).
,o 391 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. La. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Robertson v. Wegmann, U.S.
- (1978). See note 44, infra.
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In Shaw, a civil action was brought by plaintiff against Garrison and others with whom he allegedly conspired to deprive
Shaw of his civil rights by prosecuting him in bad faith for conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy."
After the commencement of the action, but prior to trial, the
plaintiff died. He was not survived by any of the classes of individuals upon whom an action, other than one for damage for
property, inured under Louisiana law.
It was clear that state law could be properly incorporated
into section 1983 when it furthered the court-interpreted purposes
of the Civil Rights Act. 2 In Shaw, however, the more difficult
situation was presented. The district court was forced to decide
whether to incorporate a state survival provision it felt was contrary to the purpose of section 1983 and allow the action to abate
or to turn to federal law. The court refused to apply state law,
finding it inconsistent with federal law, and in its place created
a "federal common law of survival in civil rights actions in favor
of the personal representative of the deceased."' 3 Thus, at the
time Jones came to trial in Colorado, Shaw clearly stood for the
proposition that state law need not be incorporated via section
1988 when it stood in opposition to the purposes of section 1983."
The complaint alleged causes of action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986.
42 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970). The Supreme Court said of section 1988 in Sullivan v.

Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969):
This means, as we read § 1988, that both federal and state rules on
damages may be utilized, whichever better serves the policies expressed in
the federal statute. The rule of damages, whether drawn from federal or state
sources, is a federal rule responsive to the need wherever a federal right is
impaired.
Id. at 240 (citations omitted).
,1 391 F. Supp. at 1368. A similar result was obtained in the following cases: Spence
v. Stares, 507 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1974); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965); Rhoads
v. Horvat, 270 F. Supp. 307 (D. Colo. 1967); Washington v. Official Court Stenographer,
251 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Tracy v. Robbins, 40 F.R.D. 108 (C.D.S.C. 1966);
Antelope v. George, 211 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Idaho 1962).
" Subsequent to the dismissal of certiorari in Jones, Shaw v. Garrison, 391 F. Supp.
1353 (E.D. La. 1976), was first affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, 545 F.2d 980 (1977), and then reversed by the Supreme Court, sub nom.
Robertson v. Wegmann, U.S.
(1978). Three justices, including two of the dissentors in Jones (White and Brennan), joined in a strongly worded dissent.
The majority opinion accepted the basic thrust of the plaintiff's argument that state
law need not be incorporated into section 1983 actions when inconsistent with the purposes
of the act, yet ruled that in the situation presented, Louisiana law was not so at odds with
the purposes of section 1983 as to be stricken in favor of federal common law. Robertson
v. Wegmann, U.S.
- (1978).
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This was the precedent which Mrs. Jones presented to the
Colorado Supreme Court upon appeal. She argued that the restrictive Colorado provisions regarding damages were too inconsistent with the purposes of section 1983 to be incorporated into
the federal statute. It was argued that the Colorado Supreme
Court should reject the state's damage limitations just as the
federal district court had rejected Louisiana's limitation on survivability."
III. THE REMEDY
If a plaintiffs interests are to be protected by a state statute
to such an extent that the federal action may be dismissed, one
would think that the remedy available in the state courts would
be completely coextensive with that available in the federal
courts. However, an examination of the provisions of the Colorado
wrongful death statute quickly points out severe limitations present at the state level which are not present in the federal action.
The Colorado wrongful death statute, as interpreted by the
Colorado Supreme Court, is limited only to the recovery of compensatory damages for the loss of decedent's services and support
and does not permit the recovery of damages for the survivor's
grief, sorrow, and emotional distress."5 In addition, the trial court
in Jones ruled that the wrongful death statute did not permit the
recovery of punitive damages, nor a recovery in excess of $45,000
because the plaintiff was not dependent upon the deceased.46
Also, Colorado has expressly described the wrongful death action
as being only a "property tort action" and not as a tort action "for
injuries done to the person." 7 Finally, the Colorado statute says
nothing about compensation for the loss of a civil right.
The Court admittedly limited the decision:
Our holding today is a narrow one, limited to situations in which no claim
is made that state law generally is inhospitable to survival of § 1983 actions
and in which the particular application of state survivorship law, while it
may cause abatement of the action, has no independent adverse effect on the
policies underlying § 1983. A different situation might well be presented...
if state law "did not provide for survival of any tort actions," or if it significantly restricted the types of actions that survive. We intimate no view
moreover, about whether abatement based on state law could be allowed in
a situation in which deprivation of federal rights caused death.
Id. at (citations omitted).
550 P.2d at 342.
, Id. at 341.
,7Fish v. Liley, 120 Colo. 156, 208 P.2d 930 (1949).

JONES v. HILDEBRANDT

Clearly these limitations do not apply to an action brought
pursuant to section 1983. The Colorado court realized that it was
under a duty, when evaluating the section 1983 claim, to interpret
and apply federal law. The court agreed with the plaintiff that
section 1983 did not expressly create a survival action, and that
section 1988 required the incorporation of state law. However, it
was at this point that the Colorado court decided that section
1988 mandated the conclusion that the Colorado remedy constituted the exclusive determinate of damages and remedies available under a section 1983 action.48 The court acknowledged that
it was applying federal law via section 1988, yet failed to look
beyond the familiar state law to a body of well established federal
common law in fashioning a remedy.4"
The Colorado court based its dismissal of plaintiff's section
1983 action upon the grounds that it was "merged" with the state
statutory remedy. The court did not further define this term nor
did it cite authority for the proposition. The commonly accepted
definition of the term "merger" as applied to causes of actions
refers to the situation where one person takes or acquires "a remedy in legal estimation higher than that he already possesses for
the same right." 50 It is then said that by exercising your right to
the greater remedy you allow the lesser right to merge into the
cause of action pursued.'
It is hard to see how this definition applies to a section 1983
cause of action brought in a state court. Section 1983 actions by
definition must involve constitutional violations which would
" The Colorado court in Jones stated that the state's wrongful death limitations
would be "engrafted" into a section 1983 action even if brought in a federal court. 550 P.2d
at 344. However, section 1983 does not mandate this result. As discussed above section
1988 operates only when federal common law is found deficient, and then incorporates
state law only to the extent that it is inconsistent with the purposes of the Act. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 (1970).
11 It has been held that where federally protected rights have been invaded, the courts
will adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief. This is true even though the
federal statute provides for only a general right to sue for such invasion and does not
address an available remedy to make good the wrong done. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678
(1946).
BIACK's LAW DICONARY 1140 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
The term merger has also been used in criminal law where the identical
criminal act constitutes two or more offenses such as where the same act is
both a felony and a misdemeanor. The rule is the lower grade merges with
the higher. State v. Smith, 190 Mo. 706, 90 S.W. 440 (1905).
, BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1140 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
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presumptively be placed on a legal tier higher than that of state
common law or statutory causes of action.
Section 1983 is a vehicle for the vindication of individual
constitutional rights. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in
Monroe stressed that the "deprivation of a constitutional right is
significantly different from and more serious than a violation of
a state right and therefore deserves a different remedy even
though the same act may constitute both a state tort and the
deprivation of a constitutional right." 2 This description of section 1983 hardly seems to place it in the mergable category.
Possibly, the Colorado court meant by the term "merger"
that two actions were identical from the standpoint of remedies
available; however, since section 1983 provides a more extensive
remedy than the Colorado wrongful death act, with its $45,000
maximum recovery, this does not seem to be the case. In comparison to the plaintiff's wrongful death actions, section 1983 is
clearly a separate legal remedy. The section was enacted for a
specific purpose, at a different time, granting jurisdiction for
different offenses, to remedy different ills, in a different way than
does the Colorado wrongful death statute. Section 1983 has no
net pecuniary loss limitation imposed. Section 1983 has no statutory limitation for individuals without dependents. Additionally,
5
the section has been interpreted to allow punitive damages.
The two actions are clearly not identical, nor do they provide
equal remedies.
The identity of remedies was crucial to the Colorado Supreme Court's ruling, but, as seen above, the remedies simply are
not identical. Under federal law the loss of a civil right alone is
compensable, even though it is not accompanied by a pecuniary
loss. 5 The measure of compensation in section 1983 actions,
56
though at times difficult to assess, has been considered great.
365 U.S. at 196.
It has been generally held that where two causes of action are granted by statute
without the second enactment expressly or impliedly supplanting or abrogating the first,
the newer remedy is not to be considered exclusive but rather cumulative. This is true
even where the separate remedies are given under state and federal statutes. Jenkins v.
S. Ry. Carolina Div., 152 S.C. 386, 150 S.E. 128 (1929) (allowing joinder of a cause of
action brought under Federal Employers Liability Act and a state wrongful death statute).
Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965).
" Rhoads v. Horvat, 270 F. Supp. 307 (D. Colo. 1967).
" Faber v. Rizzo, 363 F. Supp. (E.D. Pa. 1973).
"

3
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The Colorado decision limiting plaintiffs solely to the wrongful
death provisions has prevented every consideration of whether or
not such plaintiffs should be compensated for a constitutional
deprivation.
IV. THE RATIONALE
The Colorado court dismissed plaintiffs section 1983 claim,
saying that her rights were adequately protected by the state
cause of action and the state remedy. This conclusion was
reached by an analysis which emphasized that if a federal cause
of action existed-whether brought in a federal or state court-it
would be controlled completely by the state damage limitations.
This basic assumption lies at the heart of the Colorado court's
rejection on all four of plaintiff's arguments for the establishment
of a section 1983 claim.
Apparently, what the Colorado court did was to look at the
interest sought to be protected and decide that it either was not
protectable under the rationale of Davis or was adequately protected by the bringing of a wrongful death action in state court.
Thus, the section 1983 action was dismissed.
The same rationale was used in rejecting plaintiffs second
argument for her section 1983 claim. The court agreed with plaintiff that the statute itself was silent on survival and that section
1988 required resort to state law to the extent that such state law
was compatible with federal law. However, the majority of the
court would not accept petitioner's contention that the Colorado
statutory limitations, such as the net pecuniary loss provision,
were totally incompatible with the interests protected under section 1983. By accepting state law as being completely compatible
with the purposes of section 1983, the court was not forced to
apply the next echelon of authority-federal common law. 57
Petitioner's third argument began where her second left off.
The claim stressed that, even in the absence of section 1988 (directing courts to state law where compatible), section 1983 itself
created a constitutionalcause of actions independent of state law
limitations. The Colorado court recognized that such a right to
federal wrongful death remedies impliedly did exist in some limited areas; however, they refused to accept these cases as being
'7

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
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controlling in Jones. Instead, the court relied upon a perceived
Congressional intention not to preempt the state's "carefully
'5 8
wrought wrongful death remedies.
While this argument has some validity it is by no means
conclusive. Federal courts do develop rules of law and decisions
in selected areas of particular federal concern.5 9 It would appear
that the protection of civil rights as defined in the Constitution
would be such an area of federal concern even in the absence of
the provisions of section 1988.
In Morange v. States Marine Lines Inc.,10 the case acknowledged by the Colorado court, a plaintiff sought to bring a wrongful death action against the owner of a vessel upon which her
husband had been killed. At the time of the husband's death the
vessel was within the navigable waters of the state of Florida.
Neither federal statute nor Florida law provided for a wrongful
death action based upon the seaworthiness of a vessel. Yet, in
Morange the Court held that an action does lie under general
maritime law for death caused by violation of general maritime
duties. Thus, the creation of remedies for wrongful death is not
limited merely to statutory law, and there exists authority for the
creation of wrongful death actions within federal common law
also. This position, however, was rejected by the Colorado court
in favor of a perceived Congressional intent not to preempt state
wrongful death remedies. Yet, federal preemption has been exercised in at least two areas involving wrongful death actions. A
federal policy in favor of the survivability of wrongful death actions and the awarding of punitive damages has been applied as
a matter of federal common law in clear opposition to state policies. Such preemption has been exercised whenever state law has
been found to be in opposition to the purpose of section 1983.
Petitioner's final and potentially most significant argument
in favor of a separate section 1983 claim received but superficial
treatment by the Colorado court. This was the claim that she was
550 P.2d at 345.
See Friendly, In Praiseof Erie - and the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 383 (1964). Among the areas where federal courts are developing a common law,
Friendly lists interstate disputes, some national banking practices, government contract
law, labor contract law, unfair competition, regulation of interstate carriers, and defamation by multi-state media. 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 408-18.
398 U.S. 375 (1970).
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deprived of her own constitutional rights by the police shooting
of her son. Although the court said these rights were not very well
articulated, the issue was definitely before the court. The Colorado court stated that there was no deprivation of a constitutional
right because the state did not directly attempt to restrict plaintiff's own personal decisions relating to procreation, contraception, and child rearing which were issues involved in cases such
2 The quesas Griswold v. Connecticut6 and Meyer v. Nebraska."
tion thus presented was, what is the definition of a legally protectable liberty interest? The term "liberty," as contained in the
due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, has
been held to denote more than mere freedom from bodily restraint. It also guarantees the right of the individual to contract,
to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home, and to bring up
children.63 The Court has clearly recognized the right to procreate;' Jones posited the question whether this right to conceive
children could be expanded to give a mother the right to raise her
child free from any wrongful taking by the state.
This specific question was addressed by the Eighth Circuit
in a case which is strikingly similar to Jones on its facts, Mattis
v. Schnarr15 In Schnarr, a father whose son had been shot and
killed while attempting to escape arrest as a fleeing felon, brought
a section 1983 action against the police officers who shot his son.
The two cases differed, however, on the defenses asserted. In
Schnarr, the defenses of good faith and probable cause were accepted by the district court and the action was dismissed. The
court of appeals reversed the district court and held that although
the defenses of good faith and probable cause were available to
the officers in the action for damages, the father did have standing to bring a declaratory judgment action. The case turned on
the issue of whether the plaintiff had standing to bring an action
at all. The defendants relied, as did the Colorado court in Jones,
on the argument that one may not sue for the deprivation of the
'

381 U.S. 479 (1965).

62

262 U.S. 390 (1923).

11Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 290 (1923).
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 523 (1942).
502 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1974).
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civil rights of another. The court established a two-step process
by which it tested the plaintiff's standing in the action: (1) The
party seeking relief must show that he is sufficiently affected by
the action he is challenging to justify consideration by the court
of the validity of the action; and (2) the plaintiff must show the
action complained of affects him and not some third party. 6
The court found that the father was sufficiently affected by
the killing of his son to justify the court's considering the matter,
reasoning that the state wrongful death statute created a vested
right in the plaintiff to bring suit for the death of his minor son.
The right was viewed as not being derivative, but rather, a new
cause of action created in the father. The ground given for recovery was "the reciprocal duty of the child to render to its parents
such services and earnings as the latter may reasonably expect."6 7
The court quoted with approval a Missouri Supreme Court case
which ruled that "the right of a parent to a minor's services is in
the nature of a personal right arising out of the family relationship, not a property right arising out of a psuedo contractual
relationship. "68
In Schnarr the parent was found to be the "injured party"
under section 1983, and was seen to be suing in his own right for
injuries personally sustained. 6 This qualified him under the first
of the court's two-part test for standing.
The court then turned to what it considered the more difficult question-whether the killing of plaintiff's son invaded his
constitutionally protected rights under the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. As most courts have done, the justices looked to see whether the interest was so deeply rooted in
the traditions of Anglo-American law as to be considered fundamental. Citing Meyer and Griswold, the court focused on the
familial relationship between parent and child and decided that
such a relationship was indeed fundamental70 and that the police
0 Id. at 593.

67Id.
U Mennemeyer

v. Hart, 359 Mo. 423, 221 S.W.2d 960, 962 (1949) (quoted in Mattis
v. Schnarr, 502 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1974)).

42 U.S.C. § 1983.
"The entire fabric of the Constitution and its purposes that clearly underlie its
specific guarantees demonstrate that the rights to marital privacy and to marry and raise
a family are of similar order and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically protected." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495-96 (1964).
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officers did deny the plaintiff a civil liberty-the right to raise a
son.
Schnarr was decided by the Eighth Circuit two years prior
to the Colorado high court's review of Jones, yet it was not mentioned in the court's opinion.
V.

THE REVIEW

At the time Jones was appealed to the United States Supreme Court, Colorado's position was clear: Section 1983 was
silent on the issue of damages; section 1988 mandated resort to
state law in such situations; Colorado's wrongful death statute
was totally compatible with the purposes and objectives of section 1983; and thus it was totally controlling in both actions to
the extent that the federal cause of action became a mere redundancy of the state redress. The Colorado court had ruled that
merger was appropriate, that no section 1983 action exists independent of state law, that a survivor may not sue under section
1983 for injuries suffered by the deceased, and that any damages
recoverable under section 1983 would be limited by Colorado law
to direct pecuniary loss. As shown above, these rulings were contrary to those of a majority of the state and federal courts which
had addressed these issues.
The case was ripe for review. The United States Supreme
Court had not previously had an opportunity to address the issue
as to what the appropriate measure of damages is in such an
action. Additionally, the petitioner was arguing that the shooting
of a child was a constitutional deprivation of a civil right protected by the liberty clause of the fourteenth amendment. This
issue also had never been addressed by the nation's highest court.
It appeared that the case would turn upon a discussion of two
issues: (1) A Davis type discussion as to what is or what is not a
valid protectable liberty interest; and (2) whether or not a state's
net pecuniary loss rule is consistent with the purposes of the Civil
Rights Act?
Unfortunately, the court declined to discuss these important
issues. Instead the justices split 5-3 (one justice not hearing the
case) as to what had actually been presented to the Colorado
court. Five justices, as stated in their per curiam opinion, believed that there had been a shift in the posture of the case upon
appeal. These justices ruled that the question presented in the
petition for certiorari had been mooted by petitioner's oral argu-
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ment. Thus the writ of certiorari was dismissed as being
"improvidently granted.''"
The rationale given by the Court for the dismissal was that
they had granted certiorari to look at the issue of damages; that
is, to see if the Colorado state limitation was proper in the section
1983 action. A necessary prerequisite for this review, as stated by
the Court, was that the plaintiff must be suing for the same injury
under section 1983 as he is under the state wrongful death statute.
The Court reasoned that this situation could not exist if the damages sought under section 1983 were for injuries to a different
plaintiff than the one allegedly wronged under the state statute.
The majority argued that petitioner had shifted her case to a
different wrong upon oral argument-the deprivation of the
mother's right to raise her child without interference. Citing the
Colorado position that wrongful death is only a property tort
action, not an action for injuries to the person, the Court said that
the two actions were clearly distinct.72
Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall, however, felt that
the question of a mother's deprivation of a constitutionally protected right had been sufficiently raised in the Colorado Supreme
Court. These justices believed that the issues were important
and should have been decided. In support of their position, they
pointed to the Colorado court's specific rejection of each of petitioner's claims in support of her 1983 action, specifically the
fourth claim where she alleged violation of her own constitutional
rights. The minority cited the allegations made in petitioner's
original complaint which clearly could be read so as to include a
claim for invasion of the mother's own civil liberties.7 3 In the
1, 97 S. Ct. 2283 (1977). The Court cited Supreme Court Rule 23(1)(c) and Belcher
v. Stengel, 429 U.S. 118 (1926), as authority for the dismissal.
72 Fish v. Liley, 120 Colo. 156, 28 P.2d 930 (1949).
' Both the per curiam and the minority opinions cited portions of petitioner's complaint as authority for their respective positions as to what had actually been set forth
below. The majority cited a somewhat edited version of petitioner's third claim (the
section 1983 claim) to support their contention that a case for the deprivation of the
mother's civil rights had not been sufficiently made. The majority opinion, in contrast,
quoted the third claim in full. This claim taken in full context clearly may be read as to
include a definite constitutional claim for the deprivation of the petitioner's own civil
rights.
A comparison of the two footnotes is set forth below:
Per Curiam note six:
6. Her complaint alleged that she was deprived of:
"a. Her child's right to life
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words of Justice White, "[tihese issues were addressed directly
by the Colorado Supreme Court, and I doubt that that court
misunderstood the scope of the litigation before it or reached and
decided issues not fairly presented by the appeal."7
The minority opinion added that, in addition to the question
of whether a mother's civil liberties included the right to raise a
son free from state interference, the question of the state damage
limitation was also a valid question for review.
CONCLUSION

As it now stands in Colorado, state damage limitations appear to control federal actions brought in state court in conjunction with state statutory claims. This is in spite of an express
overruling of the Colorado decision by a minority of the United
States Supreme Court and a definite effort to avoid endorsement
of the decision by a majority of the justices.
The situation in Colorado at present is that the Jones decision stands as a very weak precedent for future plaintiffs. The
results of the decision might be attacked on one of several
grounds. First, a future plaintiff will be careful to sue in behalf
of the estate of the deceased to avoid any problems with the issue
of standing. Once standing is firmly established, a direct attack
on the damage issue may be launched by showing the incompatibility of the state net pecuniary loss rule with the aims and purposes of the federal Civil Rights Act. Section 1988 does not re"b. The right to her child's freedom from physical abuse, coercion,
intimidation, and physical death; and
"c. Her right to her children's equal protection of the laws."
Nowhere does she allege her asserted constitutional right to raise her child.
97 S. Ct. 2283, 2286 n.6 (1977).
Justice White's note two:
2. Petitioner's first two claims for relief were grounded on state law. The
third claim for relief stated:
"During all times mentioned in this Complaint, Douglas Hildebrant
while acting under color of law, intentionally deprived the Plaintiff of her
rights, security and liberty secured to her by the Constitutionof the United
States, including but not limited to:
"a. Her child's right to life;
"b. The right to her child's freedom from physical abuse, coercion,
intimidation, and physical death; and
"c. Her right to her children's equal protection of the law." App. 3.
(emphasis added).
97 S. Ct. 2283, 2288, n.2 (1977).
1, 97 S. Ct. at 2290.
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quire the incorporation of such inconsistent provisions. The Supreme Court has left open for future decisions the evaluation of
a mother's rights in the raising of a child. Clearly a Schnarr-type
argument could be made that the right to raise a child free from
state interference is a fundamentally protected civil liberty.
In any case, the failure of the Colorado courts to fairly address these issues in the light of recent case law and the hesitancy
of a majority of the United States Supreme Court to address the
liberty issue has done much to confuse and little to clarify statefederal relationships in the context of section 1983 actions.,'
Bruce A. Lampert
7' The fact that the issues presented in Jones have merely been postponed and not
resolved is exemplified by a recent filing in the Colorado District Court. Walter Gerash,
one of the attorneys for the petitioner in Jones, has been retained by the survivors of
Arthur Espinoza, a victim of a July 30th shooting in Curtis Park by a Denver policeman.
The issues presented in Jones have again been raised.
In his pleadings Mr. Gerash has not filed a wrongful death action at all, but rather
he has filed only a section 1983 claim. In addition, the action is being brought in the name
of the estate of Mr. Espinoza, pleading deprivation of his constitutional rights as well as
those of his family. The validity of the Colorado decision in Jones will be tested shortly.

THE POWER TO REGULATE PEOPLE:

Moore v. City of

East Cleveland
INTRODUCTION

The Village of Euclid and the City of East Cleveland are
adjacent suburban coumunities located northeast of Cleveland.
Both Euclid and East Cleveland passed zoning ordinances which
when challenged as constitutionally invalid became the subjects
of review and decision by the United States Supreme Court.'
The two decisions, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
and Moore v. City of East Cleveland,3 were handed down more
than fifty years apart, and they represent two of the four times4
the Supreme Court has spoken out on the power of municipalities
to regulate land use through zoning.5
A subtle but significant change has taken place in the zoning
powers of municipalities during the span of years between Euclid
and Moore: What began in 1926 as the power to regulate the uses
of land' has expanded in 1977 to include the power to regulate the
people who use the land.7
The analysis of this evolution will be in three parts: First, a
brief summary of the two cases which gave rise to the new power,
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas8 and Moore; second, a discussion
I Moore v City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
2 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
431 U.S. 494 (1977).
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
' Three other Supreme Court cases in the 1970's interpret zoning ordinances, without
tracing the origins of zoning power back to Euclid. Village of Arlington Hts. v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427
U.S. 50 (1976); City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The Court in Euclid
upheld a complex zoning scheme which divided the village into various classes of use
districts, ranging from single family dwellings to heavy industrial uses. Id. at 389-91.
7 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). See Frame & Scorza, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas: Property
Rights, Personal Rights & the Liberal Regime,2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 935 (1975); Note,
An Extension of the State's Police Power: The Protection of Family Values Through
Zoning Litigation, 21 Loy. L. REv. 243 (1975).
x 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
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of the confines of the so-called "two-tier" equal protection analysis which led to Belle Terre; and third, an analysis of Moore as a
response to Belle Terre.
I.
A.

THE CASES

Belle Terre

The Village of Belle Terre passed an ordinance restricting
land use to single-family dwellings, defining "family" to include
one or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, or
not more than two unrelated persons living as a single housekeeping unit.' The owners of a house in Belle Terre leased it to six
unrelated students. When notified that they were in violation of
the ordinance, the owners and three of the students sought to
have the ordinance declared unconstitutional. 0 The district court
sustained the ordinance," but the court of appeals struck down
the ordinance as violative of equal protection.
The Supreme Court reversed, using an equal protection analysis: Since the ordinance did not infringe on any fundamental
right it was to be given only a minimum level of scrutiny.'" Justice
Douglas, 4 writing for the majority, cursorily dismissed the contention that the ordinance encroached on any "fundamental
right" guaranteed by the Constitution. 5 Rather, the opinion emId. at 2.
d. at 2-3.
367 F. Supp. 136, 148-49 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
12 476 F.2d 806, 818 (2d Cir. 1973). The court of appeals had departed from the
traditional "two-tier" analysis. See Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword:
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972) [hereinafter Gunther], asking instead "whether the
legislative classification is in fact substantially related to the object of the statute." Boraas
v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 814 (2d Cir. 1973).
*3The Court used the so-called "two-tier" approach. See notes 43-75 infra.
I* Many people had expected Douglas to classify the choice of household living companions as a civil liberty not to be interfered with by the state, especially considering his
concurring opinion one year earlier in Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
543 (1973). Criticism of the apparent inconsistency between his views in Moreno and Belle
Terre has been strong. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 17-18 (Marshall,
J., dissenting); Margolis, Exclusionary Zoning: For Whom Does Belle Terre Toll, 11 CALIF.
W.L. REV. 85 (1974); Note, No Dogs, Cats or Voluntary Families Allowed, 24 DEPAuL L.
REV. 784 (1975).
" 416 U.S. at 7-8. The "fundamental rights" which have been held to trigger strict
scrutiny are: The right to travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); the right to
vote, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); the right of association,
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); the right of access to courts, NAACP v. Button,
0
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phasized the wide latitude given to the state in its exercise of
police power:"6 "It is ample to lay out zones where family values,
youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air
make the area a sanctuary for people."' 7
Justice Marshall dissented," stating that the classification
distinguishing related and unrelated people "burden[ed] the
students' fundamental rights of association and privacy guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments."' 9 The judicial
deference generally given to legislative determinations did not
require abdication of judicial responsibility to protect basic constitutional rights.20 By attempting to regulate "the way people
choose to associate with each other within the privacy of their
own homes," 2 ' Belle Terre had unconstitutionally interfered with
fundamental rights.
B.

Moore

Belle Terre appeared to be conclusive: Broad judicial deference must be given to local zoning officials in the exercise of their
police power, and that power includes the power to regulate the
internal composition of the household.
Three years later, however, the Court tempered its Belle
Terre holding in Moore v. City of East Cleveland.22 Petitioner
Inez Moore lived with her son and two grandchildren. The grandchildren were first cousins rather than brothers, one being the
child of her son and the other the child of her deceased daughter.,
Because of the city's definition of "fai.m'ly" in its single-family
zoning ordinance, 4 Mrs. Moore was notified that one of her
grandchildren was an "illegal occupant." When she refused to
371 U.S. 415 (1963); the right to procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942);
the right of privacy, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
* See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
* 416 U.S. at 9.
* Id. at 12 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
* Id. at 13. The fundamental rights of association and privacy are included in note
15 supra.
" 416 U.S. at 13-14.
" Id. at 17.
431 U.S. 494 (1977).
Id. at 496-97.
' The East Cleveland ordinance defined "family" members by their relation to the
nominal head of the household. The complex provision is found at 431 U.S. 496 n.2.
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remove the child, Mrs. Moore was convicted of violating the ordinance. 5 On appeal she challenged its constitutionality.
East Cleveland's ordinance, and Mrs. Moore's claim of invalidity, were substantially similar to the ordinance and claim the
Court had reviewed three years earlier in Belle Terre. Both ordinances dealt with single-family zones, and attempted to define
"family" in a restrictive fashion. Both purported to serve traditional zoning objectives: Preventing overcrowding, minimizing
traffic and parking congestion, preserving a neighborhood free of
disturbing noises.26 Both ordinances recognized the importance of
the "family."" Most importantly, both ordinances went beyond
5 regulating the
the traditional scope of zoning set forth in Euclid,"
use of land, and sought to regulate who may use the land and in
29
what manner.

Despite some similarity, the Court chose to distinguish Belle
Terre by creating a new fundamental right of "family" and by
using substantive due process analysis instead of equal protection
analysis.
The Court, Justice Powell writing for the majority, began by
describing the effect of East Cleveland's ordinance. Unlike Belle
Terre, East Cleveland had attempted to regulate its housing by
slicing deeply-into the family itself: "On its face, [the East Cleveland ordinance] selects certain categories of relatives who may
live together and declares that others may not. In particular, it
makes a crime of a grandmother's choice to live with her grandson
.... "30 The opinion then discussed the constitutional issue of

the case: whether the ordinance violated the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.3 ' The usual rule of judicial deference to legislative discretion was inappropriate here because the
" Id. at 497.

" Id. at 499-500; Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. at 5, 9.
" Belle Terre sought to protect the "extended family," while East Cleveland provided
protection to the "nuclear family." See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 507510 (Brennan, J., concurring).
" 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). See note 6 supra.
" Only Justice Stevens perceived the distinction. He saw the critical issue as the
extent to which courts should allow interference with a property owner's right to determine
the internal composition of his household. 431 U.S. 494, 518-19 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 498-99.
" The Court found it unnecessary to reach Mrs. Moore's contention that the ordinance was violative of the equal protection clause. Id. at 496 n.3.
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legislature had intruded on the freedom of choice in matters of
marriage and family life.32 Justice Powell noted that the Court
had consistently recognized some private realm of family life
which the state would not be allowed to penetrate.3 3 Governmental intrusion into this realm was subject to strict judicial scrutiny. 34 The Court ruled that when such scrutiny was applied, the
ordinance had to fall because the governmental interests advanced were not sufficient to justify the city's intrusion on a
fundamental right.Justice Powell clearly recognized the need for "caution and
restraint" whenever the Court proceeded to review legislation on
substantive due process grounds. The pitfalls of the Lochneryears, when the Court took on powers of judicial intervention as
a "super-legislature, ' ' 37 served as a warning to courts that intervention must be exercised with great care.m But judicial interference was appropriate, even essential, when government impinged
on "the sanctity of the family." 39
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined Justice
Powell's majority opinion." Justice Stevens gave the Court its
bare majority in striking down the ordinance, but he concurred
only in the judgment, not in the opinion of the majority."
The four dissenting Justices filed three separate opinions
Id. at 499.
Id. The Court listed numerous cases in support of the "private family realm,"
though none of the cases had specified any definitive boundaries of that realm. Id.
4'Id.

Id. at 499-500. East Cleveland had attempted to justify the ordinance as a measure
designed to alleviate overcrowding and undue financial burdening of its school system.
The Court ruled that the particular ordinance before the Court had but a tenuous relation
to alleviation of those problems. Id.
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1904). See text accompanying notes 43-45 infra.
37The terminology is taken from Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1964),
wherein the Court refused to use Lochner as a guide. Id. at 482.
R "[There is reason for concern lest the only limits to such judicial intervention
become the predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members of the Court."
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 502.
a Id. at 503.
, Id. at 506 (Brennan, J., concurring).
" Id. at 513. (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens rested his opinion on procedural due process: "[Tihere [does not) appear to be any justification for such a restriction on an owner's use of his property . . . .East Cleveland's unprecedented ordinance
constitutes a taking of property without due process and without just compensation." Id.
at 520-21.
11
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with varying reasons for their disagreement. 2
II.

A.

THE CONFINES OF THE Two-TIER ANALYSIS

Development of and Difficulties with the Two-Tier Approach

Around the turn of the century, a series of cases culminating
in Lochner v. New York"3 had established a policy of judicial
intervention on substantive due process grounds." This policy, in
reality a substitution of judicial notions of public policy for legislative choices, was gradually abandoned in the 1930's.45 During
the years of the Warren Court, however, intervention by the
Court regained limited acceptance. This time, rather than relying
on the due process clause, the Court began to use equal protection
analysis in examining state legislation. Whenever a legislative
classification impinged on a "fundamental right" or involved a
"suspect classification," that legislation was subjected to strict
scrutiny by the Court and was struck down unless the state could
offer a compelling state interest to overcome its constitutional
frailty. The list of fundamental rights and suspect classifications
was finite, 6 but application of the high level of scrutiny was virtually always fatal."7 Though never formally adopted by the
minimal scrutiny,
Court, 8 the "two-tier" analysis, strict versus
49
became the standard of the Warren Court.
,1Chief Justice Burger dissented on procedural grounds-Mrs. Moore's failure to
exhaust her administrative remedies. Id. at 521. Justices Stewart and Rehnquist viewed
Belle Terre as controlling on most issues, and they dissented primarily because of their
belief that the Court possessed limited powers of intervention. Id. at 531-35. Justice White
disagreed with the Court's use of substantive due process. Id. at 541.
' 198 U.S. 45 (1904).
" See generally, G. GUNTHER, CASES & MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 548-656
(1975).
" See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502 (1934).
'6For a general list of fundamental rights, see note 15 supra. The most common
suspect classifications triggering strict scrutiny are: Race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967); alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), and Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886); and national origin, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
" The one notable exception is Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
(national security upheld as a compelling state interest for the confinement of Japanese
during World War II).
" See Note, Equal Protection: Modes of Analysis in the Burger Court, 53 DEN. L.J.
687 n.1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Modes of Analysis in the Burger Court].
" The approach of the Court in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), is illustrative of the two-tier analysis. In Shapiro, the Court invalidated three state laws which
defined welfare benefits to persons not meeting the one-year residency requirement, stating:
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Difficulties inherent in the two-tier system soon became apparent.5 0 On the one hand, application of the two-tier approach
seemed straightforward: Interference with a fundamental right
or suspect class would not be tolerated, and the statute would be
stricken; absent such interference, the statute would be upheld.'
On the other hand, the enumerated fundamental rights were so
imprecise that it was difficult to discern when legislation infringed on a fundamental right. Therefore, the Court was able to
intervene freely and strike down statutes merely by spinning
analogies to previously enumerated rights .52 Dissatisfaction with
the two-tier approach grew in the Supreme Court, expressed most
vocally by Justice Marshall."
The Burger Court seemed to move away from the rigidity of
the two-tier system toward an intermediate standard of scrutiny.
Some decisions of the early seventies marked an apparent
change. In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 4 for example,
the Court invalidated a Louisiana workman's compensation
statute which denied recovery to an illegitimate child, stating:
"[Wihen some statutory classifications approach sensitive and
fundamental personal rights, this Court exercises a stricter scrutiny . . . . The essential inquiry in all [these] cases is . . . :
What legitimate state interest does the classification promote?
What fundamental personal rights might the classification
endanger?""
While a Weber-type approach was followed in a subsequent
decision in the same year, 56 it was never accepted as a replace[Wie reject appellant's argument that a mere showing of a rational relationship between the waiting period and . . . permissible state objectives will
suffice to justify the classification . . . [Aippellees were exercising [their]
constitutional right [to travel], and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.
Id. at 634 (citations omitted).
" An exhaustive treatment of the "two-tier" approach and its vagaries is contained
in Note, Developments-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1123-24 (1969).
, See text accompanying notes 46-47 supra.
" See Gunther, supra note 12, at 10.
See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 97-130 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
Id. at 172-73.
" Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
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ment of the two-tier system. On the contrary, there were divergent views as to which standard the Court might apply in future
cases. One commentator forecast the arrival of a "meansoriented" approach;5 7 Justice Marshall advocated a "slidingscale" approach. 5 But none of these was ever formally adopted
by the Court. 59
B. Belle Terre and the Two-Tier Approach
1. Background
In the absence of Supreme Court guidance in the zoning
area,6 0 courts addressing precisely the same issue-the extent to
which a local zoning ordinance may interfere with the choice of
household companions-handed down conflicting decisions using
6
different constitutional rationales. 1
A New Jersey court struck down a zoning ordinance with a
restrictive definition of "family" on substantive due process
grounds. 2 A federal court in Wisconsin struck down a similar
statute using equal proteciion analysis and an intermediate standard of scrutiny. 3 An Illinois court ignored constitutional issues
altogether, ruling that the legislature was not authorized to pass
a zoning ordinance which regulated the internal composition of
households. 4 And finally, a federal court in California upheld a
restrictive definition of "family" after, deciding that neither equal
protection nor due process applied.6 5
7 Gunther, supra note 12, at 20-21.
See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" See Modes of Analysis in the Burger Court, supra note 48, at 716.
0 See text accompanying notes 1-7 supra.
" See, e.g., Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973). The dearth
of Supreme Court zoning cases provided the judge with little guidance as to the Burger
Court's approach to equal protection analysis. It was unclear whether minimum or strict
scrutiny or some intermediate standard should be applied. See text accompanying notes
50-59 supra. His decision upholding the ordinance relied on similar state cases and his
belief that the Burger Court had an intermediate standard of scrutiny-both were grounds
for Supreme Court reversal. See text accompanying notes 9-21 supra.
"2 Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 251-52, 281 A.2d 513,
518 (1971).
Timberlake v. Kenkel, 369 F. Supp. 456 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 Ill. 2d 432, 438, 216 N.E.2d 116, 120 (1966).
" Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd, 487
F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974).
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2.

Belle Terre

The court of appeals opinion in Belle Terre"6 represented the
Second Circuit's attempt to find the appropriate constitutional
standard for examining restrictive definitions of family. The
court's inquiry was limited to whether the zoning ordinance's
unequal classification-allowing occupancy to more than two
members of a traditional
family while denying occupancy to a
"voluntary" family- 7 violated the equal protection clause.
After deciding that the traditional "fundamental" rights
were not affected and therefore strict scrutiny was inappropriate,6 8 the court ruled that it was not limited by the rigidity of
the two-tier formula: "[Tihe Supreme Court appears to have
moved from this rigid dichotomy. . . toward a more flexible and
equitable approach . . . .Under this approach the test for application of the Equal Protection Clause is whether the legislative
classification is in fact substantially related to the object of the
statute." 9 This ordinance had the purpose and effect of compelling Belle Terre residents to conform to the community's prevailing social preferences; as such, the ordinance had no relevance to
the public health, safety, or welfare, and was thus invalid. 0
The Supreme Court's reversal of the court of appeals had a
two-fold effect. First, the Court did what the court of appeals said
was not possible: It justified the restrictive ordinance under the
traditional zoning objectives.7 The Supreme Court expanded the
concept of the general welfare to include the power to promote
family values.7"
Second, Belle Terre confirmed the application of the "twotier" approach in zoning cases, and rejected the court of appeals'
Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973).
Id. at 812.
'
Id. at 813-14. The court acknowledged that the rights of privacy, association, and
travel asserted by the plaintiffs were important, but that they did not "fit snugly" into
any of the Supreme Court's previously recognized categories of fundamental rights. Id. at
814.
" Id. at 814 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 815.
" See Note, The Entrenchment of the TraditionalFamily Structure, 13 J. FAM. L.
901, 905 (1973-74).
' Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 9. See also Note, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas-A
Reaffirmation & Strengthening of the Police Power, 4 CAP. U.L. REv. 157, 164 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Strengthening of the Police Power].
'7
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choice of an intermediate, flexible level of scrutiny.' :' Justice
Douglas' review was brief and conclusive: No fundamental rights
were involved, nor was the ordinance aimed at transients." Such
a restrictive definition of family was permissible within the exercise of the police power.75 In short, strict scrutiny would be applied only to ordinances infringing on previously enumerated fundamental rights, and these rights would be strictly construed;
minimal scrutiny would be the standard for all other ordinances.

III. Moore: RESPONDING

TO

Belle Terre

The inflexibility of the "two-tier" approach, specifically
adopted in the zoning area by the Supreme Court, became apparent in Moore. The injustice of an ordinance which "makes a crime
of a grandmother's choice to live with her grandson"7 was clear
enough, but the Court had confined itself to an either-or choice:
Either find a fundamental right triggering strict scrutiny and
force the government to show a compelling state interest justifying the ordinance, or allow the injustice to remain after a minimal
amount of scrutiny.
Belle Terre had established a strong precedent, the application of minimum scrutiny of zoning cases. In Moore, the Supreme
Court was forced to use two techniques to circumvent the constraints of its earlier decision. First, the Court avoided equal protection altogether, resting its decision within the contours of substantive due process.77 The Court offered no explanation for its
choice of due process instead of equal protection, but it seemed
to take comfort in the imprecision of the due process clause itself.
The Court quoted at length from Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe
v. Ullman,7 s including:
IT]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the
specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This
"liberty" ... is a rational continuum which recognizes what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require
See Strengthening of the Police Power, supra note 72, at 164.
4 416 U.S. at 7-8.
7 See text accompanying notes 16-17 supra.
" Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 499.
Id. at 496 n.3.
7- 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify
their abridgment."

The Court recognized that its decision marked a reentry into
the treacherous field of substantive due process, 0 but the Court's
hesitance would not override its duty to strike down an arbitrary
cutting off of protected family rights."
A second and more significant way that the Court avoided
its Belle Terre reasoning was by creating a new fundamental
right, the right of family for related individuals.82 Plaintiffs in
Belle Terre had unsuccessfully claimed that the Village's ordinance infringed on their fundamental right of privacy, association, and travel.8 3 For the Supreme Court in Moore to return to
any of these rights as a means of invoking strict scrutiny would
have been difficult without overruling, or at least emasculating
Belle Terre.
Though it is too early to forecast the effect of the Court's
resurrection of substantive due process, the Court's creation of a
new fundamental right is likely to have several immediate and
possibly profound consequences. Specifically, two issues have
been raised by Moore: First, how can local zoning authorities
reconcile the two Supreme Court holdings, Moore and Belle
Terre, in drafting future single-family ordinances? And second,
what are the perimeters of the newly established right of family?
A.

Reconciliation

At first blush, reconciliation of the two decisions seems fairly
straightforward. Justice Powell's majority opinion saw Belle
4 The Belle
Terre as distinguishable from Moore.8
Terre ordinance
made a clear cut and reasonable distinction between related and
unrelated people, and it purported to promote "family needs"
and "family values. ' s5 East Cleveland's ordinance on the other
hand, made no such rational distinction; the city's scheme arbitrarily "selects certain categories of relatives who may live together and declares that others may not. 8' 6
"

Id. at 542-43, quoted in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 499.

" See text accompanying notes 47-50 supra.

" 431 U.S. at 502.
K2See text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
" See text accompanying note 74 supra.
',
431 U.S. at 498.
" Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. at 9.
' Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 498-99.
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The distinction between the two cases was clear especially in
light of the different plaintiffs in each case: Six college students
with no familial ties in Belle Terre;" a grandmother separated
from her orphaned grandchild in Moore.S8 The clarity of the
related-unrelated distinction begins to fade, however, when the
contrast between potential plaintiffs is not so extreme. Justice
Marshall summarized the possibly absurd results under a bloodrelation requirement, questioning the validity of an ordinance
which "permits any number of persons related by blood or marriage, be it two or twenty, to live in a single household," but
which limits "the number of unrelated persons bound by profession, love, friendship, religious or political affiliation, or mere
economics who can occupy a single home.""9
The majority opinion's failing in Moore is that it gives no
guidance to the lower courts for future cases. If the relatedunrelated test is carried to its extreme, a single-family ordinance
might limit the number of unrelated individuals to one person. 0
At the other extreme, Moore might be interpreted to mean that
municipalities may place no limits whatsoever on the number of
related individuals, thus defeating the traditional purposes of
zoning."
Three other views offered by the Justices in Moore further
confuse future applications of both Moore and Belle Terre.
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion perceived Belle Terre
as supportive of the Court's holding rather than distinguishable
from it."2 The Belle Terre ordinance had extended protection to
all related people; the Village knew it was powerless to interfere
with families of related individuals. East Cleveland had extended
protection only to nuclear families despite the existence of
"extended" families, especially among blacks.9 3 As such, the ordi' Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. at 2.
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 496-97.
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. at 16 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
But see Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
, See note 35 supra. The obvious extension of the Court's holding is that no legislation may interfere with the family, no matter now large the family is, how many cars the
family possesses, or how many children from the family enter the school system. See, e.g.,
Riverside v. Reagan, 270 Il1. App. 355 (1933) (eighteen related individuals held to be a
single family).
12 431 U.S. 494, 511 (Brennan, J., concurring).
11Id. at 508-510.
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nance represented an "imposition by government upon the rest
of us of white suburbia's preference in patterns of family living."94
Justice Brennan's view of Belle Terre suffers the same weakness that the majority view does: Under the Moore-Belle Terre
combination, a city is powerless to regulate the number of people
allowed in single-family dewellings if they are related, but the
city may regulate the lifestyle choices of unrelated individuals,
with no apparent limitations.
Justice Stevens, concurring only in the judgment, offered a
third view of Belle Terre. 5 His actual interpretation of Belle Terre
is contained only in a footnote,96 and it is far from clear what
significance he attached to Belle Terre as precedent. Justice Stevens stated that ordinances regulating the internal composition
of households, like the Belle Terre ordinance, were permissible
only if aimed at preventing transiency,97 despite the fact that his
predecessor Justice Douglas specifically ruled that the ordinance
was not aimed at transients. 8 Justice Stevens' interpretation of
Belle Terre can mean only that he would have decided Belle Terre
differently if the city had been unable to prove the effectiveness
of its ordinance in preventing transiency. Justice Stevens' basic
premise was that a property owner, not the city, has a fundamental right to decide who may reside on the property.9
The fourth and final interpretation of Belle Terre is contained in Justice Stewart's dissent.100 Justice Stewart described
Belle Terre as controlling on Mrs. Moore's claimed rights of association and "privacy of the home." 10' While he recognized the
distinction between related and unrelated persons, Justice Stewart stated that the mere existence of ties of kinship did not give
related persons constitutional protection superior to that given to
unrelated persons.' 2 Like the other views of Belle Terre, Justice
Stewart's opinion offers little guidance as to what extent future
zoning ordinances may regulate the internal composition of
households.
, Id. at 508.
Id. at 513 (Stevens, J., concurring).
" Id. at 519 n.15.
'

Id. at 519.
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. at 7.
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 513-14.
Id. at 531 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
,o Id. at 535.
102 Id.
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Thus, Moore presented four disparate views of Belle Terre.
Reconciliation of the two cases by local authorities and their subsequent application may prove difficult. Taken to extremes, Belle
Terre would allow the exclusion of all unrelated individuals, while
Moore would not allow any numerical limitation on related individuals. Should the Court now decide to step out of the zoning
arena, as it did for fifty years after Euclid,101 forcing the states to
determine what Belle Terre and Moore really mean, confusion
may be the end result.
B.

The Perimeters of the Family Right

Zoning laws encompass a great variety of definitions of family.'10 The fact that zoning laws should be concerned with families
at all is somewhat paradoxical, since zoning was originally upheld
as a means of regulating uses of land 05 without regard to who uses
the land or in what manner. 06
Municipal definitions of "family" became inevitable when
zoning ordinances began to set aside certain zones for singlefamily dewellings. Having upheld the power to zone, the Supreme
Court initially declined to enter the definitional controversies
that arose in lower courts.0 7 The Supreme Court intervened only
when local governments began to differ on the extent to which
they could regulate who constituted a single "family" under their
ordinances.
The decision in Moore represents the second step of the Supreme Court's review of permissible "families" which it began
three years earlier in Belle Terre. Though the Moore majority
attempted to distinguish the prior case, Moore is really a corollary
to the Belle Terre holding: Zoning to protect the family and
'

272 U.S. 365 (1926). See text accompanying notes 1-7 supra.
See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) ("family" defined as

two unrelated people or more than two people related by blood, marriage, or adoption);
Neptune Park Ass'n v. Steinberg, 138 Conn. 357, 84 A.2d 687 (1951) ("family" defined as
a single housekeeping unit); People v. Skidmore, 69 Misc. 2d 320, 329 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1971)
("family" defined as one or more persons occupying a unit as a non-profit housekeeping
unit).
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
,O, See text accompanying notes 1-7 supra.
107 After Euclid and Nectow, see text accompanying notes 1-7 supra, the Court specifically denied certiorari on several occasions. See Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of
Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 919 (1953); Stover v. New
York, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 42 (1963).
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"family values" is permissible,' but zoning which interfereswith
the family in any way must be striken.
1. Interpreting Moore's "Family"
Taken at face value, the Supreme Court's holding in Moore
is very simple. Courts will not tolerate any ordinance which limits
the right of a family to reside in a single-family dwelling:
"[W]hen the government intrudes on choices concerning family
living arrangements, this Court must examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent
to which they are served by the challenged regulation."''0 9 The
Supreme Court never defined the scope of this family right, but
it did rely on prior decisions in holding that the American tradition includes "uncles, aunts, cousins and especially grandparents
sharing a household along with parents and children . . .,,
Interpreting Moore in its broadest application, however,
would cause several difficulties. First of all, interpreted literally,
Moore took away the discretionary zoning power in defining the
family the Court originally awarded in Euclid. Traditionally, the
zoning power has been used to control population density and
traffic and noise levels,"' but that power was effectively curtailed
by Moore: Families, those related by blood, marriage, or adoption, may live together no matter how many family members,
how many automobiles are owned, and how much they disturb
the neighborhood." 2 Related groups of eighteen or more are not
inconceivable if the house can accommodate them."3
Second, using Belle Terre and Moore, local governments may
define "family" in such a way as to legalize the social preferences
of its residents. For example, a municipality may wish to develop
a community without hippies, communes, or any unrelated people living together without benefit of marriage. Zoning ordinances
"' Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. at 9. The Belle Terre ordinance did allow
two unrelated people to live together, however. Justice Douglas does not explain the
correlation between "family values" and unmarried couples living together.
1" 431 U.S. at 499.
110Id. at 504.
..See generally J. BEUSCHER, R. WRIGHT, & M. GITELMAN, CASES & MATERIALS ON
LAND USE 500-29 (2d ed. 1976); Note, The Entrenchment of the Traditional Family
Structure, 13 J. FAM. L. 901, 904 (1973-1974).
",2 Presumably, local health regulations and nuisance laws will still be available to
control excesses, but the zoning tool is eliminated as to related groups.
11 See note 91 supra.
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defining "family" as only those related by blood, marriage, or
adoption exclude these disfavored groups without regard to the
traditional purposes of zoning, minimizing traffic and noise and
protecting the environment for children." ' In effect, zoning becomes an instrument for social control, even though it was never
intended to be a means of excluding undesirables."'
Until the intended scope of Moore is clarified by the Supreme
Court, local authorities will have to continue their attempts to
regulate single-family districts by formulating various alternatives to the restrictive scheme struck down in Moore.
2.

Supreme Court Oversight: The Power to Regulate People

Proper drafting of zoning ordinances requires the enacting
muncipality to carefully formulate its objectives. If a city's sole
object is preservation of the traditional family, those related by
blood, marriage, or adoption, Belle Terre and Moore give planners the requisite judicial guidelines: A zoning ordinance may be
drafted in furtherance of "family needs" and "family values,"",
but "family" must include all blood relatives rather than the so7
called nuclear family."
If, however, municipalities wish to achieve other, more traditional zoning objectives, such as prevention of overcrowding and
traffic congestion"' or preservation of neighborhood character
and property values,"' restrictive definitions of "family" do little
or nothing to further these aims. 12 On the contrary, such regula"I Euclid, 272 U.S.

365, 394 (1926).
Is Note, No Dogs, Cats or Voluntary Families Allowed, 24 DEPAuL L. REv. 784, 795
(1975); Note, An Extension of the State's Police Power: The Protectionof Family Values
Through Zoning Legislation, 21 Loy. L. Rxv. 243, 247 (1975); Comment, 50 WAsH. L. Rzv.
421, 435 (1975).
HI Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. at 9.
"' Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 504-06.
"'
See text accompanying note 35 supra.
"' See Timberlake v. Kenkel, 369 F. Supp. 456, 458 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
"2 The Court in Moore recognized that the East Cleveland definition did little to
further its supposed aims:
For example, the ordinance permits any family consisting only of a husband,
wife, and unmarried children to live together, even if the family contains a
half-dozen licensed drivers, each with his or her own car. At the same time
it forbids an adult brother and sister to share a household, even if both
faithfully use public transportation.
431 U.S. at 500. Three years earlier, Justice Marshall made a similar point about the
marginal utility of Belle Terre's ordinance. See text accompanying note 89 supra.
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tions serve no purpose except to interfere with a property owner's
"right to use her own property as she sees fit."''
The basic failing of both East Cleveland and Belle Terre is
that in drafting their respective ordinances, they attempted to
determine who might use their single-family dwellings. Rather,
the two cities should have looked to see if restrictive definitions
of "family" bore any relation to reduction of overcrowding or
preservation of property values. 22 Quite simply, these ends cannot be achieved by prohibiting a grandmother from living with
her grandchild'2 or prohibiting more than two unrelated people
from living together. 2 By focusing on who might occupy a single
residence, the two municipalities lost sight of zoning's proper
function, regulating the use of land for residential dwellings. A
brief overview of zoning development demonstrates how this failing came about.
Zoning began very simply. Euclid25 held that a local government had the power to classify the use of land into three categories, residential, commercial, and industrial. Each of the three
classifications was broken down further as zoning became more
complex. Residential zones were subclassified into single-family
and multi-family uses, but the city's power to regulate was still
limited: It could regulate how a landowner used his property in
relation to his neighbors, but it could not regulate the identity of
those who used the property. When local governments began to
define "family," however, the Euclidean emphasis on land use
was subtly but definitely overthrown. Belle Terre represents more
than Supreme Court ratification of the local power to set singlefamily zones; it represents judicial approval of the local power to
regulate the identity of those who use the land.
Moore is the first and to date the only limitation on that
power. But, far more significantly, Moore is a second lost opportunity to recognize and possibly reverse the changeover from
land-use to "people-use." Until the Supreme Court recognizes the
possible implications of the state's regulating the internal compo"

Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 513 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), first enunciated a
rational relationship test in zoning. Id. at 395.
'2 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 499.
2,Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. at 16 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
12
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sition of households,
local authorities can presumably exclude
"undesirables" ' from their neighborhoods and justify the exclusion under Belle Terre and Moore. As Justice Marshall concluded
three years ago:
Zoning officials properly concern themselves with uses of the
land-with, for example, the number and kind of dwellings to be
constructed in a certain neighborhood or the number of persons who
can reside in those dwellings. But zoning authorities cannot validly
consider who those persons are, what they believe, or how they
choose to live, whether they are Negro or white, Catholic or Jew,
Republican or Democrat, married or unmarried.'2

The Euclid power to govern land use was never intended to
validate the regulation of individual lifestyle choices.'2 8 The
courts and municipalities must recognize the growth of and the
need for limits on the power to regulate people.
CONCLUSION

The development of zoning law from Euclid and Nectow to
Belle Terre and Moore has brought with it a subtle but important
new zoning power. Not only do localities have the power to regulate uses on the land; they have also acquired the power to regulate the people who use the land. Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court has failed to address the evolution of this new power, attempting to evaluate the scope of that power with respect to
traditional objectives the old power was supposed to achieve. The
result of this failure is that the Court has upheld zoning ordinances which determine the internal composition of households
without ever questioning the purpose of such regulation.
Recognition that there must be limitations on the power to
govern the composition of households is the first step toward
reversing the trend. Local governments must have the power to
control use of the land, but that power should not be expansively
construed to allow control of who uses the land or in what manner.
Belle Terre and Moore must be reanalyzed. The power to
decide whether a piece of property may be used for residential,
I' See text accompanying note 115 supra.
121

Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. at 14-15 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

Note, An Extension of the State's Police Power: The Protection of Family Values
Through Zoning Legislation, 21 Loy. L. REv. 243, 247 (1975).
"2
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commercial, or industrial purposes belongs to the state. The
power to decide who resides on a piece of residential property
properly belongs-and must be returned-to the property owner.
David W Miller

Singleton v. Wulff:

EXTENSION OF THE RIGHT OF

PRIVACY THROUGH STANDING
INTRODUCTION

Missouri participates in the Medicaid program, under which
the Federal government partially underwrites qualifying state
plans for medical assistance to the needy.' Missouri's plan 2 includes a list of twelve categories of medical services that are eligible for Medicaid funding. The last category provides medical
assistance payments for pregnancies carried to term or for therapeutic abortions, but denies such payments for nontherapeutic
abortions.'
In 1974 two Missouri-licensed doctors brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the state Medicaid Statute.4 The
district court dismissed for lack of standing to bring the action.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Wulff v.
Singleton,5 held that the physicians did have standing to bring
the action. In reaching a similar decision on the subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Blackmun held that the
plaintiffs-physicians had standing to assert their own rights since
they suffered concrete injury of an economic and professional
nature from the operation of the challenged statute.7 The Court
also held' that physicians should be allowed to assert the rights
of their women patients to be free of the unconstitutional governmental interference with the decision to terminate pregnancy.'
This comment will examine the Court's rationale for granting the
physicians standing on each basis.
42 U.S.C. §§ 1396(a)-1396(g) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 208.151-208.158 (Supp. 1975).
Mo. REV. STAT. § 208.151(12) (Supp. 1975) ("Family planning services as defined
by federal rules and regulations; provided, however, that such family planning services
shall not include abortion unless such abortions are medically indicated." Id.).
I Wulff v. State Bd. of Registration for Healing Arts, 380 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D. Mo.
1974).
5 508 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 1041 (1975).
6 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
Id. at 112-13.
Id. at 118.
Justice Stevens, concurring, agreed with the Court's conclusion but, since he was
not sure that the plurality's analysis would sustain the physicians' standing to represent
their patients, he did not join in that part of the opinion. Id. at 121-22. Justice Powell,
joined by the Chief Justice, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Stewart, dissented as to the
issue of representation. Id. at 122.
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STANDING OF PHYSICIANS TO ASSERT THEIR OWN RIGHTS

A. Analysis of Wulff
The concept that a physician must show direct personal injury to be granted standing was first considered in the context of
abortion cases in Roe v. Wade 10 and Doe v. Bolton." The principal question in these cases was whether a state could constitutionally prohibit an abortion except when it was necessary to
protect the life of the mother.12 In each case, the Court granted
the physician standing to challenge a criminal abortion statute.
The Court reasoned that a sufficiently direct threat of personal
detriment existed because the physicians were the ones against
whom such statutes were aimed.13
In Griswold v. Connecticut,14 as in Roe and Doe, a physician,
who was criminally charged as an accessory to the crime of using
birth control devices and thus had a direct personal stake in the
result of the litigation, had standing to challenge the statute on
his own behalf.
These cases, relied upon by the Court, are best interpreted
as supporting only the limited proposition that the existence of a
criminal statute which directly affects the interests of a physician
will suffice to grant the physicians standing to challenge that
statute. Wulff can be distinguished from each of these cases. The
Missouri Medicaid statute imposes no criminal penalties upon
the physicians and in this respect does not serve to directly and
adversely affect their interests. The physicians are free to perform
abortions without fear of any possible prosecution.
30

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

" 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
" The Court's reason for recognizing the constitutional right to have an abortion was
that this decision lay within the right of privacy previously identified by the Court. See
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 209-15 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973). The
leading modem case establishing a constitutional right of privacy is Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), in which the Supreme Court held invalid a state law prohibiting
the use of contraceptive devices as applied to people who operated a birth control clinic.
The Court rested its decision on the conclusion that a number of specific guarantees of
the Bill of Rights protected "peripheral" rights or "penumbral" zones, some of which
came together to form a constitutionally protected zone of privacy. The marriage relationship lay within this zone of privacy and it would be a violation of this interstitial right to
permit governmental intrusion to enforce the anti-contraceptive law. Id. at 483-86.
3 410 U.S. at 124; 410 U.S. at 188.
" 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Another case the Court regarded as lending support to its
grant of standing to the physicians concerns a municipal hospital
resolution which prohibited use of hospital facilities for nontherapeutic abortions. In Nyberg v. City of Virginia,5 the District
Court granted the physicians standing on two grounds: First, they
have a right to practice medicine according to the highest medical
standards without unreasonable restraints; second, they cannot
be arbitrarily deprived of an opportunity to perform abortions
which may account for a portion of their livelihood."6
Although, as in Wulff, the Nyberg Court found that potential
economic injury was sufficient to grant standing, the physician's
ability to perform abortions in Nyberg was severely limited due
to the resolution adopted. The Medicaid statute under attack in
Wulff neither prohibits nor limits the physicians in the performing of abortions. Therefore, Wulff is again distinguishable.
This analysis indicates that a grant of standing to the physicians in Wulff based on their own direct injury is questionable. 7
Since only the welfare recipients are directly affected under the
Medicaid statute, they are the only proper parties to seek relief.
B.

Analysis of the Leading Cases

Although the Court can be criticized for its analysis in Wulff,
the court's inconsistency in this case brings into focus a more
significant problem with the Court's general methodology. Wulff
is an example of the Court's unwillingness to set out the various
considerations that arise when plaintiffs seek standing to complain of injuries caused by remote governmental action. The
Court tends to focus its decision around a narrow range of factors
that are more easily susceptible to classification and rulemaking
than are the policy concerns and values implicit in standing decisions. An attempt is made to root out the actual considerations
of the Court in the recent cases utilized by the Wulff Court. Wulff
is compared with these leading cases and reappraised in terms of
the factors the Court weighed in reaching its determination to
grant standing. This analysis will provide a reasonable basis for
predicting future standing cases.
IS

495 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 891 (1974).

' Id. at 1344.
'7 See Note, Denial of Equal Protection to Patient as also Constituting Denial of
Equal Protection to Physician, 7 U. TOL. L. REv. 213 (1975).
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In Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 1 8 an unwed mother sought to
enjoin the discriminatory application of a Texas criminal child
support statute to parents of legitimate children only, claiming
that the district attorney unconstitutionally discriminated
against her illegitimate children by refusing to prosecute their
father for failure to provide child support." The Court determined that it was speculative whether the injury would be remedied even if the relief was granted because the only result of
success on the merits would be to send the father to jail. 0
Mr. Justice White criticized the majority's reasoning, arguing that criminal sanctions are useful in coercing fathers to meet
their support obligations.2 ' What is important to notice is that the
dissent's position, though resulting in an opposite conclusion
from the majority, is just as valid. Presumably, other factors
persuaded the Court to deny standing.
The controlling reason for denying standing was implied
when the Court pointed out that a person lacks standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when that person is
neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.22 The underlying policy decision is that an interested and indirectly injured
party should not be permitted to interfere in prosecutorial decisions. By explicitly basing its decision to refuse standing on the
plaintiffs actual prospects for relief, the Court needlessly introduced a new concept into the law of standing.?
In United States v. SCRAP, 24 five law students challenged a
ruling of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) which allowed a surcharge on railroad rates, pending the adoption of rate
increases, until an environmental impact study was made under
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 25 Plaintiffs
Is410 U.S.

614 (1973).
Id. at 614-15.
SId.
Id. at 621.
Id. at 619.
23 The Court, in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), cited Linda R.S. v. Richard
D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973), as support for its new causation test. The ultimate question in
Warth was not whether the defendant harmed plaintiffs in a specific way, but whether
the Court felt that it should provide effective relief. 422 U.S. at 504. The Court's reliance
on Linda R.S. illustrated this concern.
24412 U.S. 669 (1973).
1 National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4342(2)(c) (1970).
"
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sought standing under section 10 of the Administrative Procedure
Act" claiming that the surcharge would result in discrimination
against the hauling of recyclable goods and thereby damage the
environment." The Court granted standing by applying the liberal test that a complaint should be considered unless it appears
beyond a doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. The result
in SCRAP seems sensible only because the speculative injury was
of the type contemplated by the statute alleged to be violated.
NEPA required an environmental impact statement thereby indicating that the purpose of the legislation was to protect against
possible harm to the environment. Therefore, if the Court had
denied standing on the grounds that the plaintiffs' only harm was
concern over the possible detrimental environmental effects, it
necessarily would have defeated the purpose of NEPA. A further
policy behind the Court's refusal to dismiss the claim is the
Court's evident willingness' to give environmental litigants the
opportunity to more easily and securely raise environmental
claims. 3
The Court, however, chose not to base its holding on the
specific concerns of the case and instead, the case was made to
turn on a procedural point. The Court stated that although plaintiffs might have been required to make a stronger showing of
causality on a motion for summary judgment, they should not be
forced to show more on a motion to dismiss. 3 This holding represents a failure of the Court to take responsibility for articulating
the significant environmental considerations which undoubtedly
led the Court to search for some procedure safeguard on which to
ostensibly base their decision."
n Administrative Procedure Act, § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 720 (1970), which provides: "A
person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved
by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof."
" Plaintiffs allege that the rate structure would selectively discourage the transportation and use of recyclable materials, consequently increase the consumption of natural
resources, and thereby result in the proliferation of refuse and litter. The railroad replied
that the surcharge represents a general rate increase and would not discourage the movement of scrap materials. 412 U.S. at 676.
" For a discussion advocating a liberal viewpoint regarding standing, see generally
The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. Rav. 450 (1970); Tucker, The Metamorphosis of the Standing to Sue Doctrine, 17 N.Y.L.F. 911, 929 (1972).
2 412 U.S. at 689.
11 For a discussion of relevant considerations underlying situations like SCRAP, see
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In Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War,3

the citizens-plaintiffs sought a declaration that members of Congress were ineligible to hold a commission in the Armed Forces
Reserve because of the incompatibility clause of the Constitution.32 The plaintiffs alleged that a violation of the incompatibility clause would deprive citizens of the faithful discharge of legislative duties by reservist members of Congress.3 The Court would
not grant standing because of the abstract and speculative nature
of the allegation.3 '
The weakness of the Court's decision is that a rule requiring
concrete injury is illogical and inappropriate when applied to a
constitutional provision which is designed to protect against injuries that are not necessarily concrete. The incompatibility clause
is aimed at eliminating the possible ill effects on the legislature
and the public from conflicts of interest in Congresspersons.
Thus, if the plaintiffs in Reservists are concerned that Congresspersons may fail to discharge their duties faithfully because
of conflict of interest, then the plaintiffs are suffering the very
injury the provision was designed to prevent. 35
One explanation for the Reservists decision was the Court's
concern for the implications of allowing citizens to involve legislators in suits grounded on abstract and speculative allegations,
which if sanctioned in courts, would impair a legislator's ability
to perform his duties on grounds which may amount to no more
than suspicion. In addition, the embarrassment associated with
generally Comment, Standing to Challenge Governmental Actions Which Have an Insubstantial or Attenuated Effect on the Environment, 1974 Dtrz L.J. 491.
31 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
32 "[N]o Person holding any office under the United States, shall be a Member of
either House during his Continuance in Office." U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
418 U.S. at 212.
Id. at 220.
The problem of determining what injuries will be deemed concrete is particularly
apparent when Schlesigner v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), is
compared with United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973), where possible harm to aesthetic and environmental interests was considered a sufficient injury in fact. In Justice
Marshall's dissent in Reservists, he expressed concern about the different results reached
in these two cases, stating that it was reprehensible that the Court's priorities would allow
hearing a claim involving interference with aesthetic appreciation of natural resources,
but would not countenance one involving violation of a specific constitutional provision.
418 U.S. at 239-40. Implicit in this contrast is the fact that the Court recognizes a varying
hierarchy of values, the more important of which will provide a controlling consideration
in the decision regarding standing.
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such litigation could be politically detrimental thus encouraging
nuisance suits. But by not giving express weight to these policy
considerations, the Court raised for subsequent courts formidable
questions about the degree of concreteness needed for standing
and created confusion as to the contextual appropriateness of the
concrete injury test.
In Warth v. Seldin,36 one group of plaintiffs consisted of low
and moderate income individuals who resided outside of the town
of Penfield. They claimed that Penfield's zoning ordinance had
prevented persons of low and moderate income from acquiring
residential property in the town. 7 In denying those plaintiffs
standing, the Court enunciated a new causation test. The plaintiffs must allege facts from which it could reasonably be inferred
that, absent Penfield's restrictive zoning practices, there would
be a substantial probability that they would have been able to
purchase or lease in Penfield.8 The plaintiffs were denied access
to federal court because they had not demonstrated that they
personally would benefit in a tangible way from federal court
intervention." The Court, while recognizing that plaintiffs suffered a loss of housing opportunity, decided that this injury was
not caused by Penfield's asserted illegal acts but rather was a
consequence of the economy of the area housing market. 0
The Warth Court used standing as a device to limit its policymaking role in the exclusionary zoning area rather than as a
device to measure the sufficiency of plaintiffs' injuries. Although
clothed as a constitutional decision that an insufficient causal
relationship existed between plaintiffs' exclusion and Penfield's
zoning ordinance to warrant effective relief," Warth is based on
a prudential determination to impose higher injury in fact standards where constitutional rights are being adjudicated. 2 By bas- 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
" The community's land use ordinance allocated 98% of the town's vacant land to
single-family dwellings. Only .3% of the land available for residential construction was
zoned for multifamily dwellings. Id. at 495.
" 422 U.S. at 504.
" Id. at 503-07.
Id. at 506.
" The Court's reliance on Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973),
illustrated
this concern. 422 U.S. at 504 & n.79.

11See C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E.
§ 3531, at 18 (Supp. 1975).
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ing its rationale on the issue of causality, the Court distorts the
complex standing problem presented in Warth and sheds no light
on the considerations it thought important.
C.

Conclusion

The Court's treatment of injury in fact without any particularization in light of either the policies properly implicated or the
context of the relevant precedent threatens that it will become a
catchall for an unarticulated discretion on the part of the Court.
Too often various considerations have been merged into one confused inquiry concerning standing. The Court, in Wulff, disguised
its reasoning by focusing on the economic nature of the injury
asserted and the professional relationship involved. By basing its
decision on these aspects, the Court neglected the important difference between the precedent and Wulff in that the physicians
alleged no direct personal injury under a criminal statute. By
ignoring this disparity, the Court effectuated its policy consideration of expanding the constitutional right of privacy concerning
governmental intrusions into matters relating to marriage, procreation, and family relationships by granting standing to physicians to contest statutes which prevent or severely restrict them
in the performing of abortions." In Wulff, the Court has actually
sought to emphasize that decisions arising out of the physicianpatient relationship are constitutionally protected under the right
of privacy, but in doing so, has failed to take responsibility for
articulating this as the paramount concern.
Underlying this tension is the Court's inability to fashion a
general rule substantially applicable within similar contexts. It is
necessary for the Court to place cases within meaningful groupings, to recognize within these groupings the considerations properly evoked in determining standing, and to articulate clearly
and consistently through a more descriptive analysis the controlling factors in future cases.
II.

STANDING TO ASSERT CONSTITUTIONAL Jus TERTII

The second basis upon which the Court granted standing to
the physicians in Wulff was as representatives of their patients.
43 A generalized right of privacy is nowhere mentioned in the Constitution. It is
entirely the creation of the judiciary. See discussion note 12 supra.

SINGLETON v. WULFF

Although the Court has proclaimed a general presumption
against the representative assertion of a person's right (jus tertii)," the Court looks primarily to two factual elements to determine whether this presumption should apply in a particular case.
The first is the ability of the third party to assert his own right."
The second" is the presence of a substantial relationship between
the litigant and the person whose rights he seeks to assert. 7
Applying these principles led the Court to grant jus tertii.48
The Court found several obstacles to the women's assertion of
their own rights. They could be chilled from asserting their rights
by a desire to protect the privacy of their decision. Also, the Court
stressed the imminent mootness of any individual woman's
claim." The closeness of the relationship was satisfied by the
confidential nature of the physician-patient relationship. Each of
these factors is considered below.
A. Analysis of the Leading Cases: Obstacles
The Court reneges on its committment to the first factual
element justifying an exception when, after admitting that the
mentioned obstacles are surmountable through the use of a pseudonym or assembled class action,s the Court concludes that if the
assertion of a woman's right is to be representative to that extent
" 428 U.S. at 114 (citing Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953)). This rule was
first enunciated in Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943), where a physician was denied
standing to attack a state anti-contraceptive statute in a declaratory judgment action on
the grounds that it endangered the lives of three of his patients and consequently constituted a deprivation of life without due process of law. The Court held that his patients
were not parties to the proceeding and that there was no basis on which to secure an
adjudication of his patients' constitutional rights. Id. at 46. The primary consideration
was the fact that there was no bar to the patients asserting their own rights on their own
behalf.
, 428 U.S. at 116.
0 Id. at 115.
'1 Id. (citing Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188-89 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
116 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 481 (1965); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 259 (1953)).
" 428 U.S. at 118.
" Id. at 117.
Suit may be brought under a pseudonym. Furthermore, the case should not be
treated as moot since the question is likely to recur and a holding of mootness would make
it difficult or impossible for an important constitutional question to ever be presented for
decision by the Court. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124-25 (1973). The Court, in
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976), suggests that a class could be assembled, whose
fluid membership always included some women with live claims. Id. at 117.
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anyway, then there seems little loss in terms of effective advocacy
from allowing its assertion by a physician.' This argument indicates that the Court is willing to allow jus tertii whenever per52
sonal litigation becomes practicably impossible.
An analysis of the precedent relied upon by the plurality
confirms the necessity of practicable impossibility. Wulff can be
distinguished from these cases because the factor of impossibility
is not present so as to justify the Court in granting an exception.
In Barrows v. Jackson,53 a covenantor who sold land to a
black purchaser in violation of a racially restrictive covenant was
granted jus tertii, when he was sued for damages by another party
to the covenant, to assert that enforcement of the convenant by
an award of damages would violate the equal protection rights of
prospective black purchasers of similarly restricted property. The
Court argued that it would be "difficult if not impossible" for the
prospective vendees to assert their grievance before any court.54
Other factors confirm the virtual impossibility of prospective
black vendees asserting their own constitutional rights. First, the
victim of the possible discrimination would not be known.5 5 Second, it is difficult to see how, in the absence of a contract to sell,
a black purchaser could have an actionable interest. And finally,
there would be no chance, even under broad intervention rules,
that a black would become a party to any proceeding to protest
that the awarding of damages to a covenantor would impair his
right to purchase property in the future."
In NAACP v. Alabama,5 7 the NAACP, in resisting efforts
to enjoin it from doing business in the State of Alabama, had
standing to assert that compulsory production of membership
" 428 U.S. at 117-18.
" Id. at 126.

346 U.S. 249 (1953).
" Id. at 257.
' The Court refers to them as "unidentified but identifiable," meaning persons who
might want to purchase a house but could not do so because of the racially restrictive
covenant. Id. at 254.
" The federal courts recognize two types of intervention: 1) Intervention by right
where conferred by federal statute and 2) intervention discretionary with the court where
the intervenor's claim or defense involves a question of law or fact common to the action.
FED. R. Crv. P. 24.
57 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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lists violated the constitutional rights of its members to freedom
of association. 58 The action of the state was claimed unconstitutional because it would have deprived the members of their right
to remain anonymous and to keep their membership in the organization secret. The members would have had to forgo those
rights in order to assert them. The only possible way that their
rights could have been effectively protected was to permit the
association to assert them."
In Eisenstadt v. Baird,10 an advocate of birth control who was
prosecuted for violating a statute forbidding the distribution of
contraceptives to unmarried persons had standing to assert the
constitutional claims of persons to whom he had distributed contraceptives. The Court reasoned that since the statute prohibits,
not use, but distribution, persons denied access to contraceptives
are not themselves subject to prosecution and, to that extent, are
denied a forum in which to assert their own rights.2
Singleton v. Wulff13 can be distinguished from the Barrows
line of cases on the issue of jus tertii in that the third party
patients can easily seek relief on their own behalf."4 The Missouri
" Id. at 466.
" An effective way of counteracting pressures designed to nullify the constitutional

rights of others may be to permit a third person who is not subject to the same pressures
to assert them jus tertii.
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
" MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. Ch. 272, §§ 21, 21A (West 1970).
Section 21 provides in part: "Except as provided in section twenty-one A, whoever
• . . gives away. . . any drug, medicine, instrument or article whatsoever for the prevention of conception . . . shall be punished by imprisonment. . . or by a fine ....
"
Section 21A provides in part: "A registered physician may administer to and prescribe for any married person drugs or articles intended for the prevention of pregnancy
or conception. A registered pharmacist . . . may furnish such drugs or articles to any
married person presenting a prescription from a registered physician."
" The Court found a comparatively stronger basis for granting jus tertii than in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), where a physician who was criminally
charged as accessory to the crime of using birth control devices had standing to assert that
the Connecticut anti-birth control measure violated the constitutional rights of his patients to privacy in marital relations. The Court argued that unmarried persons denied
access to contraceptives in Massachusetts, unlike the users of contraceptives in Connecticut, are not themselves subject to prosecution and, consequently, under the statute are
denied a forum in which to assert their own rights. The Massachusetts statute, unlike
the Connecticut statute considered in Griswold, prohibits the distribution, not the use,
of contraceptives. 405 U.S. at 446.
63 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
See Note, Denial of Equal Protection to Patients as also Constituting Denial of
Equal Protection to Physicians, 7 U. TOL. L. REv. 213, 221-22 (1975).
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Medicaid statute expressly provides the welfare recipients with a
statutory right to an administrative hearing if their claims for
medical assistance are denied." Furthermore, the welfare recipients are afforded the right to appeal decisions regarding requests
for medical assistance payments through the administrative process as required by federal legislation and established under the
Missouri Revised Code." By this direct statutory endowment,
absent in Barrows, NAACP, and Eisenstadt, the patients in
Wulff are granted the means to assert their rights on their own
behalf.
One of the difficulties in applying the obstacle test is a lack
of Court guidance in determining what relative degree of impracticability is conclusive to warrant the assertion of a third party's
rights. As it stands, the test does not serve its intended purpose
of providing a reasonably useful criterion for factually determining standing, but rather lends itself to whatever measure of adaptation serves the Court's discretion in granting or in refusing jus
tertii on prudential grounds. This test, like the causation test, is
another example of how the Court obscures what is at issue in a
given case by creating an analytic device that can be stretched
to accommodate the unarticulated discretion of the Court. The
Court can fashion this test, as it did in Wulff, to grant or to refuse
standing without either an enunciation of the policies properly
implicated or a close regard for the context of relevant precedent.
B. Analysis of the Leading Cases: Physician - Patient
Relationship
Focusing on the professional relationships in Barrows, Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Doe, the Court indicated that allowing
physicians in Wulff standing to assert their patients' rights flows
naturally from these decisions. 7 To the extent that there is a preexisting and substantial relationship' 8 rather than a fortuitous
6 Mo. REV. STAT. § 208.156 (Supp. 1975) ("The department of public health and
welfare shall provide for granting an opportunity for a fair hearing to any applicant or
recipient whose claim for medical assistance is denied or is not acted upon with reasonable
promptness." Id.).
" 38 Fed. Reg. 22007, § 205.10(a)(5) (1973) ("An opportunity for a hearing shall be
granted to any applicant who requests a hearing because his claim for financial or medical
assistance is denied . . . and to any recipient who is aggrieved by any agency action
resulting in suspension, reduction, discontinuance, or termination of assistance." Id.).
6? 428 U.S. at 115.
I at 117.
Id.
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one, the Court seems willing to grant jus tertii 9 An analysis of
these cases demonstrates that the Wulff Court has not clearly
recognized that a relationship has no abstract importance but
rather assumes significance by establishing a link between the
claimant's injury and the constitutional right of the third party.
In Barrows v. Jackson,70 the issue was whether the right of
prospective black purchasers of real estate to be free from racial
covenants implied or necessitated derivative protection for white
sellers to be free from damages for breach of the covenant by
selling to blacks. The vendor-vendee relationship was protected
because the policy against discrimination implied collateral protection for white sellers.7'
In the birth control controversies of Griswold v. Connecticut 2
and Eisenstadt v. Baird,73 suppliers of contraceptive materials
69We should expect that the Court's sensitivity to the importance of a particular kind
of relationship would vary from time to time as a general reflection of the existing social
values. Today, for example, the Court is more apt to recognize the significance of a
professional or fiduciary relationship as opposed to a commercial relationship and find
that for certain social policy reasons one is more deserving of the Court's protection than
the other. This change in emphasis illustrates how judicial doctrine develops in response
to the particular problems and attitudes of a given social period and confirms the Court's
social function as an arbiter and maker of policy. This course of development is both
reasonable and desirable when you consider that the security of commercial transactions
is embodied in established contract law doctrine while various protections of personal
liberties have only recently come to be explained as resting on a constitutional right of
privacy. It is not surprising, then, that the Court has taken a more active role to safeguard
matters relating to marriage, procreation, and family relationships since the protection
of these recently conceived liberties is not yet embodied in any established legal doctrine.
See also discussion in note 82 infra.
As one example of increased judicial sensitivity, notice that the effect of holding a
statute to be overbroad is to relax the usual standing rule that a litigant challenging a
statute must show that his or her own conduct was constitutionally protected. In the
preferred first amendment area, a litigant may attack a statute's constitutionality on
overbreadth grounds even though the litigant may have engaged in conduct that the state
could constitutionally have regulated by a statute that was more narrowly drawn. The
primary reason for this extended base of standing is that the Court has been concerned
about potential self-censorship by other persons who might be afraid to engage in protected speech because of the statute's broad coverage. If such persons did not speak, then
the statute would have an inhibiting effect on constitutionally protected speech. See e.g.,
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521-22 (1972).
70 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
" The Court implicitly recognized this reasoning when it granted the vendor jus tertii
to challenge restrictive covenants because the owner "is the one in whose charge and
keeping reposed the power to continue to use the property to discriminate or to discontinue
such use." Id. at 259.
" 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
73

405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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were prosecuted under statutes forbidding use in Connecticut and
distribution in Massachusetts, respectively. By granting jus tertii
to the physicians in each case, the Court implicitly recognized the
dependent nature of the relationship between enjoyment of a constitutional protection and the guarantee of access. The Court
reasoned that the rights of recipients were likely to be diluted or
adversely affected if they could not be asserted by the physi4
cians.1

In Roe v. Wade75 and Doe v. Bolton,7" a patient's right to
privacy was held to confer upon her physician a resultant right
to perform abortions during her protected period. Physicians have
a protected interest in performing abortions by virtue of the policy toward women. The Court argued in Roe" that a woman's
exercise of her right to an abortion is necessarily at stake since
she cannot safely secure an abortion without the aid of a physician.
In Singleton v. Wulff,7" the Court emphasized that the presence of the confidential physician-patient relationship merged
the physician and his patient for constitutional standing purposes.7" By stressing the importance of a particular type of relationship that would justify an exception to the general rule, the
Court offered a principle which is subordinate in importance to
the nature of the governmental impact upon that relationship. 0
This analysis indicates that what is important is not whether a
parciular category of relationship exists but rather whether the
Missouri statute substantially impairs the expectancies or characteristics naturally arising out of the physician-patient relationship.
By placing primary emphasis on the nature of the relationship, the plurality seems to be generating a category of relationships, anyone of which, in itself, would justify a grant of jus tertii.
The problem with this reasoning is that it promises to provide a
11381

U.S. at 481; 405 U.S. at 445-46.
75410 U.S. 113 (1973).
76 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
" Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-56 (1973).
7
428 U.S. 106 (1976).
7'

Id. at 117.

" The dissent would keep the emphasis on the impact of the litigation on the third
party interests and treat the closeness of any relationship as only one factor in determining
whether the third party interests will be represented adequately. Id. at 128 n.5.
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reasonably useful criterion for factually determining jus tertii,
but in actuality only surfaces one factor that a court should consider in deciding standing. Besides the presence of a substantial
relationship, equally important factors are the nature of the governmental impact upon that relationship and the degree to which
the third party is dependent on the claimant for the protection
of his right. Although the Court recognized these contextual factors,"' by analyzing Wulff in terms of a general rule with principled exceptions, the Court obscured the importance of these factors and failed to articulate the rationale behind the significance
given to a professional relationship.
C.

Conclusion

Although the Court has exercised its discretion to proclaim
a general presumption against standing to assert the constitutional claims of third parties, the Court has recognized many
departures from this rule. The frequency with which the Court
has allowed exceptions suggests the lack of any coherent justification for the Court's general rule. This uncertainty can be attributed to the Court's failure to articulate the policy considerations
properly implicated by its decisions and to recognize that these
concerns cannot be itemized according to any principled criteria
but rather are more accurately based on a variety of factors implicit in the various contexts in which jus tertii arises. By attempting to structure its reasoning with reference to two conclusive factors, the Court obscures the process by which the scope
of jus tertii is determined.
Although it is generally wise to limit the assertion of jus
tertii, there are instances where, in order to perpetuate other
significant values, there must be a relaxation of the standing
requirement. In such instances, it is imperative that the Court
develop and apply well defined considerations so that neither set
of values is diminished. 2 At the present time, the Court is more
" The Court reasons that the woman's exercise of her right to an abortion is necessarily at stake in Singleton v. Wulff, 410 U.S. 106 (1976), because "an impecunious woman
cannot easily secure an abortion without the physician's being paid by the State." Id. at
117. In addition, "[T]he constitutionally protected abortion decision is one in which the
physician is intimately involved." Id.
" For example, to the extent that the Court is willing to give special protection to a
particular right or value, it may be willing to take a broadened view of standing when that
right is asserted, although it is the right of one other than the claimant. The Court may
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concerned with advancing and protecting personal liberties such
as freedom from racial discrimination, s freedom of association,
and the right of privacy with respect to governmental intrusions
into matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, and
abortion." This emphasis results because certain constitutional
guarantees, within a given social period, inspire a greater sensitivity on the part of the Court than do others.8 6 Wulff is an example of the Court's grappling with the task of clarifying and defining recently conceived personal liberties in matters of privacy
through a broadened bases of standing to assert jus tertii.
Daniel W, Moynihan
be eager to clarify the law in a particular area in order to prevent the inibition of the values
embodied in that right because of the uncertainties as to its exact scope. Singleton v.
Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976) is one example of this broadened base of standing being
extended to a litigant in order to insure the protection of a third party's interest, which is
implicated by their relationship.
0 See, e.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
M See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
" See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976); Nyberg v. City of Va., 495 F.2d
1342 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 891 (1974); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
" See discussion in note 69 supra.

ESTATE PLANNING FOR FARMERS AND RANCHERS
UNDER SECTION

2032A

INTRODUCTION

The Estate and Gift Tax Reform Act of 1976 added to the
Internal Revenue Code the most significant estate tax legislation
ever enacted for the farmer or rancher-section 2032A.1 The congressional intent underlying section 2032A was simple: minimize
inflated valuation of farmland when determining the farmer's
gross estate. 2 Consequently, this new law was designed to reduce
a farmer's estate tax liability if certain requirements are satisifled.3 This reduction in estate tax is accomplished by an alternative method of valuing the farmer's real estate-valuation of
farmland at its current use as a farm rather than at its "highest
and best use." Proper implementation of section 2032A should
result in the transmission of the small family farm between generations without creating burdensome estate taxes.' Thus, farm
families are not forced to liquidate the farm assets to cover the
estate tax liability.
This paper has two principal sections. The first discusses
requirements, definitions, valuation methods, and recapture of
I I.R.C. § 2032A. This section was enacted into law by section 2003 of the Estate and
Gift Tax Reform Act of 1976. Only estates of decedents dying after December 31, 1976
can elect section 2032A. This section applies also to realty in a closely held corporation
but this paper limits its discussion to farm realty. All "sections" referenced in this paper
are from the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
1 H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1976), at 22. This intent was stated in
the report as follows:
[Wjhere the valuation of land reflects speculation to such a degree that the
price of the land does not bear a reasonable relationship to its earning capacity, your committee believes it unreasonable to require that this "speculative
value" be included in an estate with respect to land devoted to farming ...
Keydel, Explaining the Tax Reform Act of 1976 to Clients, PRAc. LAW., Mar. 1, 1977
at 11. In actual tax dollars the estate tax will be lowered by $90,000 to $350,000 depending
on the tax bracket involved. Id. This range of tax savings is derived from the product of
the lowest and highest estate tax rates under section 2001(c) and the maximum reduction
in the gross estate allowed under section 2032A. The calculations are as follows:
Maximum Reduction
Allowed

Tax Rate

18%

of

$500,000

Decrease in
Tax

$ 90,000

70%
of
$500,000
$350,000
The maximum reduction rule is discussed in text accompanying note 32 infra.
'Id.
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tax saved by electing the special valuation under section 2032A.
The second analyzes the considerations involved to elect section
2032A, the pre-mortem planning necessary to comply with the
section, and the post-mortem planning required to avoid forfeiting the benefits of the section.

I.

AN INEQUITY OF THE ESTATE TAX LAWS

Under the current law, the property included in a decedent's
gross estate is to be reported at its "value." ' Treasury regulation
20.2032-2(b) defines "value" as "the price at which the property
would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller,
neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts."' Farm real estate,
therefore, has been valued at the "highest and best use" of the
property.' Consequently, because the farm property's industrial
or developmental value was higher than its agricultural value, the
farm either had to be sold to pay the high estate tax or converted
to a nonagricultural use to increase its income and justify its

retention .8
Reacting to this inequity, Congress enacted section 2032A to
eliminate the "highest and best use" valuation and to introduce
"special use" valuation.' In enacting the law, Congress evidently
felt that a policy of encouraging retention of the "family farm"
in the United States outweighed the policy of encouraging industrial development of the land."
A.

II. GENERAL
Requirements

PROVISIONS OF SECTION

2032A

In order to qualify for its benefits, section 2032A prescribes
I.R.C. § 2031(a).
'(1965).
H.R. REP. No. 1380, supra note 2, at 21.
Id. at 22. See also, Kelley, Estate Tax Reform and Agriculture, 7 U. TOL. L. REv.
897 (1976); Smith & Scrow, The Estate and Gift Reform Act of 1976: A Look at Two of
the Major Provisions, UTAH B.J., Winter, 1976, at 42. The former article provides an
excellent discussion of the methods of valuation before enactment of section 2032A and
of the resulting hardship for the heirs of the farmer's estate. It cites one study which noted
that more than 60% of all farm estates in Iowa became legally or economically fragmented
following the death of the owner.
I H.R. REP. No. 1380, supra note 2, at 22.
,0 Cf. Taylor, Public Policy and the Shaping of Rural Society, 20 S.D.L.R. 475 (1975)
(for the opinion that family operated farms are the most efficient and socially desirable
method of farming).
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a number of specific criteria. The section applies only if the decedent was a citizen or resident of the United States and if the
property is "qualified real property." ' " To be "qualified real property" an eight-point test must be met:
1. The property must be real property located within the United
2
States;1
2. the property must be used at the time of the decedent's death
in a "qualified use;"' 3
3. the property, along with the personal property used with such
real property, must pass from the decedent to a "qualified heir;""
4. the property, along with personal property used with it, must
comprise at least 50 percent of the adjusted gross estate;"
5. the property, valued by itself at its "highest and best" use, must
comprise at least 25 percent of the adjusted gross estate;"6
6. the property must have been owned by the decedent or a
"member of his family" during five of the eight years immediately
preceding the decedent's death; 7
7. there must have been "material participation" by the decedent
or a "member of his family" in the operation of the property in its
"qualified use" during five of the eight years immediately preceding
the decedent's death; and
8. the executor or other estate representative must file an election
with the estate tax return which designates the realty and agrees
that the recapture rules of the section will apply with respect to that
property."

B.

Definitions

To understand the stated requirements of section 2032A, certain phrases defined by that section must be examined.
"Qualified real property" qualifying for "special use" valuation includes the farmhouse, or other residential buildings, and
related improvements located on the farm.20 However, such buildI.R.C. §§ 2032A(a), (b)(1).
Id. § 2032A(b)(1).
" Id. § 2032A(b)(1)(A)(i).
" Id. § 2032A(b)(1)(A)(ii).
" Id. § 2032A(b)(1)(A).
For the purposes of this test, the value of the property, real
and personal, and the adjusted gross estate are determined without regard to section
2023A and are reduced by any mortgages or indebtedness on the property. Id. §
2032A(b)(3). See also section 2053(a)(4).
Id. § 2032A(b)(1)(B).
' Id. § 2032A(b)(1)(C)(i).
, Id. § 2032A(b)(1)(C)(ii).
" Id. §§ 2032A(b)(1)(D), (d).
H.R. REP. No. 1380, supra note 2, at 23.
"
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ings must be occupied on a regular basis by the owner or lessee
of the real property for the purpose of operating the farm. 2 '
"Qualified real property" also includes roads, buildings, and
other structures' 22 and improvements functionally related to the
"qualified use.
To the contrary, elements of value which are
not related to the farm use, e.g., mineral rights in the form of a
coal or natural gas lease, are not eligible for "special use" valuation.23
A "qualified use" is use as a "farm" for "farming purposes. "24
The definition of a farm is quite broad: it includes dairy, poultry,
nurseries, ranges, greenand truck farms, plantations, ranches,
25
houses, orchards and woodlands.
A "qualified heir" is defined as any member of the decedent's
family to whom the real property passes. 21 "Member of the family" is defined as the decedent's spouse, ancestor, lineal descendant, or a lineal descendant of the decedent's grandparent, or the
spouse of any such descendant.27 Therefore, along with his brother
and sister, the decedent's aunts, uncles, nephews, great nephews,
their spouses, would be included as
great nieces, and cousins and
"members of the family. 2 8 Adopted children, also, are included
29
as members of the decedent's family.
"Material participation" is determined in a manner similar
to that used for purposes of computing net earnings from selfemployment under section 1402(a) .30 Although the party carrying
, Id. at 24.

SId.
Id. See also Kirby, How to Plan for New Special Rules of Valuing Farm and Close
CorporationReal Estate, EST. PLAN. Jan., 1977, at 95.
2, I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(2)(A). See section 2032A(e)(5) for a definition of farming purposes.
Id. § 2032A(e)(4).
" Id. § 2032A(e)(1).
2

27

Id. § 2032A(e)(2).

Case & Phillips, Death and Taxes-The 1976 Estate and Gift Tax Changes, 1976
ST. L. J. 321, 361. Under the Uniform Probate Code, which has been adopted in
Colorado, every class of heir to which property could pass by intestate succession would
meet the definition of a "member of the family" under section 2032A(e)(2). Id.; See also
COLO. REv. STAT. § 15-11-103. Remarkably, section 2032A(e)(2) deviates from the Uniform
Probate Code by allowing the spouses of "qualified heirs" to be members of the decedent's
family.
" I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(2); Cf. COLO. REv. STAT. § 15-11-109(a) (1973) which states that
for intestacy purposes an adopted person is the child of the adopting parent.
31 I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(6). Section 1402(a) reads as follows: "The term 'net earnings from
self-employment' means the gross income derived by an individual from any trade or
21

Aiuz.
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on the business need not be the decedent or a "member of his
family," the decedent or a "member of his family" must materially participate in the business."
C. Valuation Methods
The special valuation method provided by section 2032A, if
elected, can reduce the value of the "qualified real property" by
a maximum of $500,000.32 Therefore, the personal representative

must value the property at both its "highest and best use" and
its actual agricultural use to determine if the difference between
the two values exceeds $500,000.11
Section 2032A provides for one primary method of valuation,
the income capitalization method. It is based on a formula of cash
rentals, real estate taxes, and effective interest rates.34 Because
the elements of the formula are easily determinable, the method
has three advantages: 1) "it should reduce subjectivity, and
therefore controversy, in farm valuation;" 2) "it should eliminate
from valuation any values attributable to the potential for conversion to nonagricultural use;" and 3) it should eliminate from
valuation any values attributable to speculative factors. 5 Each
element of the formula requires an average based on the five most
recent calendar years ending before the date of the decedent's
death. 3 The "qualified real property's" value is determined by
dividing the difference between the average gross cash rental for
comparable land used for farming purposes (and located in the
locality of such "qualified real property") and the average state
and local real estate taxes for such comparable land, by the average annual effective interest rate for all new Federal Bank loans. 7
business carried on by such individual, less the deductions allowed by this subtitle which
are attributable to such trade or business."
SH.R. REP. No. 1380, supra note 2, at 23.
I.R.C. § 2032A(a)(2).
RE SEARCH INSTTUTE OF AMERICA, THE RA COMPLETE ANALYSiS OF THi '76 TAX REFORM LAW, at 35 [hereinafter cited as REsEARCH INSTrruTEJ.
I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(7)(A).
U H.R. REP. No. 1380, supra note 2, at 24-25.
U I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(7)(A).
Id. The statute does not specify whether the interest rate for all new Federal Bank
loans is to be determined from a national average or regional average. The United States
is divided into twelve regions and each region's interest rate presumably would reflect the
interest rate the farmer would pay to obtain the loan.
3,
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Recapture of the Estate Tax

D.

Congress feared that unless for an extended period of time
after the decedent's death the "qualified real property" is retained as a farm for farming purposes, the "qualified heirs" might
obtain a "windfall" by electing actual use valuation and then38
proceeding to sell the property at its "highest and best use.
Therefore, section 2032A prescribes that a disposition of the
property or a cessation of the qualified use of the property within
fifteen years of the decedent's death, results in a recoupment of
the estate tax originally saved by election of the special valuation
method.3 9
1.

Disposition of the Qualified Real Property

The report of the House Ways and Means Committee describes those dispositive acts for "qualified real property" which
will subject the "qualified heirs" to the recapture provision. In
general, the recapture provision is applicable to "qualified real
property" that is disposed of in any way to nonfamily members. 0
Conversely, section 2032A also provides that there is no recapture if the interest in "qualified real property" is transferred,
by sale or gift, to a member of the "qualified heir's family."'"
However, this member is now deemed to be the "qualified heir"
with respect to such interest even though he may have paid full
value for the interest.2 Consequently, a subsequent disposition of
the interest by this deemed "qualified heir" to a nonfamily member within the fifteen year period, will trigger recapture of the
estate tax from which the original "qualified heir" already had
benefitted and, in addition, will impose liability for the recaptured amount on the deemed "qualified heir."
2.

Cessation of Qualified Use

Cessation of qualified use occurs when the farm realty is
converted to a nonagricultural endeavor. For example, farmland
leased for the purpose of a shopping center would constitute a
cessation of use.' 3 Cessation also occurs if "[diuring any period

40

42

H.R. REP. No. 1380, supra note 2, at 22.
I.R.C. § 2032A(c)(1).
Id.
I.R.C. § 2032A(c)(1)(A).
Id. § 2032A(e)(1); H.R. REP. No. 1380, supra note 2, at 27.
I.R.C. § 2032A(c)(1)(B).
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of eight years ending after the date of the decedent's death and
before the death of the qualified heir, there have been periods
aggregating three years or more during which there was no material participation by the qualified heir or a member of his family
in the operation of the farm or other business."" Thus, the concept of "material participation" is an important factor here, as
well as in initially qualifying the decedent's estate.
The death of a "qualified heir" does not constitute a cessation of use with respect to that heir's interest.45 However, if there
is more than one "qualified heir" who has an interest in the farm
realty, upon the death of one, the potential liability for recapture
ceases only as 48to the proportionate interest of the deceased
"qualified heir." In addition, if "qualified real property" was
left to two or more "qualified heirs" with successive interests in
the property, the potential liability for recapture remains undiminished upon the first "qualified heir's death." 7
3.

Computation of the Recapture Tax

The maximum that can ever be recaptured is the tax savings
that resulted from the application of section 2032A.18
The amount of estate tax benefit potentially subject to recapture with respect to any interest is the lesser of the following:
1) The excess of the estate tax liability, which would have been
incurred had the special use valuation provision not been elected,
over the actual estate tax liability for that interest based on the
"special use" valuation;49 2) the amount realized on a sale or
exchange of the interest over the "special use" value of the property;10 and 3) the "highest and best use" value at the time of the
recapture event over the "special use" value if that interest triggered recapture due to a cessation of a "qualified use."'"
Only the first amount noted requires clarification. This
amount is referred to in subparagraph 2032A(c)(2) as the
H.R. REP. No. 1380, supra note 2, at 26.
"Id.

"

"Id.
47

'

Id.
Case & Phillips, supra note 28, at 371.
C5
I.R.C. § 2032A(c)(2)(A)(i).
Id. § 2032A(c)(2)(A)(ii).
I/d.
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"adjusted tax difference attributable to such interest." It can be
expressed by the following formula:
(X) times (Y)

(Z)

where:
X is the total tax the estate deferred due to the "special use" valuation;u
Y is the excess of the interest's "highest and best use" value over
the "special use" value;
Z is the excess of the "highest and best use" value over the "special
use" value of all the "qualified real property."

Congress created three devices to ensure payment of the recaptured tax. First, the statute of limitations for the tax does not
begin until the Internal Revenue Service is notified of the
recapture-triggering event.5 3 Second, section 6324B, enacted into
law with section 2032A, provides that a lien in favor of the United
States attaches to the "qualified real property" for the duration
of the recapture period.54 Third, the agreement that is filed with
the estate tax return must contain the consent of each of the
parties to the recapture tax provisions.-' This consent imposes
personal liability for any recapture tax due with respect to the
"qualified heir's" interest in the "qualified real property.""6
I.

ESTATE TAX PLANNING

A.

Pre-mortem Planning
Estate tax planning for the farmer should be initiated well
in advance of death. If election of section 2032A is contemplated,
measures should be taken to ensure the estate's qualification.
Also, the best methods to hold and channel the farm assets to
members of the decedent's family who will fulfill the section's
requirements, must be chosen. Finally, the decision whether to
elect section 2032A or section 6166 is faced by the estate with
liquidity problems.
11This amount is also known as the "adjusted tax difference with respect to the
estate." Id. § 2032A(c)(2)(C).
I.R.C. § 2032A(f)(1).
I § 2032A(g).
Id.
H.R. REP. No. 1380, supra note 2, at 27.

SId.
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1. General Considerations
The crucial decision is whether the estate should elect section
2032A. A farm located in a completely rural area already should
be valued at its current actual use as farmland; the estate would
only be hindered by section 2032A.17 In contrast, since the value
of a farm located near residential or industrial property is affected
by nonagricultural factors, the valuations based on "highest and
best use" and "special use" would be quite disparate. In this
latter situation, however, election of section 2032A is not automatic. Consideration must be given to the costs of overseeing, 8
and to the restraint of disposing the "qualified real property"
during the fifteen year recapture period. 59 The suggested test is
whether the value of the "qualified real property" at its "highest
and best use," or the amount of income it could produce if utilized in a nonagricultural manner, is greater than the net monetary return yielded under section 2032A.1
For two reasons, the decision whether to elect section 2032A
should be made several years prior to the decedent's death. First,
if the estate will have a problem meeting the 50 percent and 25
percent test, the decedent should make inter vivos gifts of the
nonqualified property." Thus, the percentage of qualifying property in the estate will rise. 2 As an added incentive for holding
, Case & Phillips, supra note 28, at 372.
Keydel, supra note 3, at 11.
u Smith & Scrow, supra note 8, at 46.
SId.
Case & Phillips, supra note 28, at 372.
" To illustrate, a farmer owns the following assets:
Value
"

Two apartment buildings
Dairy farm

Percentage

$ 700,000

70%

300,000

30%

$1,000,000

100%

If the farmer makes an inter vivos gift of one apartment building worth $400,000, the
estate's value would be $600,000. Consequently, the percentages of the farm assets would
rise as follows:
Percentages

Total Farm Assets
Farmland

Value

Required

Before
Gift

$300,000

50

30

50

$200,000

25

20

33 /

After
Gift
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"qualified real property" until death, the "special use" valuation
rule does not apply for gift tax purposes.63 Therefore, if a donor
makes a lifetime transfer of his farm, the property is valued for
gift tax purposes at its "highest and best use." 4 Second, to ensure
"material participation" in the last eight years of the decedent's
life, the members of his family should be encouraged to partici5
pate in the farming or ranching operation.1
2. Methods of Insuring Continuity of the Farming
Operation
Choosing the proper method of holding the farm assets for
the purposes of section 2032A is critical. Whether a corporation,
partnership, or trust entity is selected,6 6 the primary concern
must be the continuation of the farm's operation for those children who elect farming for their livelihoods. 7 The corporate entity offers a distinct advantage; ownership is represented by
shares of stock. Since only shares of stock are given, transfer of
the operating farm to the children is facilitated. 8 While the partnership form has the advantage of ease of formation, its main
drawback is that it dissolves upon the death of either partner."
Thus, objectives of continuity of operation and smooth intergenerational transfer would be lost.7" In contrast, the revocable
63 RESEARCH INSTITUTE,

supra note 33, at 34.

64 Id.

Case & Phillips, supra note 28, at 372.
16Congress indicated that a decedent's estate generally should be able to utilize the
benefits of "special use" valuation where it holds the "qualifying real property" indirectly
through its interest in a partnership, corporation, or trust. However, two requirements
must be met: 1) The business in which such property is used constitutes a closely held
business as defined in section 6166; and 2) the real property would qualify for "special
use" valuation if it were held directly by the decedent. H.R. REP. No. 1380, supra note 2,
at 24. Section 6166(b)(1) defines "interest in a closely held business." A partnership
interest is an "interest in a closely held business" if 20 percent or more of the total capital
interest in such partnership is included in determining the gross estate of the decedent,
or if such partnership had 15 or fewer partners. Stock in a corporation is an "interest in a
closely held business" if 20 percent or more in value of the voting stock of such corporation
is included in determining the gross estate of the decedent, or if such corporation had 15
or fewer shareholders. Note that a trust would qualify if its corpus consisted of a partnership or corporate interest that also qualifies as an "interest in a closely held business."
67 This is the underlying objective of section 2032A. See text accompanying note 2
supra.
11 Kirby, Choosing the Best Method of Holding Farm Assets Is Integral Part of Premortem Planning,EST. PLAN., Autumn 1976, at 53.
" Treas. Req. § 1.708-(b)(1)(i)(a) (1956).
0
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trust guarantees a smooth inter-generational transfer whenever
the decedent's wife does not elect her statutory forced share of the
estate .
Once the method of holding the farm assets has been chosen,
planning should ensure that recapture of the tax is a remote
possibility. Through the farmer's will, the "qualified real property" should be channeled to those members of the decedent's
72
family who will fulfill the requirements of section 2032A.
One foreseeable problem is the possibility that the decedent's spouse will elect against the will for her statutory share of
the estate and later sell the "qualified real property" to a nonfamily member.73 Therefore, the sale would trigger recapture, and the
benefits of section 2032A would be forfeited." A plausible solution
would be the irrevocable trust since it cannot be defeated by the
surviving spouse. However, the effectiveness of this device is illusory: Section 2032A does not apply to what is essentially a gift.75
Fortunately, two devices may provide a solution to this problem.
One is a waiver from the farmer's spouse specifying that she is
waiving her right of election." The other is a will contract specifying that she will only sell the "qualified real property" to members of her family." However, since both devices are contractual
arrangement, two disadvantages exist: 1) The spouse may or may
not agree to the contract; and 2) the court may or may not grant
specific performance as a remedy for breach. Regardless, the
members of the surviving spouse's family, who wish to continue
70 Kirby, supra note 68, at 55.
71 U.P.C. 2-201. The decedent's spouse can defeat the revocable trust because it

constitutes a "transfer to the extent that the decedent retained at the time of death a
power, either alone or in conjunction with any other person, to revoke or to consume,
invade or dispose of the principal for his own benefit." Id. 2-202(1)(ii).
72 Smith & Scrow, supra note 8, at 56.
71 See U.P.C. 2-201. The corresponding Colorado provision allows a one-half elective
share. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 15-11-201 (1973).
", See text accompanying note 40 supra.
" See Treas. Reg. 25.2512-1 and text accompanying notes 63 and 64 supra.
7 U.P.C. 2-204: "The rights of election of a surviving spouse . . . may be waived,
wholly or partially, before or after marriage, by a written contract, agreement, or waiver
signed by the party waiving after fair disclosure."
Id. 2-701:
A contract to make a will or devise, or not to revoke a will or devise, or to
die intestate . . . can be established only by (1) provisions of a will stating
material provisions of the contract; (2) an express reference in a will to a
contract and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the contract; or (3) a
writing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract. . ..
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the farming operation and to avoid recapture, should attempt to
purchase or lease the "qualified real property" from the surviving
spouse.7 8
3.

The Estate with Liquidity Problems

Another crucial factor in the decision to elect section 2032A
involves its interaction with section 6166. In conjunction with
section 2032A, section 6166 was enacted to ameliorate the estate
tax problems of farmers and ranchers. Both sections can be
elected simultaneously.7 Section 6166 permits the executor to
elect to pay by installments the estate tax over a fifteen year
period." The first installment may be deferred for five years;
during this period only interest on the unpaid tax is due.8 ' In
addition, a special interest rate of four percent is charged on the
first $345,800 in deferred estate tax, reduced by the unified credit
allowable under section 2010(a). 82 However, the value of the farm
assets must exceed 65 percent of the value of the adjusted gross
estate before section 6166 can be elected. 3
If the "special use" value is elected under section 2032A, the
estate may forfeit the beneficial provisions of section 6166.1' Section 6166(b)(4) provides that the value used to determine the
federal estate tax, whether it be "highest and best use" or
"special use" value, is the value used for purpose of the sixty-five
percent requirement. Consequently, if the special use value of the
farm realty significantly reduces the value of the total farm assets, the farm's value may not exceed sixty-five percent of the
value of the adjusted gross estate." Such failure to satisfy the
sixty-five percent requirement forces a difficult decision since
election of one of these code sections precludes the election of the
MSee I.R.C. §

2032A(c)(1)(A).
" RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 33, at 49.
I.R.C. § 6166(a)(3).
Id. §§ 6166(a)(3), (f)(1).
2 Id. § 6601(j). The figure $345,800 represents the liability of a taxable estate of
$1,000,000 pursuant to the tax rate schedule in section 2001(c). The interest rate of 4
percent is quite a bargain. Section 6621(a) specifies the general interest rate of 9 percent
per annum,or a rate based on 90 percent of the average prime rate quoted by commercial
banks to large business.
0 Id. § 6166(a)(1).
m Rosen,New Tax Savings Opportunitiesin Post-mortem Planning Provided by Tax
Reform Act of 1976, 18 TAX. FoR AccouNTrws 86, 88.
Id.
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other. The basic test, therefore, is whether the estate's liquidity
problems mitigated under section 6166 outweighs the tax avoided
under section 2032A.
B.

Post-mortem Planning

To avert recapture of the estate tax, the estate's personal
representative and his counsel must periodically supervise the
administration of the "qualified heir's" interest in the farm
realty. This supervision, necessarily, must continue throughout
the entire fifteen year recapture period. Not only do they have a
duty to inform each "qualified heir" of his potential recapture tax
liability,8 6 but also a duty to discourage premature disposition of
the "qualified heir's" interest. Therefore, the severe tax consequences of a premature disposition cannot be overemphasized.
Moreover, the estate's counsel should anticipate, with effective
tax planning, IRS audits; negligent planning may result in recapture.
1.

Effects of Premature Disposition or Cessation

The tax consequences of a premature disposition of a
"qualified heir's" interest or cessation of a "qualified use" of the
"qualified property" can be disastrous. Section 2032A(c)(5)
states that the recapture tax is due and payable on the day ending
six months after the disposition or cessation. Interest is charged
on the recaptured tax only on the period beginning six months
after the day of disposition or cessation and ending on the day of
the tax payment."7 However, the recapture tax is not payable in
installments. Section 6166(h)(1), the general installment payment provision, does allow installment payment for deficiencies
in tax imposed by section 2001, the general estate tax imposition
provision. However, the recapture tax is not imposed by section
2001, but by section 2032A(e)(1). Therefore, the recapture tax
is not payable in installments.
Another unfavorable consequence of premature disposition
involves the election of section 6166 by an estate with liquidity
problems. If the "qualified heirs" dispose of one third or more of
the farm interest, then the extension of time for payment of estate
" Kirby, supra note 23, at 100.

See I.R.C. §§ 6601(a), 2032A(c)(5).
0 The new section states "there is hereby imposed an additional estate tax."
'"
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tax ceases to apply.8 9 Any unpaid portion of estate tax payable
in installments must be paid upon notice and demand from the
Internal Revenue Service. 0
Also, there will be a capital gains tax on any disposition of a
"qualified heir's" interest." This capital gain is the difference
between the amount realized from a sale and the "qualified
heir's" basis in the "qualified property.""2 Consequently, the
"qualified heir" must decide how to report this gain. Under section 61(a)(3) the entire gain must be reported in the year of sale.
Under section 453(b) only a portion of the gain is reported in any
tax year, based on the installment payments actually received in
93
that year.
If the installment method under section 453 is elected, then
the payments received from the purchaser cannot exceed thirty
percent of the sale price in the year of disposition. 4 Due to this
limitation, the payments received in the year of sale probably will
be insufficient to pay the recaptured tax caused by the disposition. 5 If the capital gain is reported pursuant to section 61, then
the purchase payments can be arranged to cover the recaptured
tax liability. However, because the entire gain is reported in one
0

I.R.C. § 6166(g)(1)(A).

" Id.
" See I.R.C. § 61(a)(3).
" Basis will be determined by section 1023, enacted into the Internal Revenue Code
under the 1976 Tax Reform Act. The section provides that the basis of the property in
the hands of the "qualified heir" is the same as the decedent's basis, increased by certain
adjustments. The fact that the transferee may have to pay the tax due to recapture does
not increase the transferee's basis because of the tax's contingent nature. See Columbus
& Greenville R.R. Co., 42 T.C. 834, 848 (1964). Presumably, an increase would be allowed
where the transferee actually pays the tax subject to recapture. See Case & Phillips, supra
note 28, at 371.
,1 A person "may return as income therefrom in any taxable year that proportion of
the installment payments actually received in that year which the gross profit, realized
or to be realized when payment is completed, bears to the total contract price." I.R.C. §
453(a).
" I.R.C. § 453(b)(2)(B).
" For example, assume the following:
$500,000
Sales Price of Interest
Basis

200,000

$300,000
Gain
To elect section 453, the purchase payments cannot exceed 30 percent of $500,000, or
$150,000, in the year of sale. Therefore, the "qualified heir" will be forced to finance any
recapture tax in excess of $150,000.
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tax year and thus is subject to higher tax brackets, additional
income tax liability is incurred.
2.

IRS Audits and Determinations

An IRS audit of an estate electing section 2032A will focus
primarily on the section's valuation and recapture provisions.
Effective planning is impossible for the former but not for the
latter. Due to its subjectivity, valuation is always subject to an
IRS attack. However, probable areas of IRS challenge warrant
mentioning. First, because the "special use" value cannot decrease the "highest and best use" value by more than $500,000,"1
the agent can create additional estate tax liability. The gross
estate will be increased to the extent either the "highest and best
use" value is increased or the "special use" value is decreased.,7
Second, the agent could contend that the value of the farm asset
fails to satisfy the fifty percent and twenty-five percent tests."
Such a determination would have the same effect as a recapture
of the estate tax saved."
Effective planning can preclude IRS determinations that result in recapture of the estate tax avoided pursuant to section
2032A. A determination either that "material participation" is
lacking or the farming activity is primarily a "hobby" will result
in recapture. The germane issue common to both determinations
is whether the "qualified heir" is engaged in a "trade or business."
Section 2032A(c)(7)(B) provides that cessation of a
"qualified use" occurs if there is no "material participation" by
a "qualified heir" or "member of his family" in the operation of
the farm.'0 The lack of "material participation" must involve
periods aggregating three years or more during any eight-year
period within fifteen years of the decedent's death.' 0 ' As noted,
"material participation" is determined by section 1402 which re" See text accompanying note 33 supra.
" However, additional estate tax liability would occur only when the two values are
adjusted after the maximum of $500,000 had already been reached.
" See text accompanying notes 15 and 16 supra.
" However, interest would accrue from the date the estate tax was due rather than
when the recapture tax was due. See I.R.C. §§ 6601(a), 6151(a), 6075(a), and text accompanying note 87 supra.
'" See text accompanying note 44 supra.
101
Id.
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lates to net earnings from self-employment.102 The issue of
whether the "qualified heir" materially participates usually arises when he leases the farm to a nonfamily member.'' The committee report states unequivocably that mere passive rental of the
farm does not constitute "material participation.' 0' 4 This statement is true because of the following general rule: income and
expenses attributable to rent from real estate are not considered
in determining net earnings from self-employment.'05 Therefore,
the requisite "trade or business" involvement by the "qualified
heir" is lacking.'0 6
However, the "qualified heir" may still lease the farm and
meet the "material participation" requirement under certain circumstances. The rental arrangement' 7 must provide that the
"qualified heir" shall materially participate in the "production"'' 0 or "management of production"'" of the farm products.
Fortunately, the IRS has delineated four objective tests of
''material participation." The "qualified heir" or "member of
his family" is deemed to materially participate in the "trade or
business" of farming if:
1. he does any three of the following: a) pay for at least half of the
direct costs of producing the crop; b) provides at least one half the
equipment and livestock used in producing the crop; c) advises and
consults with the tenant periodically; or d) inspects the production
activities periodically;"'
2. he takes a substantial part in management decisions that affect
the success of the farm activity;"'
3. he works 100 hours or more over a period of 5 weeks or more in
activities associated with crop production;"' or
4. he does things, when considered in the aggregate, which demonstrate a material or substantial involvement in the production of the
farm goods."'
See text accompanying note 30 supra.
FARmER's TAx GUIDE, PuB. 225 (1977), at 54 [hereinafter cited as GUIDE].
10 H.R. REP. No. 1380, supra note 2, at 23.
' GUIDE, supra note 103, at 54.
''

"'

'"

See note 30 supra.

' Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-4(b)(3)(i) (1976).

Id. § 1.1402(a)-4(b)(3)(ii) (1976).
I"
'" Id. § 1.1402(a)-4(b)(3)(iii) (1976).

GUIDE, supra note 103, at 54. See Rev. Rul. 57-58, 1957-1 CB 270, 271. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1402(a)-4(b)(3), (4) is the primary source for the Farmer's Tax Guide's Information
on "material participation."
"' GUIDE, supra note 103, at 54.
Id. at 55.

ld.
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Using these guidelines, the estate's personal representative or his
counsel can convert passive rental arrangements into active participation in the "trade or business" of farming. In borderline
situations, however, they should timely document all facts indicating "material participation" in anticipation of an IRS challenge.
There exists another method by which the IRS may force
recapture through the "trade or business" concept. The farm operation must be a "trade or business" before it is considered a
"qualified use" of a farm."' Section 183(a) states that if any
''activity is not engaged in for profit," then no deductions in
excess of that activity's income is allowed. Section 183(c) defines
an "activity not engaged in for profit" as one other than those
activities under section 162 which permits a deduction incurred
in carrying on a "trade or business." Therefore, if the IRS agent
determines that the farming operation is not engaged in for profit
by the "qualified heir," e.g., it is a hobby, the requisite "trade or
business" of farming for a "qualified use" ceases. Consequently,
the agent would disallow the farm's losses under section 183(a)
and impose the recapture tax under section 2032A(c)(1)(B).
Careful tax planning avoids such a result. Section 183(d)
provides a rebuttable presumption that the activity is engaged in
for profit if in two years out of any five year period the activity
produces a net profit. With an accountant's advice, the "qualified
heir" can produce "accounting" net profits. If the "qualified
heir" computes income under the cash method of accounting,
these net profits are accomplished by postponing deductions and
accelerating income items in a particular tax year." 5 Furthermore, Treasury regulations identify objective factors for determining the "qualified heir's" subjective intent to make a profit.",
I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(2).
,S See I.R.C. §§ 451, 461.
Treas. Reg. 1.183-2(b)(l)-(9) (1972). These factors are:
1. the taxpayer's history of income or losses with respect to the activity;
2. the amount of occasional profits, if any, which are earned;
3. the cause of the losses;
4. the success of the taxpayer in carrying on other similar or dissimilar
activities;
5. the financial status of the taxpayer;
6. the time and effort expended by the taxpayer in carrying on the activity;
7. the expertise of the taxpayer or his advisors;
8. the manner in which the taxpayer carries on the activity;
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Many of these objective factors can be manipulated to remove
any doubt as to the heir's bona fide profit intent. For example,
one factor is the manner in which the "qualified heir" carries on
the activity."' Therefore, the "qualified heir" should conduct the
farm operation in a businesslike manner and maintain complete
and accurate books and records; a profit intent is thus indicated.
CONCLUSION

For those who qualify and are willing to hold the farm property for fifteen years after the decedent's death, the new law offers
substantial estate tax savings. More importantly, section 2032A
ensures the continuation of the American family farm in two
ways. First, farm assets need not be sold to pay the estate tax.
Second, family members are encouraged to participate in farming
before and after the decedent's death. Valuable farming knowledge is thereby passed from one generation to the next. In essence, Congress has drafted legislation aimed primarily at social
engineering rather than revenue raising.
For the personal representative and his counsel, the new law
does not offer a specious challenge. Certainly, the law is complex
with myriad references to other Code sections. However, the law's
true challenge arises from the exacting decisions required. The
crucial decision is whether section 2032A should be elected. Once
committed, the personal representative must cope with both the
farm family and the Internal Revenue Service for fifteen years
to avoid the spectre of recapture.
Kevin O'Shaunessy O'Brien
9. expectation of profit by the taxpayer;
10. expectation that assets used in the activity may appreciate in value;
and
11. elements of personal pleasure or recreation.
' See note 116, supra.

Shaffer v. Heitner:A

SINGLE TEST FOR STATE COURT

JURISDICTION
INTRODUCTION

In the recent decision of Shaffer v. Heitner,' the United
States Supreme Court significantly changed the test for state
court jurisdiction. The Court ended the traditional distinction
between actions against persons and actions against property. It
asserted that all state court jurisdiction must be based on the test
of fairness to the defendant, as delineated in InternationalShoe
Co. v. Washington.2
Prior to the ruling in Shaffer, a foreign defendant who did not
have sufficient contacts with the forum state was not subject to
in personam jurisdiction in that state.' However, the plaintiff was
not without recourse. If the defendant owned property in the
forum state, that property could be attached in a quasi in rem
action, giving the state jurisdiction over that property in answering any claims against the unavailable property owner.' The defendant's property was the basis for jurisdiction and the means
to satisfy any adverse judgment. There was no concern for the
defendant's contacts with the forum state.
The effect of the ruling in Shaffer is to prohibit quasi in rem
actions against property if, after an examination, there are no ties
between the defendant property owner, the forum state, and the
nature of the litigation. A state no longer has automatic jurisdiction over property within its borders. Instead, it must have jurisdiction over the property owner, and that determination rests in
InternationalShoe.5
This new focus on the property owner does not preclude the
possibility that the presence of the defendant's property in the
forum state may have a bearing on the existence of jurisdiction
over him. But, the property has significance only in evidencing
ties and contacts between the defendant and the forum state.
Also, the presence of the defendant's property may have no bear-

'433
2

U.S. 186 (1977).
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
See text accompanying notes 24-28 infra.
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199 (1977).
Id. at 207-08.
Id.
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ing on the existence of jurisdiction if that property is unrelated
to the cause of action.
In applying this new test to the facts in Shaffer, the Supreme
Court determined that nonresidents of Delaware were not subject
to that state's jurisdiction, even though they owned property
within the state. This lack of jurisdiction reflected the absence of
any tie between the owners' property contact with the state and
the nature of the litigation.! Furthermore, the attachment statute, which brought the property before the Delaware court, did
not comport with the InternationalShoe test.'

I.
A.

TRADITIONAL BASIS FOR JURISDICTION

Pennoyer v. Neff

Of major significance in Shaffer was the demise of the traditional justifications for state jurisdiction to adjudicate. Much of
the traditional theory was enumerated by Justice Field in the 100
year old decision of Pennoyer v. Neff. Under Pennoyer each state
had jurisdiction over all persons and all property within its borders. Conversely, no state had jurisdiction over persons and property outside of its borders. 0 However, if a person outside of the
state's borders left property within the state, the state had jurisdiction over the property in determining any claims against the
unavailable property owner." Such quasi in rem actions were
direct against the property and indirect against the property
owner. 2 Jurisdiction over the property was automatic as long as
the property was brought before the court by attachment or sequestration. 3
One important characteristic of quasi in rem actions was that
the satisfaction of an adverse judgment was limited to the value
Id. at 213-16.
Id. at 213-14.
95 U.S. 714 (1877). The Court in Shaffer overruled Pennoyer to the extent that it
was inconsistent with its new holding. 433 U.S. at 212 n.39.
IC 95 U.S. at 722 (1877).
Id. at 723.
i Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199-200 (1977). As a result, courts did not require
personal service on the property owner.
" In Pennoyer the property was not properly attached. Thus, the court could not
proceed quasi in rem against the land because it was not before the court. 95 U.S. at 727.
Since the ruling in Pennoyer, the Supreme Court has made it necessary to augment
attachment with the most reasonably available method of personal notice. See, Schroeder
v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
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of the jurisdictional property.' The property owner could appear
specially to defend the property, without incurring personal liability, because the action remained against the property. 5
Of additional significance in Shaffer was the divisibility of
quasi in rem actions into two categories, depending on the relationship the property had to the nature of the litigation." In the
first category were actions where the attached property provided
the basis for jurisdiction and also was specifically related to the
underlying claim. One example of this first category was attachment of mortgaged property in a foreclosure action. 7 The second
category embodied situations where the attached property provided only the basis for jurisdiction. The underlying claim had no
relation to the attached property. 8 The quasi in rem action in
Shaffer fell within this second category."9 There the underlying
claim was the supposed breach of fiduciary duties by the directors
and officers of Greyhound Corp. 20 The sequestered personal stock
property of the defendants, the basis of Delaware's assertion of
jurisdiction, was wholly unrelated to a determination of any
2
breach of their corporate responsibilities. '
From Pennoyer to International Shoe

B.

The history of state court jurisdiction following the Pennoyer
concepts of power over persons and property was marked by oblique attempts to expand these jurisdictional confines to meet the
needs of an increasingly mobile society. As the country developed, it was no longer practical to restrict state jurisdiction to
' Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199 (1977).

Because the action is against the property, res judicatadoes not apply if the plaintiff seeks to bring the suit in another jurisdiction where the owner is subject to in personam
liability. See Bruns Bros. v. Central R.R., 202 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1953). Partly due to this
reason, some states allow the owner to appear only in personam in defense of his property.
This prevents a bifurcation of the suit and potential double liability. See, DEL. CODE tit.
10, § 366 (1974).
1' Folk & Moyer, Sequestrationin Delaware, a ConstitutionalAnalysis, 73 COLUM. L.
Rav. 749, 782-89 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Folk & Moyer].
"7Other typical quasi in rem actions falling within this first category include clouds
on title, enforcement of judicial liens, and establishment and determination of rights in a
trust. Id. at 782.
id. at 784.
433 U.S. at 208-09.
2 See text accompanying note 40 infra.
11433 U.S. at 213. The Court wrote that the "property is not the subject matter of
this litigation, nor is the underlying cause of action related to the property."
"
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persons and property within state boundaries. As a consequence,
the courts developed encompassing legal fictions of implied consent and implied presence, thus creating jurisdiction compatible
with Pennoyer.2 ' Similarly, the state legislatures enacted long
arm statutes to obtain jurisdictions over nonresident auto drivers
who caused damage in the state.2 3 In these situations, the state
had no real physical power over the foreign defendants, as required under Pennoyer, but it was necessary that such defendants
be subject to suit for their wrongs.
In response, the Supreme Court in InternationalShoe Co. v.
Washington2 expanded and redefined the conceptual basis for
state court jurisdiction. No longer was the focus on physical
power over persons within the state's boundaries. Instead, the
Court ruled that the jurisdictional test for in personam jurisdiction rested on a finding of minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum state. 25 Thus, no state had the power to make
"binding a judgment in personam against any individual or corporate defendant with which the state ha[d] no contacts ties or
relations."" Foreign defendants were subject to suit only if they
had sufficient contacts with the forum.27 The Court had little
concern for the Pennoyer concept of the power of the state.,, The
rationale for this new ruling was based on expanded notions of
due process fairness. 2 '
2 Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930). See, Kurtland, The
Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and In Personam Jurisdiction of State
Courts-FromPennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 569, 577-86 (1958).
2 "The advent of automobiles, with the concomitant increase in the incidence of
individuals causing injury in states where they were not subject to in personam actions
under Pennoyer, required further moderation of territorial limits on jurisdictional power."
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 202 (1977). See, Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
24 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
23

Id. at 316.

n Id. at 319.
2 See generally, McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 255 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (Texas
life insurance company subject to suit in California even though its only contact with the
state was a policy with a California resident); Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71
Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969) (The Court said that jurisdiction
reflected a balancing of inconveniences to the nonresident defendant versus the interests
of the state and the local plaintiff); Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary
Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961) (Parts manufacturer was liable in Illinois
because it was inferrable that products which incorporated its parts were used in Illinois).
2 326 U.S. at 316.
The Court in InternationalShoe wrote:
Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is
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One major aspect of the old Pennoyer rationale which remained untouched by the International Shoe ruling was the
state's jurisdictional power over property within its borders. The
Court retained the old premise that quasi in rem actions were
against property and not the property owner. If the property law
lay within the state it was subject to attachment and sale to
answer any claim against the property owner. There was no concern for the property owner's minimum contacts with the forum
state, even though he may have lacked such contacts. One judge
recently referred to this situation as an "irrational bifurcation of

InternationalShoe. "30
The continued validity of quasi in rem actions against property often resulted in great unfairness to the property owner. The
injustice was most visible in two situations. First, if the property
was intangible, its situs was often arbitrarily attached to the
forum state through the use of legal fictions. Such fictions usually
operated without the knowledge or control of the property owner.
An illustrative fiction was the Harris v. Balk doctrine 3' which
allowed a creditor's debt to be attached wherever the debtor could
be served. A similarly fetching situation occurred in Shaffer v.
Heitner. There a Delaware statute placed the situs of all stock in
Delaware corporations in Delaware, 32 regardless of the location of
the stock certificate or stockholder's domicile. The remaining
states place situs where the stock certificate lies. 33 These varying
grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's person. . . .But now
that the capis ad respondendum has given way to personal service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires only that in order to
subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within
the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts ....
326 U.S. at 315.
1 Jonnet v. Dollar Savings Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1130, 1132-33 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring).
" 198 U.S. 215 (1905). In Harris, Harris and Balk were residents of North Carolina.
Epstein was a resident of Maryland. Epstein had a claim against Balk but had no way to
serve Balk in Maryland. However, Epstein was able to obtain jurisdiction by attaching
an unrelated debt which Harris owed to Balk. The attachment occurred when Harris was
present in Maryland (debt attaches to the debtor). Later, Balk was prevented from collecting the debt owed to him by Harris because it had already been used to satisfy Epstein's
claim against Balk. Such a ruling is unlikely under Shaffer because the focus of jurisdiction in Maryland would be on Balk, not the location of the debt (Balk's property), and
Balk had no other contacts with the forum state. See, 433 U.S. at 212 n.39.
3 See text accompanying notes 62-64 infra.
3 Id.
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rules could have resulted in attachment of the stock in two jurisdictions at once.3
The other injustice occurred in the use of quasi in rem actions
of the second category, where the attached property was not the
subject of the controversy. Fairness to the property owner was
often subverted because of the lack of any meaningful nexus between the basis for jurisdiction (the presence of property) and the
controversy. If the property was attachable in the state, the owner
was subject to suit to the extent of the value of the property. 5 The
nature of the suit was not restricted to obligations arising out of
the property. Thus, if Jones lived in state B and owned property
in state C, another resident of state B conceivably could sue Jones
in state C on a matter unrelated to the attached property.
I. Shaffer v. Heitner
Heitner, a nonresident of Delaware, owned one share of stock
in Greyhound Corporation. 31Greyhound was incorporated in Delaware but had its principal place of business in Arizona. 7 In 1974
Heitner filed a stockholder's derivative suit in Delaware against
Greyhound,39 a subsidiary, and twenty-eight present and former
directors and officers of Greyhound. The complaint alleged, in
part, that the directors and officers were liable individually for
breaching their fiduciary duties. The breach occurred when they
directed the corporation in activities which caused the corporation to become subject to criminal fines and civil damages. 0
None of the directors or officers was a resident of Delaware,
nor were any of them at any time physically within Delaware.4
3 Note, U.S. Industries Inc. v. Gregg, 38 U. Prrr. L. Rzv. 789, 806-07 (1977).
See text accompanying notes 11-15 supra.
N Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 189 (1977).
37 Id.

" Id. The action was brought in the Court of Chancery, New Castle County, Delaware
on May 22, 1974.
0 In a stockholder's derivative suit, the corporation is a named defendant, resulting
from its failure to assert the claim on its own behalf. This failure makes the corporation
an indispensable party. See, Geer v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U.S. 428 (1903).
0 Greyhound was found guilty in a criminal suit of a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The court levied fines totalling $600,000 against Greyhound and a subsidiary,
Greyhound Lines. United States v. Greyhound Corp., 363 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ill. 1973),
aff'd, 508 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1974). In a related civil suit, a judgment of $13,146,090, plus
attorneys' fees, was entered against Greyhound. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound
Corp., 555 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1977).
1 The majority wrote that Heitner "did not allege and does not now claim that the
appellants have ever set foot in Delaware." 433 U.S. at 213.
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However, twenty-one of them did own stock in Greyhound Corporation, and, under Delaware law, all stock issued by a Delaware
corporation had its ownership situs in that state.4 2 Based on this
presence of property in Delaware, Heitner successfully moved to
have the Greyhound stock of these twenty-one defendants sequestered.43 Under the statute, if the defendants had wished to defend
their property they could have done so only by making a general
appearance in Delaware."
The twenty-one defendants did not attempt to defend on the
merits of the controversy."5 Instead, they appeared specially in a
Delaware Court of Chancery and moved to vacate the sequestration of their stock. They contended that Delaware did not have
jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy because they, the defendants, did not have personal contacts with the state, as required under the test of InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington."6
Both the Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme
Court47 rejected the defendants' jurisdictional attack. Each court
ruled that Heitner had instituted a quasi in rem action against
the sequestered stock property.4 ' Thus, the fact that Delaware did
not have jurisdiction over the defendants individually was irrelevant because the state had proper jurisdiction over their property.4 '

11DEL. CODE tit. 8,

§ 169 (1974). See, text accompanying notes 62-66 infra.
DEL. CODE tit. 10 § 366 (1974). Sequestration in Delaware is the equitable counterpart to attachment at law. Both may be used to obtain quasi in rem or in rem jurisdiction.
See, Sands v. Lefcourt Realty Corp., 35 Del. Ch. 340, 344, 117 A.2d 365, 367 (1955).
" Section 366 provided if the defendant did not appear in personam the court had
power to use the sequestered property in satisfaction of a default judgment. If the defendant did appear, then the judgment was personal and not limited to the value of the
sequestered property. See generally, Folk and Moyer, supra note 16, at 789-94.
,1 Since the remaining seven directors and officers owned no property in Delaware the
actions against them were apparently dismissed for failure to secure jurisdiction. 433 U.S.
at 214.
0 They also contended that the sequestration was ex parte, denying them procedural
due process. See, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (the defendant had to receive
notice and a right to be heard prior to any taking of her property). Here, however, the
Delaware Supreme Court held that the sequestration was an extraordinary situation
which justified the ex parte taking. Greyhound v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225, 231 (Del. 1977).
See, Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969) (extraordinary situations
may justify a taking prior to notice and hearing).
'" See, Greyhound v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225, 229 (Del. 1977),
LA 361 A.2d at 229.
0 The Delaware Supreme Court wrote:
There are significant constitutional questions at issue here but we say at once
3
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On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed. The
Court applied the jurisdictional test of InternationalShoe Co. v.
Washington, as the defendants had urged. It rationalized its ruling on the newly adopted premise that all actions quasi in rem
were really actions to determine persons' interests in property. 0
Such actions were against the property owners not the property.
Since the action in Shaffer was against the officers and directors
and not the stock, jurisdiction existed only if Delaware could have
exerted jurisdiction over them personally. The effect of this holding shifted the focus away from the state's power over the nonresident's property in the state to a determination of sufficient ties
among the defendant, the state, and the litigation.5 1 The Court
in Shaffer emphasized, contrary to traditional theory, that the
property owner was the real party in interest, and jurisdiction
over his interests in property within the state was permissible
only when he could be brought properly before the court.
Since Delaware had been concerned only with the presence
of the defendants' property when it took jurisdiction," it had
acted, said the Court, contrary to the International Shoe test.
Furthermore, in re-examining the facts in light of International
Shoe, the Court did not find sufficient ties among the defendants,
the state, and the litigation to permit the controversy to be tried
in Delaware. 3
III.

A.

ANALYSIS OF THE HOLDING IN

Shaffer v. Heitner

Narrow Approaches Under Delaware Law
Considering the long case history which the decision in
that we do not deem the rule in International Shoe to be one ....

The

reason of course, is that the jurisdiction under § 366 remains . . . quasi in
rem founded on the presence of the capital stock here, not on prior contacts
by the defendants with the forum.
Id.

433 U.S. at 207. The Court did not rule on the constitutionality of the defendants'
claim that the sequestration was a violation of procedural due process. See note 46 supra.
For an analysis of potential procedural due process issues in attachment to gain jurisdiction, see Note, Quasi In Rem Jurisdictionand Due Process Requirements, 82 YALE L. REV.
1023 (1973).
11433 U.S. at 204. This decision followed several recent lower court opinions. See,
U.S. Indus. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977); Jonnet
v. Dollar Savings Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1130 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring).
52 433 U.S. at 213. "The Delaware courts based their assertion of jurisdiction in this
case solely on the statutory presence of appellants' property in Delaware."
Id. at 213-16. But see, text accompanying notes 94-95 infra.
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Shaffer overturned, a serious question arises as to whether the
Court needed to take such pervasive action. It is maintainable
that narrower avenues could have brought equal results."
1. The Nature of Delaware's Sequestration Statute
In the first instance, the Delaware courts rejected the defendants' jurisdictional challenge because the action was quasi in
rem, due to the sequestration of the defendants' stock under title
10, section 366 of the Delaware Code." The Supreme Court in
Shaffer accepted the quasi in rem label and went on to attack the
general soundness of such actions.5 However, section 366 resulted
in litigation which lacked fundamental characteristics of traditional quasi in rem actions.
In describing the general nature of quasi in rem actions, Justice Marshall in Shaffer wrote that the judgment in such suits
was "limited to the property that supports jurisdiction and does
not impose a personal liability on the property owner since he is
not before the court."5 Section 366 had a quite different effect.
The statute did not limit judgments to the value of the property
because the owner could defend his property only by submitting
to full in personam liability." It is significant that in its earlier
Jurisdictional Statement the Court emphasized that section 366
was an assertion of in personam jurisdiction, causing
InternationalShoe to control." Furthermore, the Court suggested
that the Delaware statute was not a legitimate exercise of quasi
in rem jurisdiction because it did not afford the owner of the
property an unconditional opportunity to defend the property.60
11Because jurisdiction involves substantive due process issues the Supreme Court
normally refrained from making broad rulings when narrower avenues existed. See, Ashwander v. Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 345 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366 (1974).
433 U.S. at 196.
Id. at 199.
It is true that in the initial sense section 366 is quasi in rem because jurisdiction
rests on the sequestration of the property, not control over the defendant. But any defense
of the property is not quasi in rem.
15 Shaffer v. Heitner, 429 U.S. 813, Jurisdictional Statement, No. 75 1812, at 13
(October term, 1976) (not for general publication) [hereinafter cited as Jurisdictional
Statement]. Even in the Court's full opinion it recognized Delaware's motive by writing,
"the express purpose of the Delaware sequestration procedure is to compel the defendant
to enter a personal appearance." 433 U.S. at 209.
"0The Court wrote that "if Delaware were to exercise legitimate quasi in rem jurisdiction it would necessarily afford the owner of the property an unconditional opportunity
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Thus, the Court could have decided Shaffer by simply ruling
section 366 unconstitutional because it would force the defendants to submit to in personam jurisdiction in contravention to
the InternationalShoe due process test.
Perhaps one reason the Court did not base its final holding
in Shaffer on section 366 was an attempt to avoid a labeling
process. The Court had ruled previously that labeling an action
in personam or in rem was an elusive and confused undertaking."
But, if this reason were true, the Court was inconsistent in its
approach when it ventured in its Jurisdictional Statement to
label section 366 as fundamentally in personam.
2.

Delaware's Situs of Corporate Stock Statute

If the Court had wished to avoid labeling the action in
personam, it still had one other narrow avenue which it might
have used. Under the traditional concept of quasi in rem actions,
Delaware gained jurisdiction by sequestering stock property
which was located within its borders. However, the stock property, an intangible asset, 2 had its situs in Delaware only by virtue
of title 8, section 169 of the Delaware Code. 3 Section 169 provided
that Delaware was the situs of all stock in corporations formed
in Delaware. This provision was contrary to U.C.C. 8-317(1) 61
which provided that the stock certificate was the actual evidence
of the stock, and attachment occurred only when the certificate
actually was seized. Thus, the defendants were subject to suit in
Delaware and also in whatever state the certificates were located.
Because of this inconsistency, section 169 may have denied
the defendants due process of law. 5 If section 169 were unconstitutional, Delaware would have had no basis for jurisdiction because the property would not have been within its borders either
to be heard and would limit any judgment in the proceedings to the property involved."
Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 59, at 16.
" In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., the Court would not permit
due process to depend on classifications of the action as in personam or in rem. 338 U.S.
306, 312 (1950).
62 Folk & Moyer, supra note 16, at 788.
DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 169 (1974). The stock certificates were physically located outside
of Delaware. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 192 (1977).
" "No attachment or levy upon a security or any share or other interest ...
shall be
valid until the security is actually seized .
See, Folk & Moyer, supra note 16, at
788 n.221.
" Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 59, at 16.
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physically or by statutory fiction. Again, the Court recognized
this potential avenue in its Jurisdictional Statement."
B. Contrasting Views of the International Shoe Elements of
Fairnessin Actions Involving Property
1. The Majority Opinion in Shaffer v. Heitner
Of major significance in the majority opinion was the conclusion that quasi in rem actions could no longer be maintained by
a simple attachment of property within the forum state. The
Court refused to accept the traditional premise that the action
was against the land and not the landowner. 7 Since the property
owner was the real party in interest, jurisdiction over him could
result only if he were sued on matters which related directly to
his contacts, if any, with the forum state. 8 Such a view was
realistic and fair under the International Shoe test.
The majority did recognize that in some situations the litigation might concern the defendant's property in the forum state.
In that case the property would be significant in evidencing a tie
between the defendant's contacts with the state and the nature
of the litigation. However, the presence of the property would be
only one factor supporting jurisdiction, 9 making the action unlike
traditional quasi in rem actions where the presence of the property was the sole factor.
Since the presence of the defendant's property was only one
factor, the majority suggested other factors relating to property
which might have a bearing on the existence of jurisdiction.
Among these considerations were the defendant's reasonable expectancy, the state's interest in the marketability of its property,
the location of property records and witnesses, and the interest
of the state in resolving disputes concerning its citizens.70 By
raising these factors, the Court demonstrated the many variables
that might go into a determination of jurisdiction.
However, the Court did note that the presence of the defenuId.
' "We think the time is ripe to consider whether the standard of fairness and substantial justice set forth in InternationalShoe should be held to govern actions in rem as
well as in personam." 433 U.S. at 206.
"Id. at 207.

, Id. at 208.

Id.
I0
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dant's property in the forum state would be an overwhelming
factor supporting jurisdiction over the defendant where the litigation involved that property.7 Conversely, the property would
have little significance in evidencing ties where that property was
unrelated to the underlying claim.7" The majority test for jurisdiction over the defendant included not only the defendant's contacts with the forum state, but how, if at all, those contacts
related to the litigation.73 Thus, the Court effectively reshaped
the InternationalShoe test by emphasizing a three-cornered evaluation; the defendant, the forum, and the underlying claim must
all interrelate. Once such a potentially lengthy determination is
made, the forum state has full in personam jurisdiction over the
defendant.7"
2.

The Concurring Opinions

In contrast to the majority approach were the concurring
opinions of Justices Stevens and Powell. Justice Stevens hypothesized that fairness did not necessarily result from a showing of
ties between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation." In
exemplary cases where the defendant drives through the forum
state, opens a bank account, or purchases real estate, Justice
Stevens believed it was fair to maintain jurisdiction over the
defendant because the defendant could be charged with
expecting that his activities would subject him to potential liability." If a nonresident accepted the benefits of the forum state he
would be charged with assuming concomitant obligations.
71 Id.

72 Id.

at 213.

73Id. at 208-09.
1' Id. at 203-04.
" Id. at 217 (Steven, J., concurring).
75

Id.

In some respects Justice Stevens' opinion followed a theory of implied consent
expressed in dicta in Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921). There the Court theorized
that if the defendant left property in a state and then absented himself from that state,
the state then had jurisdiction over such property in answering all claims against the
absent defendant. It was said that the defendant gave his consent ex necessitate to such
potential liability against his property.
The majority in Shaffer did make negative reference to Ownbey but it is unclear
whether the Court was referring to this aspect of the decision or the procedural question
on which the case turned. 433 U.S. at 194 n.10. In U.S. Indus. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142, 153
(3d Cir. 1976) the court refused to support the consent ex necessitate concept as the sole
basis for jurisdiction because it was only dicta.
"
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Expectancy was also an important consideration in the majority opinion. But the majority did not limit the jurisdictional
test solely to a finding of expectancy. It went on to suggest other
factors which might have a bearing on the sufficiency of ties
between the defendant, the forum state, and the litigation. 8 For
Stevens, however, a finding of expectancy embodied due process
fairness to the property owner."9 Since expectancy can be attributed to anyone who knowingly leaves property in another state,
there was very little difference between this approach and traditional quasi in rem jurisdiction. In quasi in rem actions, if the
property was located within the state, the nonresident was subject to suit. 0 Under Stevens' hypothesis, if the property was in
the state, the nonresident property owner could be charged with
an expectancy and was therefore subject to its jurisdiction. The
only exception would be where intangible property was located
arbitrarily in the forum state.
The concurrence was also contrary to the majority opinion in
that Stevens did not limit the imputed expectancy of the defendant to obligations arising out of the defendant's contacts with
the forum state.8 ' Since knowingly possessing property in another
state always creates contacts between the defendant and that
state, it is essential under the InternationalShoe test that potential liability be limited to obligations arising out of the ownership
of the property. This factor the majority repeatedly stressed. If
not limited, the charge of expectancy would foster the same
abuses that existed under quasi in rem actions of the second
category; the property owner could be held liable on matters unrelated to his contacts with the forum state.
It is noteworthy that under both the majority and Stevens'
views no property owner could be charged with expecting suit in
another state if he did not know that his property was within that
state. Thus, Stevens was able to concur in the judgment because
the defendants' stock property was present in Delaware only by
" See text accompanying note 70 supra.

"' "I would also not read it [the majority opinion] as invalidating other long accepted
methods of acquiring jurisdiction over persons with adequate notice of both the particular
controversy and also that their local activities might subject them to suit." 433 U.S. at
217, 218-19 (Stevens, J., concurring).
* See text accompanying note 11 supra.
* Stevens made no mention of any requirement other than a tie between the state
and the defendant which created the expectancy. 433 U.S. at 217 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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the arbitrary workings of section 169. The defendants could not
be charged with knowledge of the quirks of Delaware situs fictions
when they purchased stock on the open market.82
However, if the facts in Shaffer had been changed slightly it
is unlikely that Stevens would have concurred. If the defendants
had left the stock certificates in Delaware, under Stevens' approach the defendants could have been charged with expecting
suit because they knowingly left their property in the state. Thus,
the stock could have been applied to satisfy any adverse judgment for breach of their unrelated fiduciary duties. Under the
majority view, the location of the stock certificates would not
have changed the results. There still would have been no tie between the defendants' stock (their only contact with Delaware)
and the controversy. The fact that there was no connection between the defendants' contacts with Delaware and the underlying
claim was a controlling fact for the majority.
Justice Powell's concurrence13 was similar in effect to Justice
Stevens' approach. Powell reserved judgment on the necessity of
meeting the International Shoe test for a nonresident, if that
person owned property which was indisputably and permanently
located in the forum state.14 Powell specifically supported the
majority shift in focus to a determination of fairness over the
property owner.15 But, Powell, like Stevens, did not view a finding
of ties between the defendant, the forum state, and the litigation
as the only method for achieving that fairness.86 Powell asserted
s2 Id. Lack of expectancy also would flaw jurisdiction under the Harris v. Balk doctrine. See note 31 supra.
Id. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring).
Powell wrote:
I would explicitly reserve judgment, however, on whether the ownership of
some forms of property whose situs is indisputably and permanently located
within a State may, without more, provide the contacts necessary to subject
a defendant to jurisdiction within the State to the extent of the value of the
property.
Id.
R5"I agree that the principles of InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington . . . should
be extended to govern assertions of in rem as well as in personam jurisdiction .
433
U.S. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring).
" One commentator has suggested recently that not only are quasi in rem actions
involving real property fair but, in many instances, such actions are fairer than the
International Shoe standard. He reasoned that a nonresident property owner had only a
casual interest in the forum state arising from his property there. Thus, under the traditional rules of actions against property he was only subject to liability up to the value of
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that his test, based on the permanence of the property, was sufficiently fair to the property owner. 87
3.

Which Standard to Use

Because both the majority and concurring views often would
achieve the same results,8 8 it is essential to examine their methods
of determining jurisdiction. The majority directed the jurisdictional determination toward a fluid process involving a potentially large number of considerations. The concurrences were
more mechanical, resulting in a simpler approach to the jurisdictional question. Simplicity is particularly beneficial because the
determination of jurisdiction is, after all, a threshold issue. 9 It is
also true that the reservations expressed in the concurrences concerned fact situations which were not before the Court in
Shaffer.10
However, both concurrences, in their simplicity, failed to
consider restrictions on the jurisdictional test which the majority
found central. The jurisdictional test, under the majority view,
centered on a weighing of significant factors, as they related to
ties among the defendant, the forum state, and the litigation. A
finding of such ties necessarily resulted in a limitation on jurisdiction to obligations arising out of the defendant's contacts with the
forum state.9 ' The concurrences failed to make any such limitations. Since the Court held that the InternationalShoe test is the
only test for state court jurisdiction, and since the majority
his property contact. Because he did have some contact with the state, it was fair to hold
him accountable. But it was not fair to make him liable personally. See, Smit, The
Enduring Utility of In Rem Rules: A Lasting Legacy of Pennoyer v. Neff, 43 BROOKLYN L.
Rav. 600, 627-28 (1977).
0 "In the case of real property, in particular, preservation of the common law concept
of quasi in rem jurisdiction arguably would avoid the uncertainty of the general
InternationalShoe standard without a significant cost to 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.'" 433 U.S. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring).
However, Powell, like Stevens, made no mention of restrictions on liability to obligations arising out of the owner's contacts with the state. See text accompanying note 81
supra.
1 433 U.S. at 207. The majority wrote that "it would be unusual for the state where
the property is located not to have jurisdiction."
Adjudication of the merits cannot proceed if the state has no jurisdiction over the
parties. E.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 314 (1945).
" Powell specifically reserved judgment on types of property other than that involved
in Shaffer. 433 U.S. at 127 (Powell, J., concurring). Stevens was unsure as to the potentially broad reach of the holding. 433 U.S. at 217 (Stevens, J., concurring).
" See text accompanying notes 71-74 supra.
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stressed that the defendant's contacts must relate to the litigation, not considering these limitations would result in an incomplete jurisdictional test. 2 Furthermore, the Court held previously
that it will not consider simplifying the jurisdictional test for the
sake of judicial convenience . 3 Consequently, a finding of ties between the defendant, the forum state, and the nature of the litigation is the definitive test for all assertions of state court jurisdiction.
C. Application of the International Shoe Test to the Facts in
Shaffer
Under InternationalShoe, the majority established that the
defendants' sequestered stock property did not evidence sufficient contacts between the defendants and Delaware in regard to
the fiduciary breach (the underlying claim). The stock was unrelated. However, Justice Brennan, concurring in part and dissenting in part,9" strongly disagreed with the majority's failure to find,
on reexamination, other ties between the defendants and Delaware concerning these fiduciary duties owed to Greyhound. Brennan viewed as a sufficient contact the directors' association with
a corporation which existed solely by the grace of Delaware law. 5
In contrast, the majority found determinative the failure of
Delaware to assert, through statutory enactment, its power to
regulate corporate fiduciary responsibilities. 6 This argument infers that since Delaware did not take the initiative to assert legislatively the full degree of state jurisdiction compatible with the
Constitution," it is unconstitutional for it to assume otherwise
433 U.S. at 207, 212.
Ild. at 207 n.23. See also, Jonnet v. Dollar Savings Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1130 (3d
Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring). Judge Gibbons wrote, "[a]lthough it can be argued
that the content of constitutional process due a litigant defending title to property will
vary from that due a litigant defending himself from liability in personam, there is no
reason to believe the Supreme Court presently recognizes such a distinction." 530 F.2d at
1133. But see, O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994, 997 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
Then the Court, in a decision following Shaffer, held that the kind of jurisdiction sought
(in rem, quasi in rem, or in personam) was a significant factor in the determination of
jurisdiction. This decision wrongly implied that the test of fairness varies in intensity
whether the action is brought against property or person. The action always must be fair
to the property owner, as delineated in International Shoe.
" 433 U.S. at 219. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I/d.

" 433 U.S. at 214.
" States need not assert jurisdiction to the full extent permissible under the Constitu-

tion. 433 U.S. at 219, 226-27 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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constitutional jurisdiction beyond the scope of its jurisdictional

statutes.
IV.
A.

EFFECTS OF THE COURT'S HOLDING

Actions Against Property

Even though InternationalShoe is now the basis for all assertions of state court jurisdiction, actions may still be brought
under the traditional quasi in rem terminology. However, an action against property must be examined anew under the
InternationalShoe test. 8 Thus, one may bring an action quasi in
rem against property, provided there is jurisdiction over the property owner. 9
Despite this possibility, a serious question arises as to the
utility, in most instances, of bringing the action against the property. If the state must base jurisdiction on the InternationalShoe
test, it ordinarily would have in personam jurisdiction over the
defendant.100 There would be no restrictions on the extent of the
remedy. If one brought an action quasi in rem against the property, the state would still have to have full in personam jurisdiction over the owner. But, because the action was quasi in rem,
this could result in a judgment limited to the attached property
because the plaintiff elected a limited remedy.
One noteworthy exception to this analysis would be a divorce
proceeding where the court is adjudicating status. In a recent
state court decision following Shaffer, the court held that a divorce action, where the wife was not subject to in personam jurisdiction, was still maintainable in rem.'0 1 Whether the state had
jurisdiction depended solely on InternationalShoe. But, the state
met the test because it had a vested interest in protecting its
citizens (the husband) and adjudicating the marriage status created therein. 0 2 If the action had been brought in personam
, O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994, 997 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
" 443 U.S. at 208. In dicta the Court said: "It appears, therefore, that jurisdiction
over many types of actions which now are or might be brought in rem would not be affected
by a holding that any assertion of state court jurisdiction must satisfy the International
Shoe standard." (emphasis added). See, O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 437 F. Supp.
994, 997 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); In re Rinderknecht, 367 N.W.2d 1128 (Ind. App. 1977).
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 203, 213 (1977).
101 In re Rinderknecht, 367 N.W.2d 1128, 1134 (Ind. App. 1977).
10 Under the InternationalShoe test there are situations where the vested interest of
the state in protecting its citizens is the dominant factor. This is an example of adjudica-
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lacked jurisdiction because
against the wife the state would have
13
she had no contacts with the state.

0

B. Intangible Property as a Factorin the JurisdictionalTest
The problems with attaching situs to intangible property
have not been solved completely by the ruling in Shaffer. The
attachment of situs to intangible property will continue to be
important simply because the defendant's property within the
forum may be a significant factor in the jurisdictional test. One
example is the role the intangible stock property played in
Shaffer. The defendants' stock was still located in Delaware due
to section 169,104 and since the stock was unrelated to the underlying claim, it was not a significant factor in the jurisdictional
determination. 15 But, there are conceivable situations where section 169 could be a crucial factor in the determination of jurisdiction. One example might be where a dispute arose over control
of stock in a Delaware corporation. If Delaware could exert a
strong interest in regulating its corporate securities, 0 jurisdiction
might lie in that state because all the defendants had contacts
with Delaware concerning the nature of the controversy.
C. Colorado's Long Arm Statute
One very real consequence of Shaffer is its effect on state
attachment and long arm statutes. In Shaffer, section 366 was
unconstitutional because it provided for jurisdiction over proption of status. In such situations the state must provide a forum because one would not
exist otherwise. 433 U.S. at 208 n.30. But see, Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary,
37 TEX. L. REv. 657, 661 (1959).
303 In re Rincderknecht, 367 N.W.2d, 1128, 1135 (Ind.App. 1977).
304 Nowhere does the majority specifically state that section 169 is unconstitutional.
Under similar facts in U.S. Indus. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 143, 155 (3d Cir. 1976) the court did
not find section 169 unconstitutional. In fact, it used section 169 as a potential factor in

the InternationalShoe test.
" The Court in Shaffer wrote:
The Delaware courts based their assertion of jurisdiction in this case solely
on the statutory presence [§ 169] of appellants' property in Delaware. Yet
that property is not the subject matter of this litigation, nor is the underlying
cause of action related to the property. Appellants' holdings in Greyhound
do not, therefore, provide contacts with Delaware sufficient to support the
jurisdiction of that State's courts over appellants. If it exists the jurisdiction
must have some other foundation.
433 U.S. at 213.
'
At 219 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
At the beginning of the opinion the majority wrote that-the controversy "concerns
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erty in disregard of any test of fairness to the property owner. 07
Since the lack of fairness in section 366 was a constitutional issue,
the holding necessarily affects similar statutes in the remaining
forty-nine states.0 8
Colorado's long arm statute provides that the ownership of
real property in the state subjects the owner, without further
consideration, to the in personam jurisdiction of the state. 09
Under Shaffer this provision lacks constitutional muster because,
like section 366, it makes no provision for a weighing of other
factors. As the majority in Shaffer noted, there may be significant
factors beyond the mere physical presence of the defendants'
property which have a direct bearing on the existence of jurisdiction." 0 Even though the Colorado provision often may achieve the
same results, its conceptual framework is contrary to the spirit of
Shaffer. I' It is traditionally quasi in rem because the presence of
property and not the defendant's contacts determine jurisdiction.
D.

Jurisdiction to Attach as Security: An Exception

One recent decision following Shaffer has made a significant
exception to the applicability of the InternationalShoe test in the
attachment of property. Applying dicta in Shaffer, a federal district court in CarolinaPower & Light Co. v. Uranet"I permitted
the attachment of property in California even though that state
did not have jurisdiction over the property owners. However, the
property was attached only as security for suit in another state.
The property was not used as the basis for jurisdiction to adjudithe constitutionality of a Delaware statute [section 3661 that allows a court of that State
to take property of the defendant that happens to be located in Delaware." 433 U.S. at
189. The Court did not specifically state that section 366 was unconstitutional but this
language combined with the broad ruling in Shaffer makes this conclusion unavoidable.
If it were not unconstitutional, Delaware could continue to sequester property within its
borders without regard for the InternationalShoe test.
'' 433 U.S. at 219 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
' COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-1-124(c) (1973). "Engaging in any act enumerated in this
statute, whether or not a resident of the state of Colorado . . .submits such person...
to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state concerning any cause of action arising from
(c) The ownership, use or possession of any real estate situated in the state .... "
It is noteworthy that the statute restricts actions to obligations arising out of the
property owner's contact. In this sense the statute is in keeping with the majority in
Shaffer. See text accompanying notes 71-74 supra.
"' See text accompanying note 70 supra.
I
See text accompanying notes 71-74 supra.
- F. Supp. -, (N.D. Cal. 1977) (46 U.S.L.W. 2194).
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cate the merits of a controversy in California and therefore the
InternationalShoe test did not apply.
The majority in Shaffer wrote: "A state in which the property
is located should have jurisdiction to attach the property, by use
of proper procedures, as security for a judgment being sought in
a forum where the litigation can be maintained consistently with
InternationalShoe. 113 The effect of this proviso was to recognize
a distinction between jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits and
jurisdiction to attach property as security for a judgment in another state on the merits. The requirements of this jurisdiction to
attach property as security were, according to the decision in
Carolina Light, (1) The presence of the property in the security
state should not be fortuitous, (2) the attachment comport with
due process procedure, and (3) the Full Faith and Credit Clause
could not otherwise achieve the same results."'
The potential value of this attachment device is significant
because it assures at least some satisfaction of judgment, like
traditional quasi in rem actions, while still requiring a fair forum
to adjudicate the merits. The only negative aspect in the use of
such an attachment procedure would be the bifurcation of the
suit.
PROSPECTIVE

With the demise of Pennoyer v. Neff, all assertions of state
court jurisdiction are now based on fairness to the defendant.
However, within the concepts of due process fairness remain
many of the vestiges of the old power of the state theory. For
example, domicile, residence, and presence, which automatically
create jurisdiction over the defendant and which are based on the
power of the state, are incorporated into the InternationalShoe
test. Several commentators have suggested that these automatic
determinations are harmful to the spirit of the fairness because
fairness should not be so mechanical."' It follows from Shaffer
ItS 433 U.S. at 210.
--1 F. Supp. -,
(N.D. Cal. 1977) (46 U.S.L.W. 2194). In Carolina Light the
suit was in arbitration and the Full Faith and Credit Clause would not apply to any award.
See generally, Folk & Moyer, supra note 16.
' Presence of the defendant has always been sufficient in itself to create jurisdiction.
Although presence does promote "an orderly administration of the laws", International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945), there are situations where presence
alone is not fair to the defendant. The situation in Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442

1978

SCHAFFER v. HEITNER

385

that if jurisdiction is no longer fair when it is based on a sole
determination of the presence of property, then perhaps it is unfair to base jurisdiction automatically on the presence of the defendant. Of course, under the Shaffer rationale, residence, domicile, and presence should be significant factors in evidencing
ties between the defendant, the state, and the litigation; but,
they should not be the sole, determinative factors." 6 If fairness
involves any sort of weighing process, other factors besides
presence, domicile, or residence should be considered, when
applicable, in the jurisdictional test.
Even without these suggested changes, the substantive
changes arising out of Shaffer v. Heitner will do much to disrupt
any assurances where jurisdiction rests. The practicing attorney
can no longer bank on mechanical determinations of jurisdiction.
These changes also will tend to prolong and confuse litigation,
particularly as jurisdiction is a threshold issue. However, the shift
in orientation to the defendant property owner and his contacts
with the forum state is the only fair approach in an assertion of
state court jurisdiction.
John S. Upton
(E.D. Ark. 1959) illustrates this possibility. There the defendant was present in Arkansas,
for jurisdictional purposes, when he was served notice on a nonstop plane flying over the
state. His simple physical presence was so fortuitous that it should not have been enough
to subject him to jurisdiction in the state.
The mechanical use of residence or domiciliary is also objectionable as the sole basis
for jurisdiction. This is particularly true with corporations. Since a corporation is a resident of that state where it is incorporated, MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT § 11, it is
subject to all suits brought against it in that state regardless of such factors as where the
cause of action arose, the nature of the suit, or the corporation's business in the incorporating state. In Shaffer v. Heitner it may have been unfair to automatically subject
Greyhound to suit in Delaware without at least considering some of these other factors.
Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction,73 HAav. L. REv. 909, 933 (1960).

